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ABSTRACT
Public finance studies the role of the government in the economy. Govern-
mental actions influence economic activity across space. Moreover, urban
economics examines cities and other geographic units to understand the spa-
tial distribution of the economy. In this dissertation, I use applied economet-
rics to understand variations in the spatial distribution of economic activity
that are related to government taxation and other factors.
In Chapter 1, I use unique data on locations and prices of gasoline retailers
in the United States to estimate the effect of discontinuities on gasoline taxes
on business location decisions and tax incidence. The econometric analysis
shows that the expected number of gasoline stations on the low-tax side
of a state border is higher than on the high-tax side. Gasoline consumers
carry 75 percent of the gasoline tax on the high-tax side, as compared to
100 percent on the low-tax side. Both effects on location and tax incidence
dissipate with 15 miles of distance. These results provide estimates of the
effect of tax discontinuities at borders on the location choices of retailers and
consequences for the pass-through of taxes to prices.
Chapter 2 identifies different pricing strategies of gasoline retailers, mea-
sures their consequences for price-level variability, and explores their de-
terminates. Using the same unique data on locations and prices of gasoline
retailers in the United States, Chapter 2 shows a high degree of heterogeneity
in pricing strategies within retail gasoline markets. The econometric analysis
shows robust gasoline price differences that depend on the pricing strategy
of the gasoline retailer. Finally, the analysis rules out conventional forms of
collusion; it shows the need for a new theory to explain the coexistence of
different pricing strategies, and proposes that the choice of pricing strategy
relates to the type of consumers that gasoline retailers target.
Chapter 3 switches the focus to the distortionary effects of taxes on the
rental housing market. The analysis exploits a feature of the tax code in the
ii
Tehran rental housing market where the tax-exemption threshold is based
on the property’s size in square meters. Using administrative data on rental
housing transactions, Chapter 3 shows substantial bunching of properties
with size just below the tax cutoff, suggesting strong behavioral responses
to the tax kink. The analysis develops a structural framework with property
taxes and filing costs to estimate the responses of supply and demand for
rental housing size. Chapter 3 shows a mid-run (10-year) price response of
rental housing size supply of 1.36, and a price response of rental housing size
demand of -0.17.
iii
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and my sister for their love,
unconditional support, and constant encouragement.
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CHAPTER 1
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO SPATIAL
TAX NOTCHES IN THE RETAIL
GASOLINE MARKET
I employ a unique dataset on fueling station locations in the United States
and their corresponding retail gasoline prices to estimate how state tax dis-
continuities affect business location decisions and tax incidence. The analysis
shows that the expected number of fueling stations on the low-tax side of a
state border is between 20 and 30 percent higher than on the high-tax side.
Gasoline consumers bear 75 percent of the fuel tax on the high-tax side,
as compared to 100 percent on the low-tax side. The effect of the border
on station location and tax incidence disappears with 15 miles of distance.
These results provide some of the first estimates of the effect of tax disconti-
nuities at borders on the location choices of retailers, their competitors, and
consequences for the pass-through of taxes to prices.
1.1 Introduction
The effects of taxes on business location decisions and local competition are
core issues in public finance. Taxation could discourage business entry or
encourage firm reallocation if after-tax profits are more favorable in other
jurisdictions. On the contrary, higher taxes might not have a negative effect
on business location if, for example, tax revenues are spent on public goods
that improve business activity.1 A notable feature in the literature is the
lack of consensus as to whether taxes deter business entrance. The retail
gasoline industry faces significant fuel tax differences across state borders
that make it possible to revisit this classical debate. For example, in 2017,
1Several studies find weak or no evidence of the effect of taxes on business location
choices. These include, among others: Carlton (1983); Bartik (1985); Coughlin et al.
(1991); Bartik (1994); Hines Jr (1996); Holmes (1998); Rathelot and Sillard (2008);
Chirinko and Wilson (2008); Duranton et al. (2011); Rohlin et al. (2014); Giroud and
Rauh (2015); and Sua´rez-Serrato and Zidar (2016).
1
the excise gasoline tax in California was 36 cents greater than in neighboring
Arizona, and 31 cents greater in Pennsylvania than in Ohio. These differences
represent 12 percent to 14 percent of the average price consumers paid for a
gallon of gasoline that year. These sizeable state tax differences, or “spatial
tax notches,” might alter the location decisions of gasoline retailers. They
may also affect local competition, particularly if businesses on the higher-tax
side of the border face fewer rivals to split the local market.2 Studying the
retail gasoline market can inform the debate in two respects, offering insight
into how taxes sway the location choices of firms, and whether taxes influence
local competition in a market in which prices are salient to consumers.
This paper provides some of the first direct evidence of the effect of taxes
on the entry and location choices of firms and their competitors, and the ef-
fect of these location choices on prices. It addresses two important questions.
First, how do spatial tax notches affect the entry and location decisions of
retailers? Second, what are the effects of these notches on the distribution
of the tax burdens between buyers and sellers? The answer to the first ques-
tion sheds light on how taxes affect firm entry into markets where consumers
have heterogeneous sensitivities to prices. The answer to the second question
informs us about how competitive is the retail market. In particular, are re-
tailers willing to locate on the high-tax side of the border when they face such
a clear disadvantage relative to retailers on the low-tax side? How do prices
and, potentially, market shares compensate firms for these disadvantages?
To addresses these questions, I use a unique and comprehensive dataset on
retail gasoline prices and fueling station locations collected by web-scraping
a network of prominent websites between March 2017 and April 2018. My
estimating framework also accounts for important local regulations and poli-
cies beyond taxation that change at state boundaries. I arrive at two main
results that were previously overlooked by the literature. First, the expected
number of fueling stations rises by 20 to 30 percent when crossing from the
high- to the low-tax side of a state border. That is, controlling for local
characteristics, the number of firms is significantly lower on the high-tax
2Notice that these spatial tax notches could deter business entrance if consumers are
highly sensitive to gasoline prices and cross jurisdictions to avoid taxation. On the con-
trary, gasoline retailers could pass-through the fuel taxes to consumer prices to keep the
same profit. Recent studies, such as Hughes et al. (2008) and Coglianese et al. (2017),
show that gasoline consumers have a small price elasticity in the United States, and meta-
analyses, such as Brons et al. (2008), show that this is the case for several countries.
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side. Second, gasoline consumers bear 75 percent of the fuel tax on the high-
tax side within 15 miles of a state border, as compared to 100 percent on
the low-tax side within the same distance. The incomplete pass-through of
gasoline taxes to consumers suggests that competition on the high-tax side
is indeed weaker than on the low-tax side, where the number of retailers is
larger. These results suggest that retailers on the high-tax side may receive
more of their business from relatively inelastic or less mobile shoppers.
Previous literature using the McFadden (1973) conditional logit analysis
or the spatial differencing approach pioneered by Holmes (1998) finds weak
or no evidence of the effect of taxes on business location decisions. Early
literature such as Bartik (1985) and Coughlin et al. (1991) uses the condi-
tional logit approach at fairly large spatial units (e.g., states). More recent
research such as Duranton et al. (2011) and Rohlin et al. (2014) focuses on
detailed microgeographic data to improve the modeling of the business loca-
tion choice. However, as is well recognized, the estimation of the conditional
logit model is difficult computationally when the number of spatial alterna-
tives is large, as when considering counties, ZIP Codes, or census blocks. To
overcome the computational burdens, numerous scholars who focus on de-
tailed geographic data generally use either the spatial differencing approach
or the equivalence between the likelihood function of the conditional logit
and the Poisson regression as developed in Guimara˜es et al. (2003). Regard-
less of the estimation method, a notable feature of those studies is their lack
of consensus as to whether taxes deter business entrance.
This paper contributes to the literature by showing the responsiveness of
firms to spatial tax notches using both the spatial differencing and the con-
ditional logit approaches. Using a choice model on a fine rectilinear grid over
the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, I show a significant
increase in the expected number of gasoline retailers on the low-tax side of a
state border. The grid consists of 3-by-3-mile squares (9 square miles, about
25 square kilometers) overlaid across the entire continental United States.
This grid is on its own a methodological contribution, because it improves
the representation of the geographic choice set of the gasoline retailers. It
allows for the use of critical site-specific controls such as the number of roads,
the distance to the road, and the distance to the border. Additionally, the
grid facilitates the testing of the critical identification assumption of smooth
variation of location-specific characteristics across space.
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Spatial tax notches can alter the incidence of taxation on consumers and
retailers due to the price sensitivity of consumers and the market compet-
itiveness of retailers.3 The previous literature shows that some consumers
avoid local taxes and regulations by crossing jurisdictions to purchase prod-
ucts such as cigarettes (Merriman, 2010; Chiou and Muehlegger, 2014) and
alcoholic beverages (Stehr, 2007; Asplund et al., 2007). Previous research
also shows that the average pass-through of taxes to consumers near spatial
tax notches is smaller than the state average for cigarettes (Harding et al.,
2012) and gasoline (Doyle and Samphantharak, 2008; Stolper, 2017; Coyne,
2017). However, the previous literature studying these markets close to bor-
ders has overlooked the change in competition due to the strategic location
choices of retailers that affects tax incidence only on the side with fewer
competitors.
This research contributes to the public finance and environmental regu-
lation literature by showing that the smaller pass-through of retail gasoline
taxes to consumer prices happens only on the side of the border with higher
taxes. This side also has fewer retailers. To the best of my knowledge, this
result provides some of the first evidence on the change of the competitive
nature of the retail market due to the behavioral responses of firms. To reach
this conclusion, I use a two-way fixed-effect model to recover the retailer’s
idiosyncratic prices. Using the retailers’ idiosyncratic prices, I identify the
tax pass-through using ordinary least-squares regression. After controlling
for additional regulations and local policies – other than taxes – that also
change at state borders, I show a complete pass-through of taxes to consumer
prices away from the border; by contrast the pass-through for retailers in a
high-tax state located within 15 miles of a border is 75 percent.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the theo-
retical and empirical literature for tax incidence under perfect and imperfect
competition. Section 1.3 describes the data and background on the U.S.
gasoline retail market. Section 1.4 illustrates the empirical strategy and the
main findings. Finally, Section 1.5 presents conclusions.
3Weyl and Fabinger (2013) shows a smaller pass-through of taxes to prices under im-
perfect competition. Fullerton and Muehlegger (2018) explains how this phenomenon
translates to environmental regulation.
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1.2 Tax Incidence and Competition in the Literature
Understanding the economic tax incidence –the burdens from the tax policy–
is important because policymakers may be more interested in distribution
effects than efficiency effects. Moreover, understanding the pass-through
from a theoretical perspective is crucial because it relates to fundamental
economic parameters such as the elasticity of demand, the elasticity of supply,
and the shape of the demand curve. Using these relationships, economic
theory makes a testable prediction: in markets where consumers can search,
firms with some market power bear a larger share of the tax burden as
compared to firms with no market power. In this section, I briefly review the
theoretical results and the related empirical findings on gasoline tax incidence
and competition.
1.2.1 Perfect Competition Benchmark
The fundamental principle of tax incidence under perfect competition as-
sociates the theoretical local pass-through of taxes with the ratio between
the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply. In this context, the
pass-through of taxes to prices is close to one-for-one (100 percent) for goods
with significantly inelastic demand or highly elastic supply. Several empirical
papers show that the demand for retail gasoline is relatively inelastic, and
other related literature shows that the motor fuel tax incidence is on average
close to 100 percent. Together, these findings are aligned with a competitive
retail gasoline market under normal conditions.
Following the notation in Weyl and Fabinger (2013), denote by p the price
paid by consumers and by τ an excise tax. Define ρ = dp/dτ as the local
pass-through of taxes to consumer prices when taxes increase, and let Q
denote the equilibrium quantity. In equilibrium, demand equates supply, or
D (p) = S (p− τ). By the implicit function theorem, assuming that the tax
begins at zero, defining the elasticity of demand as ǫD = −
(
D
′
p/Q
)
and the
elasticity of supply as ǫS =
(
S
′
p/Q
)
, with D
′
and S
′
denoting the derivatives
with respect to price, it follows that
ρ =
dp
dτ
=
S ′
S ′ −D′
=
ǫS
ǫS + ǫD
=
1
1 + (ǫD/ǫS)
.
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Hence, the ratio between the elasticity of demand and supply determines the
local pass-through rate. Notice that the rate is bounded between zero and
one. Also, for very inelastic demand, ǫD → 0, the pass-through rate goes to
one. Moreover, for a very elastic supply, ǫS →∞, the pass-through rate also
goes to one.
In practice, empirical research shows that the average demand for gasoline
is not very price sensitive (Brons et al., 2008; Hughes et al., 2008; Dahl, 2012;
Coglianese et al., 2017). Moreover, several papers show that, under standard
conditions, the average incidence of fuel taxes is close to one-for-one in the
United States.4 Furthermore, the average retail gasoline supply seems to be
very elastic due to the possibility of storage. These empirical findings are
in concordance with the idea of a competitive retail gasoline market under
normal conditions.
1.2.2 Imperfect Competition
In general, under imperfect competition, the pass-through of taxes to con-
sumer prices may be larger or smaller than one-for-one, depending on the
shape of the demand curve and the responsiveness of other competitors to
changes in input costs.5 In particular, under monopoly power, the pass-
through of taxes to consumer prices exhibits a relationship that depends on
the curvature of the demand function. When consumers can avoid taxes
by crossing jurisdictional borders, the applied literature finds smaller pass-
through of taxes to consumer prices. These findings are evidence of the
distortionary effects of spatial tax notches on the local incidence.
To understand the incidence of taxation under monopoly power, consider a
firm that faces linear costs in quantity produced, q, with smooth inverse de-
mand given by p(q) and excise tax τ .6 From solving the profit-maximization
4Chouinard and Perloff (2004), Chouinard and Perloff (2007), Doyle and Samphan-
tharak (2008), Alm et al. (2009), Marion and Muehlegger (2011), Kopczuk et al. (2016)
5Weyl and Fabinger (2013) and Adachi and Fabinger (2017) develop a broad theoretical
framework of tax incidence under oligopoly competition.
6This result, a simplified version of the monopolistic case in Weyl and Fabinger (2013),
offers intuition on the effect of consumer demand on local pass-through of taxes to con-
sumer prices. Refer to their paper for the full derivation and proofs.
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problem, the local pass-through of taxes to consumer prices is
ρ =
dp
dτ
=
dp
dq
dq
dτ
=
p′
p′′q + 2p′
,
where p′ and p′′ denote the first and second derivatives of price with respect
to quantity, respectively. Notice that the pass-through rate depends on the
shape of the inverse demand. For example, if the inverse demand is lin-
ear, then p
′′
= 0, and the tax incidence is one-half. More generally, under
monopoly and constant marginal cost, the pass-through rate is smaller than
100 percent if and only if the demand function is log-concave.7
The empirical literature shows behavioral responses among some consumers
who cross inter-jurisdictional borders to avoid state and local taxes and regu-
lations for cigarettes (Merriman, 2010; Chiou and Muehlegger, 2014; Harding
et al., 2012) and alcoholic beverages (Stehr, 2007; Asplund et al., 2007). How-
ever, Agrawal (2015) shows that local sales tax rates in the United States
increase on the low-tax side of a border, reducing the differential between
cross-border state sales tax rates by over three-quarters. Given this reduction
on the differential between sales tax rates across state borders, the behavioral
responses in the empirical literature imply that consumers are mainly avoid-
ing the state tax policy instead of the local tax policy. Fullerton and Mueh-
legger (2018) summarizes this and other considerations that can alter the
incidence of environmental regulation. Finally, Doyle and Samphantharak
(2008), Stolper (2017) and Coyne (2017) show that the average pass-through
of taxes to consumer prices for retail gasoline is on average smaller than
100 percent in the proximity to state borders. Together, these empirical re-
sults show that consumer search and distortions to competition reduce the
proportion of taxes paid by consumers.
7A function q is log-concave if and only if the second derivative of log q is negative,
or (log q)′′ < 0. Define µ = − q
q′
, where q′ is the derivative of q. Then, (log q)′′ = µ
′
µ2
,
where µ′ is the derivative of µ. Also, notice that µ = p
ǫD
, and the demand function is
log-concave when d log ǫD
d log p > 1. Intuitively, under monopoly and constant marginal cost,
the pass-through rate is smaller than one-for-one if the elasticity of demand increases more
than proportional to an increase in prices.
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1.3 Data and Context on the U.S. Fuel Retail Market
The new data for this paper contain the near-universe of fueling station lo-
cations in the United States, and their corresponding daily gasoline prices
collected from web-scraping a prominent network of web pages from March
2017 to April 2018. These detailed data are complemented with population
information from the American Community Survey (ACS) and data on the
system of primary and secondary roads from the U.S. Census Bureau. Ad-
ditionally, the dataset contains other characteristics such as state gasoline
excise taxes, local minimum wage, and the context of gasoline regulation.
This section describes the location data, the gasoline prices, and additional
variables used to analyze the location choices and the tax incidence.
1.3.1 Fueling Stations Locations and Retail Gasoline Prices
Retail gasoline prices and fueling station locations were obtained by web-
scraping roughly 140,000 gasoline retailers from the network GasBuddy. This
network of web pages collects information to create price reports of the Oil
Price Information Service (OPIS), the most comprehensive price survey in
the retail gasoline industry, and a widely used source of information for re-
search purposes. The network operates under different advertiser-sponsored
domain names.8 Members of each website input data to earn points by re-
porting and updating information on prices, locations, and features of the
gasoline retailers. They also receive points for notifying the network about
the presence of new stations. With the collected points, the users can choose
to participate in daily raﬄes of monetary prizes. The users can find and an-
nounce fuel prices using the web platform or a mobile app for smartphones.
Table 1.1 shows the number of gasoline retailers ordered by Petroleum
Administration for Defense District (PADD). The column for the year 2016
shows the total number of gasoline stations and convenience stores from the
most recent available report by the U.S. Census Bureau of the County Busi-
ness Patterns. The column for the year 2018 summarizes the total number of
fueling stations and convenience stores obtained from the network GasBuddy.
Both columns exclude Alaska and Hawaii, because the analysis exploits spa-
8The names of the local domains are, for example, www.chicagogasprices.com,
www.newyorkgasprices.com, and www.losangelesgasprices.com.
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tial tax notches at state borders, and these two states do not share boundaries
with any other U.S. state. Table 1.1 shows that the data collected from Gas-
Buddy seem to aggregate closely to the universe of gasoline retailers in the
United States.
Another important aspect of these data is the daily price information. Ta-
ble 1.2 presents summary statistics on the daily prices (in U.S. dollars) of
regular gasoline by state, including the District of Columbia. Column (a) of
the table presents the minimum price per gallon reported during the period
of analysis, column (b) shows the median price, and column (c) reports the
maximum price. Column (d) of the same table shows the standard deviation
of the price distribution by state. It is worth noting the considerable vari-
ability of the retail gasoline prices both between and within states. The vari-
ability in regular gasoline prices across states arises from spatial tax notches,
differences in labor costs, differences in blends of gasoline required at the
local level, and from differences in other regulations explained in the follow-
ing subsection. The variability in prices within states arises from differences
in costs at the establishment level, differences in margins, or idiosyncratic
differences.
As mentioned above, part of the variability in the gasoline prices across
states arises as a result of spatial tax notches across jurisdictional bound-
aries. These spatial tax notches can occur at the state, county, or city levels,
because local authorities can define local gasoline taxes. The ideal dataset
would include all these local differences in taxes and fees; however, the infor-
mation of these local differences is not centralized or readily available. Nev-
ertheless, the American Petroleum Institute (API) computes a state average
of the local excise gasoline taxes and fees that is published in its quarterly
State Gasoline Tax Report. The API, that has information on the local taxes
and fees, calculates the average rate weighting by the population of the areas
subject to each particular tax.9 Figure 1.1 shows the spatial variation of the
API’s gasoline taxes in November 2017.
Another source of variation in gasoline prices is the differences in minimum
wages across states. To account for that variation, I review the regulation
9The API’s gasoline tax report also accounts for additional state and local fees, such as,
for example, inspection fees, delivery fees, environmental assurance fees, and underground
storage tank fees. Moreover, the API computes the equivalent excise gasoline tax for the
eight states with some portion of an ad valorem gasoline tax: Alaska, California, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Virginia.
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and collect data on the minimum wage at state, county and city levels during
the period of analysis. Appendix A develops the details, shows the spatial
variation of minimum wages, and shows the variability of daily retail gasoline
prices by state.
Finally, the number of regular gasoline price reports within the sample is
in column (e) of Table 1.2. The total number of daily price observations in
the period of analysis is around 25 million. Although the dataset has a large
sample size of prices and covers almost the entire population of gasoline re-
tailers, a limitation of the dataset is the number of reports per station. Some
of the fueling stations have price reports on every day during the observation
period, whereas other gasoline retailers only have a few price reports. The
empirical strategy in Section 1.4 explains the detail of how I address the
unbalanced panel aspect of the price data.
To visualize the geographic location of the gasoline retailers, panel (a)
of Figure 1.2 uses U.S. Census Bureau data to create a map of the United
States indicating the location of the most populated areas, and the routes
of the primary and secondary roads.10 Panel (b) of the same Figure 1.2
exhibits the map of the location of the gasoline retailers. Every point on
the map represents a fueling station. It is evident that the location choice
of the retailers closely aligns with the distribution of the population and the
U.S. road network. Appendix B has additional statistics on the number of
retailers per state, and the services and characteristics of those retailers.
1.3.2 Background on the U.S. Gasoline Retail Market
The gasoline supply chain starts with distillation at the refinery and trans-
portation of the product to the wholesale supplier (a.k.a. terminal). From
the supplier, the gasoline goes to the retailer through distributors. Although
about half of the gasoline retailers sell branded gasoline from specific refiners,
the major oil companies are not in the retail business of selling gasoline. Ac-
cording to figures from the National Association of Convenience Stores, less
than 1 percent of the fueling stations were owned by one of the five major
oil companies as of July 2017. Overall, about 60 percent of the convenience
10The Census Bureau classifies as primary roads the highways within the Interstate
Highway System, including Toll Highways. Secondary ways include main arteries in the
State and County Highway System.
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stores selling fuel are single-store operators, and 85 percent of the retailers’
gasoline sales consist of regular fuel. Gasoline stations in the United States
earn just 21 percent of their total revenues from non-fuel sales, and most of
these non-fuel revenues come from food, cigarettes, and alcohol.
The retail gasoline industry in the United States faces different regional
wholesale prices that are related to the movements of crude oil and the local
regulation of gasoline standards to control air pollution. The U.S. Energy
Information Administration aggregates the main crude oil markets in the
United States by the PADD. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
regulates the gasoline standards to control air pollution through five gaso-
line standard programs: Gasoline Sulfur, Mobile Source Air Toxics (MSAT),
both regulated at the federal level; and Reformulated Gasoline (RFG), Reid
Vapor Pressure (RVP), and Winter Oxygenates (WO), which are regulated
at state and local levels with federal oversight by the EPA. The objective
of these regulations is to reduce ground-level ozone (commonly known as
smog), particulate matter, and the emissions of carbon monoxide and other
hazardous air pollutants. Appendix A presents a detailed description of the
programs and the geographic determination of the PADD.
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
As emphasized earlier, the primary goal in the empirical work is to estimate
the effect of spatial tax notches on the location decisions of the gasoline
retailers, and the effect of these tax notches on the distribution of the tax
burdens between buyers and sellers. The first part of this section develops a
location choice model over a rectilinear grid to estimate the effects of these
tax notches on the probability of finding a fueling station across jurisdic-
tional borders. The estimation uses spatial differencing and conditional logit
approaches. The second part of the analysis develops a two-way fixed-effects
model to recover the retailers’ idiosyncratic prices that then serve for the
analysis of pass-through of taxes to consumer prices near state borders.
To preview the results, the location choice model shows an increase of
around 0.7 percent on the probability of finding a gasoline retailer on the
low-tax side of a state border. That represents an increment of nearly a
22 percent in the expected number of establishments on the low-tax side
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of a border. In other words, after controlling for local characteristics, the
number of retailers falls significantly on the high-tax side. Moreover, using
the retailers’ idiosyncratic prices, the analysis shows that gasoline consumers
bear 75 percent of the fuel tax on the high-tax side within 15 miles of a state
border, as compared to 100 percent on the low-tax side within the same
distance.
1.4.1 Spatial Tax Notches and Business Location Decisions
State borders create measurable distortions to the location choices of firms.
The empirical strategy to show the distortions is to develop a discrete choice
model on a rectilinear grid over the United States. The estimation of the
location choice model uses the spatial differencing and the conditional logit
approaches. Both methods show the effect of spatial tax notches on the
location decisions of the gasoline retailers, but the two approaches have a
different interpretations.
1.4.1.1 Rectilinear Grid over the United States
Gasoline retailers choose to establish their businesses in a geographic loca-
tion with specific characteristics (e.g., the intersection of two avenues or a
site close to the exit of a highway). Many factors within a given geographic
location may affect their entry decisions. The empirical method represents
accurately the choice set of gasoline retailers by using a fine rectilinear grid
that consists of 3-by-3-mile squares (9 square miles, about 25 square kilo-
meters), overlaid across the 3 million square miles of the continental United
States. Thus, the grid includes around 330,000 units of observation. For
squares that lay over state borders, the square is split into two parts to ac-
count for state differences. For reasons such as infeasible location or legal
restrictions to cross the border, I remove from the grid the area of the Great
Lakes, the parts of the squares that overlaid in the sea, and the locations in
Canada and Mexico near the U.S. border.
The fine rectilinear grid provides structure for modeling the specific local
characteristics that retailers may use to choose their sites. Examples of local
characteristics are population and the network of roads. In particular, major
metropolitan areas have more retailers, and most retailers choose to locate
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close to main avenues. As shown in Figure 1.2 (b), the location configuration
of the gasoline retailers mirrors the most significant metropolitan areas of the
United States, and the network of highways.
Data on the current population estimates of the Census Blocks Groups
(CBG) were obtained from the American Community Survey to account
for the distribution of people across space. Geographic Information System
(GIS) software was used to determine which centroids of the CBG locate
over every square of the grid. Then, each element of the grid was assigned
with the sum of the population estimates of the CBGs that lay over each
square.11 Finally, GIS software was again used to determine the number of
primary and secondary roads passing over each square of the grid, and the
shortest linear distance between the centroids of the squares and the roads.
The population patterns and the network of roads are not the sole deter-
minants of the location of retailers over the rectilinear grid. Proximity to a
border also relates to the location decision. Each of the 107 line segments
that define a pair of bordering states determines a “proximity region” with
specific tax differences. The definition of proximity depends on the meaning
of distance. Possible metrics consist of at least three types of distances: Eu-
clidean (linear) distance, driving distance, and driving time. The Euclidean
distance between two points is the length of a straight line that connects
those points. Driving distance is the physical length of the road path that
connects two points. Driving time is a transformation that uses average speed
to recover the minutes required to travel a driving distance.
GIS software was used to determine the closest state border and its cor-
responding Euclidean linear distance for each centroid of the grid squares.12
11This approximation has two limitations: First, the shape of the census block groups
does not necessarily fit inside the boundaries of a square in the grid. Hence, part of the
population that the procedure assigns to one unit of observation may be located in an
adjacent square of analysis. Second, if one block group covers several squares of the grid
(as may be the case for low-population-density areas), the assignment methodology locates
all the population to one place, and designates no people to adjacent squares. Given the
mobility of consumers, however, this methodology works as a first-order approximation of
the distribution of people across space.
12Notice that every definition of distance needs two points as input. Finding the closest
state line using driving distance or driving time is difficult because some segments of the
border are unreachable by car. However, using those metrics, I determine the closest state
line using the intersections of primary and secondary roads with the state borders. I use
Bing Maps to determine the driving distance and driving time. The figures look similar
because the Euclidean distance is correlated with the driving distance. The information
is available upon request.
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Figure 1.3 shows proximity regions for each of the 107 internal borderlines
in the United States. Darker grey represents a higher gasoline tax compared
to the neighboring state. All borders of some states, such as Pennsylvania,
Washington, and North Carolina, lie on the high-tax side, whereas all bor-
ders of some other states, such as North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Virginia, lie
on the low-tax side. Every spatial tax notch defines one of these proximity
regions.
1.4.1.2 Location Choice Model
This subsection develops a discrete choice model to explain the observed
location patterns of the gasoline retailers using the rectilinear grid described
in the previous subsection. Figure 1.4 depicts the average location pattern
around borderlines. The figure is the result of a two-step procedure where I
first compute the number of gasoline retailers per 10,000 residents, for each
borderline and various ranges of distance to the border, and then I take the
average of each range of distance using the 107 border pairs. The vertical
dashed line in Figure 1.4 marks the state boundary. The horizontal axis shows
the linear distance to the border. By convention, the negative numbers on
the horizontal axis are the distances to the border from the state with lower
excise tax on gasoline.
A striking pattern emerges from the histogram in Figure 1.4: Crossing the
border from the low-tax to the high-tax side abruptly reduces the average
number of establishments from 4.5 to 3.3 retailers per 10,000 residents. This
decrease represents a raw reduction of about 25 percent in the number of
retailers on the high-tax side just by crossing the border. The figure suggests
responses to gasoline taxes on the location choices of the fueling stations, but
the chart does not control for other relevant factors described in Section 1.3,
such as other gasoline regulation or differences in minimum wages. To give
some structure to the analysis, I develop a substantially simplified, but not
entirely unrealistic reduced-form model to rationalize the location decision
of the gasoline retailers. The estimation uses the spatial differencing and the
conditional logit approaches.
The spatial differencing method proposes that the location choice of the
retailers between similar sites across administrative borders depends on each
side’s potential profit, which in turn depends on the distance to the border
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and other characteristics. This spatial differencing approach gives estimates
on the probability of choosing between two sides, instead of choosing between
any possible locations. The use of the spatial differencing method over the
rectilinear grid is feasible computationally because it reduces the problem to
a binary choice. On the other hand, the conditional logit method estimates
the effect of these tax notches on the probability of choosing any possible
location, with the advantage of direct interpretation of the coefficients as the
percentage changes in the expected number of establishments. However, as is
well recognized, the estimation of the conditional logit model is difficult com-
putationally when the number of alternatives is as large as in the rectilinear
grid. To overcome the computational burdens, I use the equivalence between
the likelihood function of the conditional logit and the Poisson regression
developed in Guimara˜es et al. (2003).13
Entry of Gasoline Retailers
Define Πrs as the potential profit of retailer r on a square s of the grid. It is
specified as
Πrs = Ω(ξr, ζs) + εrs,
where Ω is a function that transforms to dollar values the vectors of retailer-
specific characteristics ξr, and location-specific characteristics ζs, with a re-
tailer location-specific shock εrs. Further, assume that the transformation Ω
is linear, such that the retailer’s profit takes the form of
Πrs = w
′
rη + vrβ0 + x
′
sθ + hsβ1 + g(∆τs)λ+ kj(s)β2 + εrs (1.1)
where wr is a vector of observable retailer characteristics, vr is an unobserved
idiosyncratic effect of the retailer, xs is a vector of observed location char-
acteristics, hs is an unobserved location-specific effect, g is a function of the
tax differential, ∆τs, that captures the price differential of location s with
respect to neighboring locations, and kj(s) is a jurisdiction-fixed effect that
depends on the location s. In equation (1.1), the coefficients η, λ, θ, β0, β1,
and β2 represent the vectors (or scalars) to be estimated.
The standard approach to estimating the coefficients in equation (1.1) is
13An important caveat, however, is that the equivalence between the likelihoods only
holds in the absence of retailer-specific characteristics and no spatial correlation.
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to assume that shocks εrs follow the appropriate i.i.d. type I extreme value
distribution as in the McFadden (1973) conditional logit analysis. Then, the
probability of retailer r choosing location s as the maximizer of profits is
Prs =
exp (Ω (ξr, ζs))∑
s∈S
exp (Ω (ξr, ζs))
, (1.2)
where the summation is across all possible locations s. The estimates of
the coefficients in equation (1.1) maximize the log likelihood function based
on equation (1.2). One advantage of using this estimation approach is the
natural interpretation of the coefficient estimates.
In particular, the expected number of retailers in location s is
E (ns) = nPrs = n
exp (Ω (ξr, ζs))∑
s∈S
exp (Ω (ξr, ζs))
,
where n is the total number of retailers and ns is the number of retailers in
location s. Hence, the percentage change in the expected number of retailers
in region s, with respect to a unit change in the k-th observed location
characteristic of region s, is proportional to the estimated coefficient because
∂ logE(ns)
∂xsk
= E(ns) (1− Prs) θsk. (1.3)
However, as is well recognized, the estimation of the conditional logit model
is difficult when controlling for retailer-specific characteristics, and when the
set of possible locations is as large as it is in the rectilinear grid over the
continental United States. A possible solution is to use the equivalence be-
tween the log likelihood functions for the conditional logit and the Poisson
model, proposed by Guimara˜es et al. (2003), and extended by Schmidheiny
and Bru¨lhart (2011). The estimation of the Poisson regression is more man-
ageable computationally, but the equivalence between the likelihoods only
holds in the absence of retailer-specific characteristics ξf .
Spatial Differencing
A way around the computational burdens induced by the retailer-specific
characteristics is spatial differencing. As pointed out in Duranton et al.
(2011), spatial differencing provides an alternative that controls for both
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observed and unobserved location-specific factors and retailer-specific unob-
served characteristics. The approach considers two neighboring locations s1
and s2 located across the border of two jurisdictions js1 and js2 . Because
the two locations are close, the critical identification assumption is that un-
observed location-specific effects and observed location characteristics vary
smoothly across space. If the shocks εrs follow the appropriate i.i.d. type I
extreme value distribution, the probability of choosing the site s1 becomes
the logistic probability
Pr (s = s1|s∈{s1, s2}) =
1
1 + exp
(
−λ (g(∆τs1)− g(∆τs2))− β2
(
kj(s1) − kj(s2)
)) . (1.4)
This approach considers a gasoline retailer who chooses between neighbor-
ing sites across borders. This method only involves jurisdictional variables
(a fixed effect for each border pair) and the difference g(∆τs1)−g(∆τs2) that
captures potential profit differences of location s1 with respect to neighboring
locations s2 due to tax differences. For the rest of the analysis, assume fur-
ther that this difference depends linearly on the distance of s1 to the border,
the magnitude of the spatial tax notch, and their interactions.14
Identification Assumption and Results with This Method:
The critical identification assumption holds if observed location-specific char-
acteristics and unobserved location-specific effects vary smoothly across space.
Table 1.3 presents the results of a balance test to validate this assumption
on observed location-specific characteristics. The balance test was performed
by estimating an OLS regression of the location-specific characteristic on an
indicator for being on the high-tax side of the administrative boundary and
including border pair fixed effects.15 The coefficient estimate of the indicator
variable for being on the high-tax side of the border measures the average
difference of the observed characteristics with respect to the low-tax side of
the administrative boundary.
14Further improvements to this assumption require a model for gasoline demand similar
to Manuszak and Moul (2009) or Houde (2012) that are beyond the scope of the current
analysis.
15The observed location-specific characteristic of each square of the grid include the
excise gasoline taxes from the API, indicators for having requirements of winter oxygenates
as described in Figure A.3 of Appendix A, indicators for having price gouging laws as
described in footnote 1 of Appendix A, population estimates from the CBGs, the number
of roads and distance to the road computed using GIS software, indicators for having
requirements of reformulated gasoline as described in Appendix A, indicators for states
where the point of taxation of gasoline is at the distributor level as explained on footnote
2 of Appendix A, and the local minimum wage computed as described in Appendix A.
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Table 1.3 shows the coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-statistics, and
p-values for the indicator variable in the balance test regression. As ex-
pected, the table shows that fuel taxes change by an average of about 7 cents
when crossing an administrative boundary. The p-value of the gasoline tax
indicator shows that this change is statistically significant. Further, by in-
specting the p-values it is clear that most of the other characteristics do not
significantly change at the border. Exceptions are the requirements of winter
oxygenates and the price gouging laws; therefore, the preferred specifications
control for these two regulations that significantly change at the border.
The implementation of the spatial differencing approach in equation (1.4)
reduces to a logistic regression estimation with border pair fixed effects, where
the dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if the
square has at least one gasoline retailer and zero otherwise. As mentioned
before, I assume further that the probability of choosing one side vs. the
other depends linearly on the distance to the border, the magnitude of the
spatial tax notch, and their interactions. Table 1.4 presents the estimates for
the logit model and also includes the probit and linear probability models to
show the robustness of the results. The results in Table 1.4 show the marginal
effects at the mean of the logit and probit models for selected coefficients and
interactions of interest. Table C.1 of Appendix C presents the complete list
of estimates and alternative nonlinear specifications.
Models 1 and 2 under the logit column in Table 1.4 show the marginal
effects at the mean without and with regulatory controls that change across
borders. As explained before, those regulatory controls are the price gouging
laws and requirements of winter oxygenates. Notably, the signs and mag-
nitudes of the probit and linear estimates, models 3 to 6, are similar to
those of the logit model estimates. The similarity shows robustness of the
results under different estimation methods. The preferred specification is
model 2, because it estimates the logit model with controls for regulation
that changes at state borders. The preferred specification shows that gaso-
line retailers choose the low-tax side of the border with 0.7 percent higher
probability than on the high-tax side. This higher probability falls by 0.45
percent when moving away from the border by 50 miles to the interior of the
low-tax state. Also, the reduction effect of distance-to-the-border intensifies
by 0.40 percent on the low-tax side for every 10 cent tax difference.
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Conditional Logit
The standard method to estimate the coefficients in equation (1.1) is to use
the McFadden (1973) conditional logit approach. As mentioned before, one
advantage of using this method is the natural interpretation of the coefficient
estimates as the percentage change in the expected number of retailers due to
changes in observed characteristics. To overcome the computational burdens
of the estimation, I use the equivalence between the likelihood function of the
conditional logit and the Poisson regression developed in Guimara˜es et al.
(2003). However, the equivalence between the likelihoods only holds in the
absence of retailer-specific characteristics. For that reason, the results of the
regressions presented below only include location-specific characteristics.16
Results with This Method:
The estimation of the conditional logit coefficients offers insights into the ex-
pected number of retailers. Table 1.4 shows the estimates of the conditional
logit model for selected coefficients and interactions of interest. Table C.1 of
Appendix C presents the complete list of coefficient estimates and alternative
nonlinear specifications. Models 7 and 8 under the conditional logit column
in Table 1.4 show the coefficient estimates with and without regulation con-
trols. Both specifications include additional location characteristics such as
population, distance to the closest road, and area of the square on the grid.
The signs and magnitudes of models 7 and 8 in the table are similar, and
this similarity indicates robustness of the results. The estimates in model 8,
the preferred specification, show a significant increase of 28.9 percent in the
expected number of retailers on the low-tax side than on the high-tax side.
This higher expected number of retailers falls by 9.9 percent as distance to
the border grows by 50 miles towards the interior of the low-tax state. Also,
distance-to-the-border exacerbates the reduction effect by 14.8 percent on
the low-tax side for every 10 cent tax difference.
16The location-specific characteristics include regulation controls, such as indicators
for having requirements of winter oxygenates, indicators for having price gouging laws,
indicators for having requirements of reformulated gasoline, indicators for states where
the point of taxation of gasoline is at the distributor level, and the local minimum wage.
Other location-specific characteristics are the distance to the border, the magnitude of
the spatial tax notch and the interactions between the former and the later, population
estimates, the number of roads, distance to the road, and the area of the square, because
the element is split into two parts when it lays over a state border creating some differences
in areas.
19
1.4.2 Spatial Tax Notches and Tax Incidence
For the analysis of the pass-through of taxes to gasoline prices at state bor-
ders, I use the idiosyncratic prices of the retailers in the sample. As the next
subsection emphasizes, the use of these prices is necessary due to the absence
of enough state tax changes during the 13-month period of analysis.17 These
idiosyncratic prices allow for the implementation of two separate analyses of
the retail gasoline prices. The first investigation uses OLS to estimate the
average pass-through of taxes to prices, and it shows that consumers bear
nearly 100 percent of the gasoline tax on average. The second analysis uses
an OLS estimation of the pass-through of taxes to prices close to state bor-
ders, and it shows that the pass-through of taxes to prices falls to 75 percent
on the high-tax side within 15 miles of a state border.
1.4.2.1 Idiosyncratic Prices
Gasoline retailers set prices based on observed and unobserved characteris-
tics. For example, retailers determine prices in proportion to their observed
taxes and other costs but target unobserved idiosyncratic margins. Also, the
retail gasoline industry exhibits specific time trends and asymmetric pricing
behavior.18 Therefore, analysing the effects of tax differences on consumer
prices must account for retailer fixed effects and time trends. However, the
impacts of taxes on daily gasoline prices are undetermined because of the
time variation mismatch. During the period of analysis, only one tax change
occurred in California, a state that only has 3 out of the 107 borderlines.
To address this issue, I first determine the retailers’ idiosyncratic prices from
a two-way fixed effects model that also controls for time trends. Then, the
subsequent analysis uses these time-invariant idiosyncratic prices.
To obtain the idiosyncratic prices, I estimate a simple two-way fixed effects
model defined as
prt = ρr + γt + ǫrt, (1.5)
17The only sizable tax change happened in California. In April 2017 California Governor
Jerry Brown signed into law a plan to fund road and bridge repairs. It raised the base
excise tax on gasoline by 12 cents per gallon starting November 1, 2017, and it cut the
price-based excise tax to 17.3 cents per gallon starting in July 2019.
18Noel (2016a) presents a recent review of the literature. Doyle et al. (2010) and
Gonza´lez and Hurtado (2018) develop on the idiosyncratic effect of asymmetric pricing.
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where prt is the price of retailer r on day t. The model includes retailer
fixed effects, ρr, daily time trends, γt, and classical measurement error, ǫrt.
This model is identified for the set of retailers with more than one price
observation and with different prices on the observed days.19 I use the retailer
fixed effects, ρr, as the idiosyncratic prices. Notice that the variance of
these estimates depends on the number of daily observations. In particular,
more price observations increase precision. The subsequent analysis uses the
inverse of the idiosyncratic price variance as weights in the regressions.20
1.4.2.2 Pass-Through of Fuel Taxes to Consumer Prices
The idiosyncratic prices allow for the use of an OLS estimation of the pass-
through of fuel taxes to gasoline prices controlling for local demand, regula-
tion, and distance to the border. Results show that the gasoline tax incidence
on consumers is close to 100 percent on average. However, the pass-through
of taxes to consumer prices is 75 percent for gasoline stations in the high-tax
state located within 15 miles of a border. These results arise from a model
of the idiosyncratic prices as
ρr = taxrβ0 + x
′
rθ + ✶(Regulationr) γ + ✶(PADDr) η + ǫr, (1.6)
where ρr is the idiosyncratic price of retailer r, the corresponding state tax is
tax r, and xr, ✶(Regulationr), and ✶(PADDr) are a vector of controls with local
characteristics, indicators of regulation, and indicators for regional petroleum
markets, respectively.21 I begin using the full sample to recover the standard
result of complete pass-through of taxes. Then, I investigate with a sub-
sample close to the border, and use interactions with indicators of low- vs.
high-tax side of the border.
19The identification is similar to the models of worker and firm fixed effects (Abowd
et al., 1999), or schools and students fixed effects (Laliberte´, 2018).
20This correction is related to the sequential two-step estimation of parameters of interest
based on initial estimation of unknown parameters. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
21The controls include population per 10,000 residents on that square of the grid where
the retailer locates, density of gasoline retailers per square mile on that square of the grid,
number of roads per square mile on the grid element, and retailers’ distance to the border.
Regulation controls are explained in footnote 16.
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Average Pass-Through
Table 1.5 presents some of the estimates of the coefficients in equation (1.6)
using OLS. The table presents results for the full sample and subsamples of
retailers chosen to be 15 or more miles away from the border or within 15
miles of the border. I call these subsamples inner land and border, respec-
tively. Table 1.5 presents coefficients of interest, but Table D.2 of Appendix
D.1 presents all the coefficients estimates. The unit of analysis is the gasoline
retailer, except for model 1 of the table in which the analysis is at the state
level.22 Models 2 and 3 of Table 1.5 use the idiosyncratic prices of all the
gasoline retailers, model 4 uses the subsample of inner land, and models 5
and 6 use the border subsample.
Notable, across all specifications in Table 1.5, is that the distance to the
border has no statistical impact on the gasoline prices when it is not in-
teracted with the tax notch. The effects of the population, the number of
retailers per square mile, and the number of roads per square mile in mod-
els 3, 4, and 6 have the expected signs. The estimate of interest across the
columns of Table 1.5 is the tax coefficient on the first row. Model 1 shows
an average 100 percent tax pass-through, with the idiosyncratic state price
and no controls. The same result is valid for models 2 and 3 that use all the
retailers, and account for distance to the borders and other local controls,
respectively. Model 4 of the same Table 1.5, for the inner land subsample,
shows a slightly higher point estimate of 105 percent, but this is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from 100 percent. Finally, the average pass-through
of taxes to consumer prices is close to 90 percent on the border subsample in
models 5 and 6 of Table 1.5. These coefficients are statistically different from
100 percent. These results for the border subsample are consistent with the
findings in Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) and Stolper (2017), and these
findings motivate further investigation.
Pass-Through Close to State Borders
Table 1.6 exhibits the OLS coefficient estimates of models that use equation
(1.6), and models with an equation that is the same but also includes inter-
22The analysis at the state level estimates equation (1.5) using state fixed effects instead
of retailer fixed effects. Then, I use the idiosyncratic state price to estimate equation (1.6)
and report the coefficients in model 1 of Table 1.5.
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actions with an indicator for being on the low- or high-tax side of the border.
The table presents results for the full sample and the border subsample. The
square brackets bellow the coefficients on Table 1.6 show the 95% confidence
interval. For brevity of exposition, I only present the coefficient of interest
here, but Appendix D.1 has a table with other important estimates. Models
3 and 6 of Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 use the same specification, but the later
table shows that the average 89 percent estimate of pass-through of taxes
to consumer prices in model 6 is statistically different from 100 percent, be-
cause the 95% confidence interval excludes the number one. Also, model 3 on
Table 1.6 shows that the average 99 percent pass-through of gasoline taxes
is statistically indistinguishable from 100 percent. Finally, the coefficient es-
timates of the equation that includes the interactions with an indicator for
being on the low- or high-tax side of the border, models 3i and 6i, are statis-
tically indistinguishable from one another, and from 100 percent. To better
understand the result for model 6 in Table 1.6, I continue the investigation
by rethinking the relationship of prices to own costs vs. inter-jurisdictional
costs near state borders.
In the proximity of a state border, the inter-jurisdictional difference be-
tween own cost and costs of other retailers across the border has a relevant
effect in the definition of prices. This effect should depend on the distance
to the border, because of the traveling cost for consumers. Taking that cost
into account, I model gasoline prices close to state borders as follows:
ρr = taxrβ0 +∆τrdrβ1 + · · ·
= taxrβ0 + (taxr − taxo) drβ1 + · · ·
= taxrβ0 + taxrdrβ1 − taxodrβ1 + · · · , (1.7)
where, as before, ρr is the idiosyncratic price of retailer r, the gasoline tax
is taxr, the closest outside state tax is taxo, the spatial tax notch with the
closest outside state tax is ∆τr, and dr is the distance of retailer r to the
border.
If gasoline prices close to borders follow equation (1.7), retailer r has a
pass-through of taxes to prices defined by
ρ′r =
d ρr
d taxr
= β0 + drβ1, (1.8)
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where ρ′r is the derivative with respect to own gasoline tax. This pass-through
depends on the distance of the retailer to the state border. Notice that
specifying a relationship for distance is complicated by the fact that the
effect of distance to the border on the pass-through of taxes to consumer
prices could be nonlinear. Farther away from the border, a one-mile increase
in distance has little effect on the incidence of taxes, while near to the border
such a change may have a significant impact. For that reason, I perform the
following analysis only with retailers that locate within 30 miles of distance
to the border.
To estimate the pass-through of taxes to prices from equation (1.8), I model
the idiosyncratic prices as
ρr = tax rβ0 + taxrdrβ1 + x
′
rθ + ✶(Regulationr) γ + ✶(PADDr) η + ǫr, (1.9)
where the controls are as in equation (1.6), but also include the interaction
of distance to the border and the closest outside state tax. Notice that the
pass-through from equation (1.8) is a linear combination of the estimates
β0 and β1, and this pass-through estimate has a variance. For brevity of
exposition, I present the estimates of the pass-through of taxes to gasoline
prices close to state borders in Figure 1.5. Appendix D.2 presents a table
with the list of coefficients and additional specifications.
Each dot of Figure 1.5 represents the point estimate of the pass-through
using the coefficients of equation (1.9). The vertical dashed line in the figure
marks the state border. The horizontal axis shows the distance to the border.
By convention, the negative values of distance represent locations on the low-
tax side of the border, whereas the positive values of distance are locations on
the high-tax side. The lines in Figure 1.5 show the tax pass-through estimates
from a local linear regression that uses the point estimates, a triangular
kernel, and weighs by the inverse of the variance of the point estimate; the
colored areas represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. A noteworthy
aspect of the figure is that the pass-through of taxes to consumer prices
is statistically smaller than 100 percent on the high-tax side of the border
within 15 miles. Also, the low-tax side shows suggestive evidence of an
average higher incidence of taxation close to spatial notches. The retailers
on the high-tax side bear the burdens of some part of their gasoline tax. This
result shows that, under the assumption of perfect competition, consumers
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have a non-zero price elasticity of demand. That is, consumers respond to
gasoline prices and have a downward sloping demand curve close to borders.
1.4.3 What do we learn from the analysis?
The subsections above show the long-term effects of spatial tax notches on
the entry and location choices of gasoline retailers and their competitors, and
the impact of these location choices on the pass-through of taxes to consumer
prices. The expected number of retailers on the low-tax side increases signif-
icantly; in other words, the number of fueling establishments is substantially
lower on the high-tax side. This sharp reduction of competitors goes along
with an incomplete pass-through of taxes to prices only on the high-tax side
of the border. Why should any retailers being willing to locate on the high-
tax side of the border when they face such a clear disadvantage relative to
retailers on the low-tax side? If some retailers are eager to locate on the
high-tax side of a jurisdictional border, and they bear part of the tax bur-
den, in equilibrium they have to compensate revenue with higher shares of
the local market. Unfortunately, I do not have information on the quantities
sold by each retailer on each day to address this question directly.
How do gasoline retailers use prices to compensate for the side of the border
that they choose? I hypothesize that the gasoline retailers choose to locate on
different sides of the border because they target different type of consumers.
The dynamics of the pricing strategy may be different for retailers on the low-
than on the high-tax side of the border. In fact, in Gonza´lez and Hurtado
(2018) we address the pricing strategy heterogeneity using the same dataset
that I use here. In the paper, we show that gasoline retailers on the low-tax
side change prices more frequently, and this is related with a strategy that
aims to target more price-sensitive consumers.
1.5 Conclusion
This study uses a rich data environment to examine the location decisions of
gasoline retailers and the pass-through of taxes to prices near state borders.
The analysis of the business location decisions develops a choice model over
a rectilinear grid that covers the 48 contiguous states and the District of
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Columbia. The investigation of the pass-through of taxes near state borders
uses the retailers’ idiosyncratic prices in various OLS specifications. The re-
sults of this paper provide some of the first evidence of the effect of spatial
tax notches on the location choices of retailers, their competitors, and the
consequences of those choices for pass-through of taxes to prices. The esti-
mates show a significant increase in the expected number of fueling stations
when crossing the border from the high- to the low-tax side. This result is
robust under various estimations and shows how taxes affect establishment
location decisions. The results also demonstrate an incomplete pass-through
of taxes only on the high-tax side of the border, where the number of retailers
is smaller.
Previous studies have found mixed or no evidence that taxes influence
business location decisions. For example, Duranton et al. (2011) found no
effects of taxes on the location of England manufacturing establishments,
and Rohlin et al. (2014) found weak evidence of the entrance of new estab-
lishments operating close to a state border in the United States. This study
contributes to the literature by showing how spatial tax notches deter the en-
trance of gasoline retailers near state borders. I do not address the impact of
state tax policies on the overall level of business activity. Instead, I show the
tendency of retailers operating near state borders to choose their locations
strategically. These findings relate to the sensitivity of gasoline consumers
to prices, the pass-through of taxes to prices, and the market shares that
retailers face when choosing sides of borders.
The previous literature shows that the average pass-through of taxes to
prices near spatial tax notches is smaller than the state average for alcoholic
beverages, cigarettes, and gasoline. This paper shows that the smaller tax
pass-through happens on the side of the border with fewer competitors. This
result suggests that retailers on the high-tax side may receive more of their
business from relatively inelastic shoppers who face fewer retail options. This
observation provides some of the first evidence on the change of competition
of the retail market due to the strategic responses of establishments.
This paper shows the strategic responses of gasoline retailers to spatial tax
notches. The empirical evidence is robust to various specifications and relates
to consumer search and market structures. The costs of inter-jurisdictional
shopping, tax avoidance, and lower competition are part of the deadweight
loss that alters the welfare cost of gasoline taxation near borders. The em-
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pirical findings shed light on how spatial tax notches alter the distribution of
the burdens between buyers and sellers. Calculating the social welfare cost
of these taxes, including search costs, is beyond the scope of this analysis;
the results of this paper, however, suggest that this would be a prosperous
area for further research.
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1.6 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Gasoline Retailers by Petroleum Administration for Defense
District (PADD)
PADD Region Year 2016 Year 2018
East Coast 55,544 49,631
Midwest 38,481 40,902
Gult Coast 24,605 25,416
Rocky Mountain 4,260 5,033
West Coast 17,487 16,232
Total 140,377 137,214
Note: The table counts the number of gasoline retailers arranged by Petroleum Administration for Defense
District (PADD). The column for the year 2016 shows the total number of gasoline stations and convenience
stores using data from the County Business Patterns that the U.S. Census Bureau releases yearly. The
column for the year 2018 adds the total number of fueling stations and convenience stores obtained from
the network GasBuddy. Both columns exclude Alaska and Hawaii.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Prices and Number of Gasoline Retailers
by State
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
State
Price
min.
Price
med.
Price
max.
Price
sd.
Price
observations
Gasoline
Stations
Stations per
Capita
AL 1.69 2.19 3.12 0.16 551,420 3,667 7.5
AR 1.29 2.21 3.29 0.14 275,501 1,897 6.3
AZ 1.84 2.29 4.39 0.19 475,192 2,029 2.9
CA 2.15 3.09 5.29 0.29 2,158,215 9,493 2.4
CO 1.88 2.38 4.11 0.17 383,690 2,037 3.7
CT 1.99 2.61 3.83 0.20 215,836 1,438 4.0
DC 2.09 2.63 3.98 0.28 18,747 114 1.7
DE 1.93 2.39 2.99 0.15 78,674 307 3.2
FL 1.74 2.44 5.99 0.18 1,604,191 7,501 3.6
GA 1.15 2.35 3.79 0.19 978,478 6,378 6.2
IA 1.81 2.43 3.34 0.20 155,558 2,083 6.6
ID 2.08 2.59 3.54 0.17 119,384 834 5.0
IL 1.48 2.49 3.99 0.23 1,056,842 4,429 3.5
IN 1.73 2.45 3.90 0.18 792,829 3,194 4.8
KS 1.76 2.29 2.99 0.13 228,274 1,663 5.7
KY 1.77 2.37 3.46 0.18 458,624 2,459 5.5
LA 1.50 2.23 3.19 0.16 403,584 2,853 6.1
MA 1.89 2.49 3.99 0.19 390,988 2,443 3.6
MD 1.99 2.44 3.69 0.17 424,662 1,913 3.2
ME 1.96 2.47 3.07 0.16 122,729 953 7.2
MI 1.87 2.53 3.95 0.17 991,518 4,446 4.5
MN 1.79 2.39 3.04 0.12 496,725 2,614 4.7
MO 1.69 2.24 3.37 0.14 608,397 3,229 5.3
MS 1.69 2.19 3.09 0.15 294,996 2,247 7.5
MT 2.08 2.54 3.16 0.13 74,600 642 6.2
NC 1.55 2.35 3.65 0.16 962,103 5,672 5.6
ND 1.79 2.39 3.39 0.17 57,845 560 7.4
NE 1.54 2.45 3.18 0.19 111,544 1,212 6.4
NH 1.99 2.44 3.35 0.17 133,364 741 5.6
NJ 1.99 2.49 3.79 0.20 527,982 2,997 3.4
NM 1.34 2.34 3.98 0.17 167,355 1,025 4.9
NV 2.15 2.69 4.25 0.22 196,503 941 3.2
NY 1.61 2.61 4.29 0.19 775,311 5,496 2.8
OH 1.78 2.37 4.00 0.16 1,176,577 4,735 4.1
OK 1.49 2.19 3.35 0.18 381,594 2,522 6.4
OR 2.02 2.79 4.09 0.20 240,562 1,185 2.9
PA 1.98 2.69 3.99 0.16 893,342 4,627 3.6
RI 1.89 2.51 3.15 0.18 53,414 396 3.7
SC 1.49 2.19 3.29 0.17 470,041 3,089 6.2
SD 1.89 2.41 3.09 0.16 61,926 702 8.1
TN 1.61 2.25 3.49 0.19 657,981 4,026 6.1
TX 1.21 2.23 3.99 0.16 2,460,181 13,727 4.9
UT 2.01 2.47 3.79 0.17 217,067 1,095 3.6
VA 1.61 2.28 3.39 0.18 815,062 3,938 4.7
VT 2.08 2.53 3.50 0.16 55,208 557 8.9
WA 2.09 2.93 4.04 0.21 477,890 2,584 3.5
WI 1.89 2.39 3.39 0.13 560,657 3,029 5.2
WV 1.99 2.49 3.19 0.16 154,410 1,070 5.8
WY 1.85 2.37 3.49 0.18 50,483 425 7.3
USA 1.15 2.40 5.99 0.31 25,018,056 137,214 4.3
Note: The table presents summary statistics on the daily price reports by state, including the District of
Columbia. Columns (a) to (d) are in USD. Column (a) presents the minimum price per gallon reported
during the period of analysis, column (b) shows the median price, and column (c) reports the maximum
price. Column (d) shows the standard error of the price distribution by state. The number of regular
gasoline price reports of the sample is in column (e). Column (f) shows the total number of gasoline
retailers by state and column (g) reports the number of fueling stations per 10,000 residents using the
state population estimates for 2016.
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Table 1.3: Balance on Location-Specific Characteristics
Characteristics Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Unbalanced
Gasoline Tax 6.76 0.75 8.95 0.00
Oxig. Fuels -0.10 0.04 -2.24 0.03
Price-Gouging Law 0.17 0.09 1.90 0.06
Balanced
Population 281.27 396.80 0.71 0.48
Number of Roads 0.03 0.12 0.25 0.80
Distance to Road 0.14 0.28 0.49 0.62
Reformulated Gasoline 0.01 0.09 0.17 0.87
Point of Taxation -0.11 0.10 -1.11 0.27
Minimum Wage 0.33 0.26 1.26 0.21
Note: The table reports the coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-statistics, and p-values for a regression
of the listed location-specific characteristics on an indicator variable for being on the high-tax side of the
border. The regressions include border pair fixed effects. The observed characteristic of each square
of the grid include the excise gasoline taxes from the API, indicators for having requirements of winter
oxygenates as described in Figure A.3 of Appendix A, indicators for having price gouging laws as described
in footnote 1 of Appendix A, population estimates from the CBGs, the number of roads and distance to
the road computed using GIS software, indicators for having requirements of reformulated gasoline as
described in Appendix A, indicators for states where the point of taxation of gasoline is at the distributor
level as explained on footnote 2 of Appendix A, and the local minimum wage computed as described
in Appendix A. Gasoline taxes increase on average 6.8 cents when crossing an administrative boundary.
Most of the other characteristics do not change abruptly at the border. The exceptions are the oxygenated
fuels regulation and the price-gouging laws.
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Table 1.4: Location Decision of Gasoline Retailers
Dependent Variable: Indicator of a Retailer on a Square of the Grid
Logit Probit Linear Conditional Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Low-Tax .0059∗∗ .0069∗∗∗ .0073∗∗∗ .0091∗∗∗ .0093∗∗∗ .0110∗∗∗ .2178∗∗∗ .2889∗∗∗
(.0019) (.0019) (.0021) (.0022) (.0023) (.0024) (.0124) (.0128)
Low-Tax × Dist. to Border/50mi −.0048∗∗∗ −.0045∗∗∗ −.0061∗∗∗ −.0057∗∗∗ −.0067∗∗∗ −.0062∗∗∗ −.1027∗∗∗ −.0990∗∗∗
(.0012) (.0012) (.0013) (.0013) (.0014) (.0014) (.0073) (.0073)
Low-Tax × Dist. to Border/50mi × ∆Tax/10¢ −.0039∗ −.0040∗∗ −.0039∗ −.0039∗ −.0042∗ −.0044∗ −.1912∗∗∗ −.1479∗∗∗
(.0015) (.0015) (.0017) (.0017) (.0020) (.0020) (.0093) (.0094)
Regulation controls? no yes no yes no yes no yes
Other controls? no no no no no no yes yes
Adj. R2 .0977 .0978
Pseudo R2 .1710 .1712 .1712 .1714 .6474 .6492
Num. obs. 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076
Note: The table reports the marginal effects at the mean for the logit and probit estimations, models 1 to 4. The coefficients of the linear model come from an OLS estimation.
The coefficients of the logit, probit, and linear models are for the spatial differencing approach of equation (1.4). The estimates of the conditional logit models are for equation
(1.1) without retailer specific characteristics. All the regressions include border pair fixed effects. The squares of the grid are the unit of analysis. In models 1 to 6, the
regulation controls include oxygenated fuels and price-gouging laws. In Model 8, the regulation controls include the complete list in Appendix C. In models 7 and 8, the other
controls are the population, the number of highways, and the area of the square of analysis. The standard errors are presented in parentheses. The distance to the border is
measured in 50-mile units. The tax difference, ∆τ , is in 10 cent units. The symbols *,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively. The full set
of interactions is included in the regression but not presented in the table.
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Table 1.5: Average Pass-Through of Fuel Taxes to Consumer Prices
Dependent Variable: Retailers’ Idiosyncratic Prices in cents
States All Retailers Inner Land Border
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Tax in cents: β0 1.00
∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ .99∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ .91∗∗∗ .89∗∗∗
(.09) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Distance to Border in mi. .00 .00 .01 −.07 −.07
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.08) (.08)
Population per 10,000 res. .54∗∗ .88∗∗ .30
(.18) (.34) (.17)
Retailers per mi.2 −1.93∗∗∗ −2.82∗∗∗ −.77
(.53) (.50) (.64)
Roads per mi.2 .72∗ 1.11∗∗ .10
(.31) (.39) (.20)
Regulation Controls no no yes yes no yes
PADD yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj. R2 .89 .74 .75 .78 .54 .55
Num. obs. 49 126,981 126,934 96,727 30,218 30,207
RMSE 29.56 14.17 14.06 14.14 13.12 13.03
Note: The dependent variable is the idiosyncratic price in cents per gallon. The unit of analysis is the
gasoline retailer, except for Model 1, in which the analysis is conducted at the state level. All estimations
use the OLS method. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. The symbols *,
**, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively. Regulation Controls indicates
that the regression includes explanatory variables for gasoline regulation. All regressions include indicator
variables for the five Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADD). For the column States, the
analysis uses the price fixed effects of the 49 contiguous states. For the column All Stations, the analysis
uses the information from all gasoline retailers. The column Inner Land uses the information of retailers
more than 15 miles away from the border. The column Border presents the results for the subsample of
retailers within 15 miles of the border. The RMSE row presents the Root Mean Square Error. In models
5 and 6, with a significance smaller than 5%, the tax coefficient is different from 100 percent.
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Table 1.6: Average Pass-Through of Fuel Taxes to Consumer Prices at the
Border
Dependent Variable: Retailers’ Idiosyncratic
Prices in cents
All Stations Border
Model 3 Model 3i Model 6 Model 6i
Tax in cents: β0 .99 .89
†
[.90; 1.07] [.80; .98]
Tax × Low 1.01 .82
[.79; 1.23] [.59; 1.06]
Tax × High .95 .98
[.82; 1.08] [.84; 1.11]
All Other Controls yes yes yes yes
Share of Low [%] - 44 - 53
Share of High [%] - 56 - 47
Sample All All Border Border
Adj. R2 .75 .76 .55 .58
Num. obs. 126,934 126,934 30,207 30,207
RMSE 14.06 13.84 13.03 12.60
Note: The dependent variable is the idiosyncratic prices in cents per gallon. The unit of analysis is the
gasoline retailer. All estimations use the OLS method. The 95% confidence interval is indicated within
the square brackets. The symbol † denotes that the number one is outside the confidence interval. The
regressions include all other controls such as explanatory variables for gasoline regulation, PADD, and
other characteristics. In the Sample row, those models labeled All use information from all gasoline
retailers, and those labeled Border use the subsample of retailers within 15 miles of the border. The
RMSE row presents the Root Mean Square Error.
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Figure 1.1: Spatial Variation of State Gasoline Taxes in the US
Note: The figure shows the spatial variation of state gasoline excise taxes using the quarterly State
Gasoline Tax Report from the American Petroleum Institute (API). The API has information on the local
taxes and fees and computes the average rate weighting by the population of the areas subject to each
particular tax. The API’s gasoline tax report also accounts for the average within each state of additional
state and local fees, such as, for example, inspection fees, delivery fees, environmental assurance fees, and
underground storage tank fees per gallon. Also, the API computes the equivalent excise gasoline tax for
the eight states with some portion of an ad valorem gasoline tax: Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Virginia.
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Figure 1.2: Location of Population and Gasoline Retailers
(a) Principal Cities and Primary and Secondary Roads
(b) Location of the Gasoline Retailers
Note: Panel (a) of the figure uses U.S. Census Bureau data to create a map of the United States that
highlights (in a darker color) the location of the most populated areas of each state, and the routes of
the primary and secondary roads. Panel (b) of the figure exhibits the map of the location of the fueling
stations. Every point on the map represents a gasoline retailer. It is evident that the location choice of
the retailers closely aligns with the distribution of the population and the U.S. road network.
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Figure 1.3: Proximity Regions for State Borders
Note: Each of the 107 line segments that define a pair of bordering states determines a proximity region
with a specific spatial tax notch. For each centroid of the squares of the grid, using Euclidean distance,
I determine the closest state border and its corresponding linear distance. The map shows proximity
regions of each state border. Darker grey represents a higher gasoline tax compared to the matching
neighboring state. All borders of some states, such as Pennsylvania, Washington, and North Carolina,
lie on the high-tax side, whereas all borders of some other states, such as North Dakota, Oklahoma, and
Virginia, lie on the low-tax side. Every spatial tax notch defines one of these proximity regions. The map
shows all the variations.
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Figure 1.4: Average Number of Gasoline Retailers per Capita Close to
Spatial Tax Notches
Note: The figure shows the average location patterns of gasoline retailers around state borders. The figure
is the result of a two-step procedure where I first compute the number of gasoline retailers per 10,000
residents, for each borderline and various ranges of distance to the border, and then I take the average of
each range of distance using the 107 border pairs. The vertical dashed line in marks the state boundary.
The horizontal axis shows the linear distance to the border. By convention, the negative numbers on the
horizontal axis are the distances to the border from the low-tax side of the border.
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Figure 1.5: Pass-Through near State Borders
Note: The figure shows the pass-through of taxes to consumer prices from equation (1.8). Each point of
the figure represents the estimate from the OLS regression that includes interactions for distance to the
border and high- or low-tax side of the border. The lines in the figure show the tax pass-through estimates
from a local linear regression that uses a triangular kernel. The estimates are statistically smaller than
100 percent on the high-tax side of the border within 15 miles.
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CHAPTER 2
PRICING STRATEGY HETEROGENEITY
IN RETAIL GASOLINE MARKETS
Retail gasoline markets feature high cross-sectional price dispersion and asym-
metric cycles in price dynamics. This paper identifies different pricing strate-
gies –indicated by cycling behavior– at the gasoline retailer level, measures
their consequences for price-level variability, and explores their determinants.
We use daily, station-level gasoline prices in the U.S., and propose a new cy-
cling indicator that overcomes problems with the existing one. Our results
show a high degree of heterogeneity in pricing strategies within retail gasoline
markets regardless of the gasoline brand, and even among gasoline retailers
in close proximity. We use this new intra-market variation in cycling behav-
ior as an identification strategy to estimate a cycle-induced price difference
of 3.43 cents between non-cycling and cycling stations. With respect to the
reasons that motivate cycling behavior, we rule out conventional forms of
collusion and show that some testable predictions of the standard theory of
pricing cycles do not hold. We show that the choice of pricing strategy by
the retailers relates to the type of targeted consumers: non-cycling stations
aim to attract inelastic consumers while cycling stations target price-sensitive
consumers.
2.1 Introduction
The varying price of retail gasoline is in the psyche of American consumers.
U.S. households spend a non-negligible share of their incomes in gasoline
and their demand for it is very inelastic (Brons et al., 2008). Consumers are
also exposed to gas prices regardless of their purchases because gas stations
post their prices publicly for everyone to see, including the competition. One
salient, well-documented feature of retail gasoline markets is the high degree
of cross-sectional price dispersion: a price spotted for a gas station can dif-
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fer sharply from another found just down the block (see, e.g., Figure 2.8b).
This affects market efficiency and impacts welfare, as consumers have to al-
locate more resources to price-search activities. Studies that have attempted
to identify the sources of price differentials across stations have focused on
variables such as market structure, firm characteristics, gasoline brand, ge-
ographic differentiation, and market concentration (Eckert and West, 2004;
Hosken et al., 2008). But much of this intra-market variation in prices has
gone unexplained even after controlling for all these determinants. In this pa-
per, we show that gas station heterogeneity in pricing strategies accounts for
a significant part of the price dispersion observed in retail gasoline markets.
The goal of this paper is to identify the existence of different pricing strate-
gies across firms within retail gasoline markets, measure its consequences for
price-level variability, and provide insights into the reasons behind the pric-
ing strategy choices of gas stations. In order to detect types of strategies we
inspect the price dynamic patterns they produce. We distinguish between
two different patterns, according to the presence or absence of asymmetric
price cycles. These type of cycles, where rapid price spikes are followed by
slow reductions (see, e.g., Figure 2.1), have only been documented at the
market level (Eckert, 2002; Noel, 2007a; Lewis, 2009); there is no empirical
evidence of firm heterogeneity –or lack thereof– in cycling behavior. In this
paper, we identify cycling and non-cycling pricing strategies at the station
level. We establish that both strategies coexist within markets, even for sta-
tions in close proximity and regardless of brand or other station and location
characteristics. This heterogeneity seems to be explained by consumers sort-
ing through gas stations that target different price sensitivities, and results
in a significant price gap between cyclers and non-cyclers.
We use a rich data set of daily, station level gas prices in the continen-
tal U.S. obtained from GasBuddy.com, a website that provides consumer-
reported information on gas prices. In order to recognize the presence of
cycles, we construct an indicator that exploits a definitional implication of
the asymmetry by comparing the steepness of increasing and decreasing cy-
cle phases. The resulting classification of dynamic price schedules is robust
to several data situations often faced when studying retail gasoline markets,
including the presence of price trends and short sample periods. This new
cycling indicator is a methodological contribution that improves on the stan-
dard measure used in the literature, the median change in price, that is based
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on the assumption that cycle asymmetry generates more periods with price
decreases than periods with increases. The median price change indicator
cannot identify cycles at the station level due to the large number of days
were individual stations do not change their prices. Furthermore, the impli-
cation of the asymmetry relies on or may not hold if the decreasing stage of
the cycles is under- or over-represented (e.g., under the data circumstances
mentioned above), in which case it leads to misclassifications. Our new cy-
cling indicator overcomes these drawbacks.
With our new cycling indicator, we classify the gas stations in our sample
according to their cycling or non-cycling strategies. Our results indicate that,
even though cycling stations are highly concentrated in the Midwest, several
locations that have been viewed as non-cycling based on aggregate market
price dynamics actually have remarkable concentrations of cyclers as well,
most notably in Florida, Georgia, and Texas. This challenges the presump-
tion in the literature that market-level cycles in the U.S. are a Midwestern
phenomenon (Lewis, 2009; Doyle et al., 2010; Zimmerman et al., 2013). More
generally, although most firms in cycling markets are cyclers and vice versa,
both price strategies are to be found in any type of market, sometimes coex-
isting yards away from each other. The station-level heterogeneity in cycling
behavior that we find contributes to the explanation of intra-market price
variability: controlling for the variables normally associated to price levels
in the literature, cycling gas stations charge 3.43 cents less than non-cycling
ones. Therefore, the pricing strategy arises as a newly-found significant de-
terminant of cross-sectional price dispersion.
To assess the reasons behind these cycles and the variability in cycling
behavior, we first revisit the validity of existing explanations of asymmetric
cycles in retail gasoline markets. The overwhelming majority of previous
studies align with the theory of Edgeworth cycles (Maskin and Tirole, 1988).
This is one of the equilibria of the authors’ duopoly model; it consists of
a price war, in which firms undercut each other until they reach marginal
cost, followed by a relenting phase with firms randomizing over whether or
not to restore price and initiate a new cycle. It has been claimed that the
theory does not offer testable predictions other than the asymmetric price
cycle pattern. However, the random strategies played in the attrition war
phase imply that it should not be possible to predict when firms leave the
trough of the cycle. We establish that the probability of a cycling station
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to be at the last day of its cycle trough is highly concentrated on certain
days of the week, undermining the ability of the standard Edgeworth cycle
model to explain the asymmetric price cycles in retail gasoline markets. An
alternative explanation of these cycles suggested by a new strand of liter-
ature is that they are the result of collusive behavior, based on the degree
of coordination at the restoring stage (Byrne and De Roos, 2019; Foros and
Steen, 2013). An observable consequence of any conventional form of collu-
sion would be an increase in price level, but a convincing identification of
the effect of cycles on prices has eluded the literature due to the presence of
observable and unobservable confounders that cannot be controlled for when
the cycles are defined at the market level. In this paper, we exploit station-
level variability in cycling behavior as an identification strategy to estimate
the cycle-induced price gap controlling for market-level confounders. We find
that cycling stations charge on average lower prices, which provides evidence
against conventional collusion hypotheses.
An explanation of cycling-behavior heterogeneity consistent with our data
is a setting where gas stations choose a pricing strategy depending on the
type of consumers they intend to target. Cycling stations aim to draw the at-
tention of search-intensive consumers with frequent and sizable price changes.
By concentrating lower prices on a few forecastable days, they attract price-
sensitive consumers more willing to restrict their purchases to certain days of
the week. In contrast, non-cycling stations divide up the pricing space in a
different way. They use loyalty cards and cash discounts to target consumers
that are willing to incur the hassles of carrying station cards or cash, and
charge much higher prices to those that are not. Because of their low propen-
sity to search, these consumers will also be attracted to non-cycling stations’
fewer and milder changes in prices. We provide evidence of consumers sort-
ing themselves through gas stations according to the price schedule they offer
by constructing a proxy for the frequency of price reporting, directly related
to the level of search activity. Our results indicate that consumer search is
indeed higher at cycling gas stations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature on retail gasoline markets, emphasizing our paper’s contributions.
Section 2.3 describes the database used in this study. Section 2.4 introduces
the cycling indicator we construct to classify stations’ strategies, describes
its properties, and compares it to existing indicators. Section 2.5 provides an
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overview of the degree and nature of the station-level cycling heterogeneity
found within U.S. markets. In Section 2.6 we reassess the validity of the
reasons behind cycle asymmetry that have been suggested by the literature
and offer an explanation of strategy heterogeneity consistent with our results.
Section 2.7 concludes with a discussion of the contributions of this paper, its
limitations, and implications for public policy and future work.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to previous research on gasoline retailing that focuses on
cross-sectional price dispersion and asymmetric retail price cycles, two well
studied but previously unlinked topics in the literature.1 Empirical work
analyzing the determinants of station price levels has mainly considered the
effect of location characteristics (e.g., station density), brand or contractual
form, and station characteristics. The findings on location concentration
have been mixed: while several studies report a negative relationship between
price and station density (see, e.g., Barron et al. (2004) and Eckert and West
(2004) for markets in the U. S. and Canada, respectively), others find no
effect (e.g., Hosken et al. (2008) in Washington D.C.). Station amenities
or physical characteristics (such as the availability of car wash or service
station) have been found to have little effect (Eckert and West, 2004; Hosken
et al., 2008). It has also been shown that station level prices are significantly
affected by brand and vertical structure (Hosken et al., 2008). There is no
previous work incorporating the role of different pricing strategies in station-
level price variability, which is the contribution of this paper to the retail
gasoline price dispersion literature.
Asymmetric price cycles in gasoline retailing were first documented by
Allvine and Patterson (1974) in some southern and western U.S. cities. Cas-
tanias and Johnson (1993) were the first to notice the resemblance between
these cycles and an ‘Edgeworth cycle’ dynamic pricing equilibrium. Edge-
worth cycles were proposed by Edgeworth (1925) and later formalized by
Maskin and Tirole (1988) as one of the possible Markov perfect equilibria
of their alternating price-setting duopoly model. In this Edgeworth cycle
1See Eckert (2013) and Noel (2016b) for extensive surveys of the literature on retail
gasoline markets.
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equilibrium, firms engage in a price war undercutting each other until the
competitive price is reached; a relenting phase then starts where firms ran-
domize between setting marginal cost and restoring price—in which case the
other firm follows—to start a new cycle. Figure 2.2 displays the market-level
price dynamics that are generated in this equilibrium; the similarity with the
sawtooth-like patterns observed in retail gasoline markets is evident. As a
consequence, Edgeworth cycles have been the theoretical foundation of the
overwhelming majority of empirical work that arose since the early 2000 on
asymmetric price cycles in gasoline retailing dynamics.2
The main contribution of this literature has been to establish the existence
of asymmetric cycles, independent of changes in costs, in retail gas prices.3
They have now been documented in most large and many medium-sized cities
in Canada (Eckert, 2002; Noel, 2007b; Atkinson, 2009) and Australia (Wang,
2009) since the 1980s, and in some European cities (Foros and Steen, 2013;
Siekmann, 2017). In the United States, the consensus is that these cycles
reappeared in the 2000s only in several Midwest markets (Lewis, 2009; Doyle
et al., 2010; Zimmerman et al., 2013). They have been shown to be more likely
to emerge in markets with low (Eckert, 2003; Noel, 2007a) or intermediate
(Doyle et al., 2010) levels of concentration, as well as those with a large
number of certain type of small retailers (Noel, 2007a; Doyle et al., 2010).
Noel (2007a) shows how the length (found to be either monthly, weekly
(Lewis and Noel, 2011; Foros and Steen, 2013), or sometimes daily (Noel,
2007b)) and amplitude of the cycles are affected by market characteristics.
The main contributions of our paper are in the topics within this literature
related to individual station behavior, the effect of cycles on price levels, and
the alternative explanation of these cycles as the result of collusive behav-
ior. Previous work using station-level data focused on the analysis of price
leadership and coordination (Noel, 2007b; Atkinson, 2009; Lewis, 2012), but
2A few articles suggest extensions of the model to generate more testable predictions.
Eckert (2003) introduce firms of different sizes; Noel (2008) introduces different types of
asymmetric equilibria (cost shocks, product differentiation, capacity constraints) and adds
a third firm.
3Some papers relate this phenomenon with that of ‘rockets-and-feathers’, where retail
gasoline prices adjust faster to cost increases than they do to cost decreases. Eckert (2002)
shows that the speed of upstream prices passthrough depends upon the current position on
the Edgeworth cycle. Noel (2009) decomposes the asymmetry into a component explained
by price response asymmetry and a ‘pure’ Edgeworth cycle asymmetry. Lewis and Noel
(2011) show that passthrough is faster in cycling than in non-cycling cities.
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there is no empirical evidence on the existence of cycling and non-cycling
station-level behavior. The only paper that refers to asymmetric cycles as a
station level decision is Doyle et al. (2010), but they use market-level data
and several predictions of their model—which is an adaptation of Edgeworth
cycles—are inconsistent with our findings, as we will explain later.
Attempts to find an association between asymmetric cycles and price lev-
els have been mostly limited to cross-section comparisons between markets
with and without cycles (Noel, 2002; Doyle et al., 2010), although these pa-
pers warn against causal interpretations. Zimmerman et al. (2013) propose
a difference-in-differences approach using the start of the Midwest cycles in
2000; the decreasing price associated with the cycles, however, may be biased
by confounding changes in market structure of those cities (e.g., the expan-
sion of some large independent chains). Noel (2015) exploits the variability
generated by a fire in a Canadian refinery that arguably made asymmetric
cycles in some markets halt, which led to increased prices; the external valid-
ity issues associated with this natural experiment exercise indicates that this
result needs to be interpreted cautiously. A valid identification strategy for
the estimation of the effect of cycles on price levels would also be helpful to
shed light on the claim that these asymmetric cycles are collusive in nature.
Byrne and De Roos (2019) and Foros and Steen (2013) argue that the level
of coordination in the synchronization of price restorations is an indication
of anti-competitive behavior in Perth (Australia) and Norway, respectively.4
However, there is no evidence linking cycles to the expected result of any tra-
ditional form of collusion on the price level, nor is there a valid and general
strategy available to identify it.
In summary, our paper primarily contributes to the literature with the
identification of asymmetric cycles at the station level. The intra-market
variability found in cycling behavior, in turn, provides the literature with a
new identification strategy for the cycle-induced price gap, which helps disen-
tangle various collusion hypotheses. Additionally, it contributes to the discus-
sion of what explains cross-sectional price-level variability in retail gasoline
markets, by uncovering a novel determinant—station’s cycling strategies.
4Both markets posses institutional features that may make the cycles in this cities
different in nature than those in North America, a price transparency program in Perth
and recommended prices in Norway.
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2.3 Data
We use a novel database of daily regular gasoline prices at the station level in
the continental United States. We gathered these data from GasBuddy.com,
a website that provides information on gas prices reported by consumers
through a smartphone app. Consumers use this app to check prices at sta-
tions nearby and find good deals, but they also have cash incentives to report
or update prices as they spot them. The use of this type of consumer-reported
data is not new in the academic research on retail gas prices, although most
previous work analyzes Canadian markets.5
We retrieved these data every day at 10:00 pm during the 7-month period
between September 22, 2017 and April 22, 2018. For each day and gas
station in our sample we observe the latest price reported, how long ago it
was reported (we keep only prices reported in the last 24 hours), station
location, station brand, and other station features (convenience store, cash
discounts, etc.). See Hurtado (2018) for an extensive explanation of the
database.
In our analysis, we work with gas stations that have prices reported for at
least 100 (out of 213) days, to ensure that we correctly capture the patterns
in their price dynamics. We further limit our sample to cities with a represen-
tative amount (at least 70%) of stations with more than 100 reports6 in order
to be able to accurately characterize competition at the market level. Our
final database consists of 10,134,059 observations, from 58,618 gas stations
in 313 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA).
2.4 A New Cycling Indicator
The first step in our analysis is to classify gas stations according to their
price strategy. We do so by inspecting the firm-level price dynamics that
these strategies produce; in particular, we determine whether or not a station
engages in asymmetric cycles. Figure 2.3 displays representative examples
of the different types of price dynamics at the station level. To tell them
apart in our data, we need a measure able to identify the presence of the
5See Atkinson (2008) for a description of the advantages and potential issues.
6This last restriction only reduces our sample size to be 80% of all stations with more
than 100 observations.
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distinctive sawtooth-like pattern in Figure 2.3b. In this section, we develop
such an indicator, discuss its properties and robustness, and compare it with
measures used in previous work.
We propose a cycling indicator that exploits a definitional implication of
the cycle asymmetry. In the presence of asymmetric price cycles, sharp price
jumps are followed by gradual decreases. As a consequence, the rate at which
prices go up is faster than the rate at which they go down. We construct a
measure of that discrepancy, the Cycling Ratio, defined as the average change
in increasing stages divided by the absolute value of the average change in
decreasing stages:
Cycling Ratios =
|∆+ps|
|∆−ps|
=
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s
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where ∆tp
s = pst − p
s
t−1, τ+ is the subset of dates in the sample at which
station s experienced an increasing-price stage, and τ− is the subset of dates
at which the station experienced a decreasing-price stage.7
A Cycling Ratio sufficiently larger than one indicates that prices go up
significantly faster than they go down, suggesting the presence of cycling be-
havior. In order to minimize the use of an arbitrary threshold above which a
gas station should be considered a cycler, we augment this measure by com-
bining it with another regularity of asymmetric cycle patterns: the presence
of sizable price jumps. Figure 2.4a illustrates the strong positive correlation
between cycle asymmetry, as measured by the Cycling Ratio, and the size
of the price increases, which we measure with the average percent price in-
crease. We classify most gas stations with a Cycling Ratio of 1.5 or higher
as cyclers: for these, the price increases were on average more than 50%
faster than the decreases. For Cycling Ratios higher than 1.1 but lower than
1.5, we demand more evidence of cycle asymmetry by requiring an average
price jump of at least 1% for the gas station to be classified as cycler.8 A
graphical depiction of the definition of our cycling indicator is provided in
Figure 2.4b; the indicator takes on a value of one for gas stations classified as
cyclers according to the previous description, and is zero otherwise. A more
7See Figure F.1 for clarification of τ+ and τ− in the examples of Figure 2.3.
8We require a price jump of at least 0.3% for Cycling Ratios 1.5 or higher, mostly to
correct for measurement error.
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conservative approach is to only consider cyclers those that have a Cycling
Ratio greater than 1.5 and non-cyclers those with a Cycling Ratio lesser or
equal to 1 and percent price jump below 1%, discarding the rest (Figure F.2).
Appendix F contains robustness analyses were the results of this paper are
estimated using this restricted sample. In general, the patterns found with
this more stringent classification are even more pronounced than those in our
main analysis.
The Cycling Ratio constructed to measure cycle asymmetry is robust to
the different realities usually found when analyzing gasoline price data. To
illustrate, Figure 2.5 displays some simplified examples used to evaluate the
accuracy of the Cycling Ratio in the presence of price trends and short data
periods. The price dynamics in Figures 2.5a, 2.5b, and 2.5c come from the
same asymmetric cycling data process, but represent different contexts of
analysis: upward trends in Figure 2.5b and short-period data availability in
Figure 2.5c. Regardless of those differences, however, the average (i.e., per
period) price increase is always $0.4 and the average price decrease is always
-$0.2, resulting in a Cycling Ratio of 2 that reflects the asymmetry of these
cycles. In Figure 2.5d a non-cycling dynamic pattern is shown, with average
price increases of $0.1 and average price decreases of -$0.1 for a Cycling Ratio
of 1. The presence of a downward trend in Figure 2.5d did not prevent the
Cycling Ratio from correctly identifying the absence of asymmetric cycles.
To conclude this section, we compare the performance of our new cy-
cling indicator with the standard indicator used in the literature, the median
change in price. Lewis (2009) used for the first time the median daily change
in a city average price as a proxy for the extent of asymmetric price cycles.
The measure reflects the following rationale: with cycle asymmetry, there
would be more periods when the price decreases than periods when it in-
creases, and then the median first difference of the price would be negative.
This indicator has been extensively used in the literature ever since to iden-
tify cycling cities (Lewis, 2009; Doyle et al., 2010; Lewis, 2012; Zimmerman
et al., 2013). The cutoff threshold below which a market is categorized as
cycler varies across studies; Doyle et al. (2010) applies a cutoff of -0.5 cents,
that was later adopted by Zimmerman et al. (2013) as well. Whereas the
median change in price was used to classify cycling and non-cycling cities
before, in this study we intend to classify patterns of the price dynamics of
firms instead. Unlike market-level prices, which as an average of its stations
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will most certainly change daily, one feature of the price dynamics of indi-
vidual gas stations is the large number of days when there are not changes
in prices. As a result, the median price change has no power to identify
cycling from non-cycling station-level strategies (for example, in Figure 2.3
both stations have a median price change of zero).
The inability of the median change in price to classify gas stations, how-
ever, is not its primary drawback: it may incur misclassifications at the
market level under certain conditions. The implication of the cycle asymme-
try that its accuracy relies on does not hold whenever the decreasing stages
are under or overrepresented, which happens in practice under the circum-
stances of retail gasoline markets mentioned before. For instance, if prices
trend upwards, the undercutting phases will be cut short, which generates a
lower count of days with negative changes in price. In this case, the median
price change will tend to misclassify cycling markets as non-cyclers (e.g., in
the case of Figure 2.5b, the median price change is $0.1). On the other hand,
with downward trends, the decreasing stages will be artificially long, making
the median price change prone to misclassify symmetric dynamic patterns as
asymmetric cycles (in the example of Figure 2.5d, the median price change
is -$0.1). But even if the decreasing price stages reach down to the same,
steady marginal cost every time, if the available data span a relatively short
sample period undercutting stages might be underrepresented, leading to
false rejection of cycling behavior (e.g., the median price change is $0.1 for
Figure 2.5c). Even though adjusting the cutoff threshold can sometimes mit-
igate this issues,9 those changes would necessarily be arbitrary and would
heavily depend on visual inspection.
The cycling indicator proposed in this paper is suited to identify cycling
asymmetry in station-level price dynamics and overcomes the misclassifica-
tion drawbacks of the median change in price. Because it leverages changes
in steepness of the stages instead of their different duration, its accuracy does
not depend on a constant marginal cost or a lengthy data set. The main use
we make of our new cycling indicator in this paper is the classification of all
the stations in our sample as cyclers or non-cyclers; however, the new indica-
tor can be applied to price dynamics at the market level as well. In Table 2.1
we compare the split of the 313 cities in our data in cyclers and non-cyclers,
9Noel (2015) mentions the need to determine the cutoff considering the price trends.
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according to both the new indicator and the median price change (using the
-0.5 cent threshold). For most markets the indicators coincide; however, al-
most a quarter of the cities are non-cyclers according to the median change
in price but cyclers according to the new indicator. This can be in part due
to the cutoff used being too stringent, but, as we will explain in the next
section, it is mostly due to the misclassification issues of the median price
change that our new indicator improves upon.
2.5 Intra-Market Price Strategy Heterogeneity
Using the indicator described in Section 2.4, every gas station in our sample
was classified according to its price strategy, concretely, based on whether it
engages in asymmetric price cycle dynamics or not. In this section we present
our findings on the heterogeneous cycling behavior found in retail gasoline
markets, characterize this variability between and within cities, and explore
its consequences for cross-sectional price dispersion.
2.5.1 Cycling Heterogeneity: An Overview
Every point in Figure 2.6 corresponds to a gas station in our data, and its
color depends on the price strategy it was classified into.10 Blue points rep-
resent non-cycling firms, whereas red and orange represent cycling stations.
The distinction among cyclers accounts for differences in the degree of asym-
metry or cycle intensity: orange is for cycling stations with a Cycling Ratio
between 1 and 3, red for Cycling Ratios of 3 or higher (i.e., prices jump at
least three times as fast as they go down). Figure 2.6 reveals two broad fea-
tures of asymmetric price cycles in U.S. retail gasoline markets. First, even
though cycling gas stations are highly concentrated in the Midwest, other
metropolitan areas in the South and the West also have a high concentration
of cyclers. Several previous studies have concluded that market-level cycles
in the U.S. are a Midwestern phenomenon (Lewis, 2009; Doyle et al., 2010;
Zimmerman et al., 2013); however Figure 2.6 shows a significant agglom-
eration of cycling firms in typically considered non-cycling areas, suggesting
there might be asymmetric price cycles at the market level in these areas too.
10Figure F.3 provides a version of this map in grayscale.
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We test this by applying our cycling indicator to the average price dynamics
of every city in our sample (see Table 2.1), which confirmed the existence
of asymmetric cycles in some non-Midwest markets in the states of Florida,
Georgia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Utah. In some of these cases, the median price change classifies them as
cyclers as well; it might have been the case, then, that previous work did
not find cycle asymmetry there because the cycles were indeed not present
during the time period that their data spanned. In other cases, the median
price change is not negative enough (considering the usual cutoffs) to detect
price cycle asymmetry; this reinforces the advantages and the identification
power of our new cycling indicator.
Figure 2.6 also highlights that, even though there is concentration of cyclers
and non-cyclers in different markets, gas stations with both types of price
strategy turn up to a greater or lesser extent all around the country. To
better illustrate this result, Figure 2.7 shows a closer look at some selected
markets. The cities of Chicago in Figure 2.7a and Dallas in Figure 2.7b are
overall cycling markets, while both Boston in Figure 2.7c and Los Angeles in
Figure 2.7d are non-cycling markets. Although most firms in cycling markets
are cyclers and vice versa,11 both price strategies are found in each type
of market, sometimes coexisting yards away from each other (Figure 2.8a).
Figure 2.9 depicts the average price dynamics of cycling and non-cycling
stations separately for our two examples of cycling cities; clearly, the overall
cycling nature of these markets is inherited from the dynamic patterns of
their large proportion of cycling stations.
We also explore whether gas stations stick always to the same price strategy
or instead change it over time. To do this, we constructed daily station-level
indicators using price dynamics within a two-month rolling window.12 As
explained in Section 2.4, the robustness of our cycling indicator to short
data periods allows us to perform this exercise accurately. Based on this
daily indicator, we calculated the share of cycling and non-cycling stations
11The share of cycling stations does not seem to uniquely determine cycling at the
market level. Preliminary results show that there is a non-linear relationship between
the two, and it interacts with station-type concentration; for the cycling pattern to show
up in average prices, cycling stations do not only need to be enough, but also effectively
coordinate cycle peaks and troughs.
12We also tried an alternative window of 4 months with very similar results, see Sub-
section 2.6.1.
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in the U.S. for every day in our sample period, shown in Figure 2.10a. The
fluctuation of this share reveals that firms in U.S. retail gasoline markets
do switch pricing strategies over time; only 26% of the gas stations in our
sample stick to either a cycling or non-cycling strategy during the whole
period (Figure 2.10b). In that sense the full-sample cycling indicator we use
throughout the paper summarizes the price strategy that each gas station
most predominantly followed.
2.5.2 What Predicts Cycling Behavior?
In light of our findings in Subsection 2.5.1, we explore which location charac-
teristics and station features are associated with each type of pricing strategy
(Table F.1 and Table F.3; the dependent variable is the cycling indicator). In
Table F.1 the estimations include city-brand fixed effects, so the results aim
to explain the variability in cycling behavior of same-brand stations within
the same market. Non-cycling stations tend to be located in more densely
populated areas. Furthermore, consistent with Doyle et al. (2010), we found
a non-linear relationship with station density: cycling is more likely at in-
termediate levels of station concentration; it peaks at 6 or 7 gas stations in
a 1-mile radius. However, once we control for the cycling behavior of neigh-
bors, station density loses explanatory power, suggesting that Doyle et al.
(2010)’s geographic differentiation vs. market power channel does not drive
this result. A station’s cycling indicator is strongly correlated with the cy-
cling indicator of its closest neighbor—and with the average cycling behavior
of neighboring stations in general—although that influence fades away the
more isolated the station is. This result implies that gas stations follow-
ing the same pricing strategy are on average expected to be found bunched
together.
Table F.3 looks at the association between cycling and station brand size
and features. Stations with convenience stores are more likely to be cyclers,
regardless of their brand size. This result complements the empirical find-
ings of Doyle et al. (2010), who find a positive relationship between cycling
markets and the presence of convenience stores, but only those operated by
independent gas stations. Some of our results, however, contrast with the
predictions of Doyle et al. (2010)’s model. In particular we find that com-
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plementary goods other than convenience store, such as service station or
restaurant, are negatively correlated with cycling. Also, both the smallest
and the largest brands are less likely to cycle, therefore their brand loyalty
channel to explain non-cycling strategies finds no support. However, we do
find evidence for one of the predictions of Doyle et al. (2010)’s model: sta-
tions with a higher proportion of consumers with propensity to not switch gas
stations are less likely to cycle. We mentioned how both channels explored
in Doyle et al. (2010) to test that prediction, geographic differentiation and
brand loyalty, do not hold in our results. The richness of our station-level
data allows us to identify a better way in which that prediction can be tested.
We find that big-brand gas stations offering discounts, either through loyalty
cards or cash discounts, are much more likely to be non-cyclers. These are
very relevant predictors of cycling behavior; we will return to these results
in section Section 2.6.
2.5.3 Pricing Strategy Heterogeneity and Price Dispersion
As mentioned in Section 2.2, vast attention has been paid in the literature to
cross-sectional price variation within markets. In examining the determinants
of price levels or price dispersion, studies have considered several types of
variables associated with these price differentials: location characteristics,
station features, local concentration of stations, brand, etc. Researchers have
not previously related price levels or price dispersion to asymmetric cycling
in gasoline markets, because cycle asymmetry is a phenomenon so far only
documented at the market level. In this paper, we introduce a new dimension
of station heterogeneity within markets, the cycling vs. non-cycling pricing
strategy, whose effect on price levels—compared to other determinants—we
explore in this subsection.
Table 2.2 presents a simple analysis of the effect of previously-considered
determinants and the pricing strategy on station-level prices. The results
are fairly consistent with previous findings: stations charge higher prices
in higher income neighborhoods and when located on a highway, and they
charge lower prices overall the higher the station density. Prices are also
related to the presence of certain station characteristics, after controlling
for city-brand fixed effects. The effect of the pricing strategy is included
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through the indicator variable ‘Cycler’, that takes value one for stations
engaging in asymmetric cycles and zero otherwise (column (2) uses our more
stringent version of the cycling indicator defined in Section 2.4). We find
that cycling stations charge prices 3.43 cents lower than non-cycling stations
on average. The magnitude of this effect is considerably higher than almost
every other determinant, whose coefficients rarely exceed one cent in absolute
value. Interestingly, two of the station characteristics with reasonably large
coefficients, loyalty card and cash discounts, are also negatively correlated
with cycling behavior. Table 2.3 shows that gas stations that neither offer
cash discounts nor loyalty cards are much less likely to be cyclers and, among
them, the cycling price gap is significantly higher. This reflects that non-
cyclers in this group charge price premiums both for the discount features
and for the non-cycling strategy. When the restricted sample is used in
column (2) of Table 2.2 the coefficient associated with cycling behavior is
80% larger, becoming by far the dominant explanatory factor for price levels.
The interpretation of the cycling coefficient, as well as the issues needed to be
tackled in order to identify it, will be discussed in detail in Subsection 2.6.1.
At this point, these results reveal that the difference in pricing strategies is a
significant determinant of price variability within markets that has not been
considered before.
2.6 Explaining Asymmetric Price Cycles
We have so far documented the existence of different pricing strategies among
gas stations within cities in the U.S. retail gasoline industry. Concretely, we
provided evidence that some firms engage in asymmetric price cycle dynamics
while others do not, even stations of the same brand in the same local mar-
kets. We illustrated some of the consequences of that heterogeneity in terms
of cross-sectional price dispersion. In this section, we attempt to shed some
light on the reasons behind the cycles and the variability in cycling behavior.
We begin by reassessing the validity of previous explanations mentioned in
Section 2.2, collusion and Edgeworth cycles. Our results indicate that nei-
ther of these theoretical foundations of asymmetric cycles finds full support
in light of our new evidence. Lastly, in Subsection 2.6.3 we exploit the rich-
ness of our station-level strategy results in order to take the explanation of
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cycling asymmetry in a new direction, related to targeting of consumers with
different price sensitivity.
2.6.1 Are Cycles Collusive?
Beyond the popular Edgeworth cycle explanation, which we will look into in
Subsection 2.6.2, the issue of whether there are collusive components behind
these asymmetric cycles or not has recently caught the attention of a new
strand of literature. As mentioned in Section 2.2, these authors argue that
the high levels of coordination found among firms in the increasing stages
are evidence of the collusive nature of the cycles. One testable prediction if
these asymmetric cycles were the result of some traditional form of collusion
is that the existence of cycles should lead to higher prices. A convincing
identification of the effect of cycles on prices, however, has eluded the liter-
ature so far. Since asymmetric cycles have been considered a market-level
phenomenon, previous attempts have relied either on price comparisons of
markets with and without cycles, or on market-level price differences before
and after cycles appear or disappear. The results from most of these strate-
gies, as the literature warns, should not be given a causal interpretation due
to the presence of market-level confounders, either unobservable character-
istics or observable features of the market structure that are very closely
correlated with the presence of cycles.13 In this paper, we provide a new
dimension of asymmetric cycle variability—the intra-market heterogeneity
in cycling behavior—which we exploit as an identification strategy to better
estimate the cycle-induced price gap.
Figure 2.11 illustrates the comparison between the previously available
source of variability and the new identification strategy that we utilize for
the estimation of the effect of asymmetric cycles on price levels. As mentioned
before, most previous work measured this effect by comparing cycling and
non-cycling markets; Figure 2.11a replicates that comparison for the markets
in our data. Consistent with the literature, non-cycling markets have higher
prices than cycling markets, on average. This price gap, however, cannot
be attributed solely to the lack of cycles, because these markets might be
different in ways other than the cycling patterns. With cycling variability at
13One exception could be Noel (2015)’s natural experiment approach, although, by
construction, it lacks external validity.
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the market level, these differences cannot be reliably controlled for, because
they are either unobservable or perfectly correlated with the existence of
cycles. To address these identification issues, we exploit a different level of
variability in cycling behavior: the within-market heterogeneity in cycling
strategies. In Figure 2.11b we overlap the price dynamics of the gas stations
of Figure 2.8; noticeably, the non-cycling station’s prices are in general higher
than those of the cycling stations. Since these firms are located close to each
other, they face the same local market characteristics; this in turn implies
that the market-level confounders are controlled for in this comparison. In
what follows, we use this source of identification to measure the effect of
asymmetric cycling behavior on price levels.
The results are presented in Table 2.4. The dependent variable is the
daily, station-level price of regular gasoline in cents, and the main explana-
tory variable is the pricing strategy of the gas station, measured with the
full-sample cycling indicator presented in Section 2.4 (other price-level de-
terminants are also controlled for, as in Table 2.2). In column (1) the price
gap was obtained without local market fixed effects; not accounting for the
market confounders gives an average difference in price of 11 cents between
cycling and non-cycling stations. Once the daily market environment is con-
trolled for by including date-zipcode fixed effects in column (2), the price gap
decreases by almost 70%. This discrepancy reveals the extent of bias in the
estimation of the price gap when one does not control for local conditions by
exploiting within-market heterogeneity in cycling behavior. If the effect on
price of the different brands by city is further canceled out, we reach our main
specification result: gas stations that exhibit asymmetric cycling patterns in
their price dynamics charge on average 3.43 cents less for regular gasoline
than stations that follow non-cycling pricing strategies (this is the price gap
reported in column (1) of Table 2.2). In other words, under the same market
structure, same-brand firms offering identical amenities and with equal loca-
tion characteristics charge on average a significantly lower price if they are
cyclers. There is a baseline effect of 2.7 cents, and then the gap increases the
higher the cycling intensity (i.e., the more asymmetric the cycles, indicated
by a higher Cycling Ratio). This result holds for premium and midgrade
gasoline as well (see Table F.6). As shown in Table 2.2, the magnitude of
the coefficient almost doubles if the results are estimated using the restricted
sample (Table F.5).
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The up-and-down nature of cyclers’ price dynamics would suggest that
the average gap previously estimated changes systematically over time. The
main specification of column (3), but interacting the cycling indicator with
the date fixed effect, yields the coefficients plotted in Figure 2.12. It can
be noticed how the price gap shrinks, sometimes even becoming positive, in
periods of cycle peaks.
The results shown so far use the full-sample cycling indicator, which classi-
fies gas stations according to the price strategy that they most predominantly
followed. As described in Subsection 2.5.1, we also constructed daily station-
level cycling indicators using the price dynamics of a two-month rolling win-
dow around each day. Accordingly, an additional test for the existence of
a price gap induced by cycling behavior would be to compare a gas station
price level in periods when it engages in cycles and in periods when it does
not.14 The results of such exercise are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Ta-
ble 2.4, where the estimation used the varying cycling indicator and included
gas station fixed effects. The decreasing effect of asymmetric cycling strate-
gies on prices survives even when looking into the dynamics of an individual
firm: the prices charged by a gas station are relatively lower on average when
the station cycles than when it does not.15
Lastly, in Figure 2.13 we explore how this cycling price gap differs across
markets in our sample. The distribution of price gaps is shown in Fig-
ure 2.13a. Although more research remains to be done to explain the variabil-
ity in market price gaps, we suggest one possible direction in Figure 2.13b.
On the one hand, the cycling classification of the market-level price dynamics
does not seem to be systematically related to the existence of a positive price
gap, nor to the magnitude of negative price gaps. On the other hand, there
seems to be a non-linear relationship between the share of cycling stations
and the price gap: the price differential between cycling and non-cycling sta-
tions seems to be bigger in markets where cycling stations are either relatively
very few or they are the big majority.
The results presented in this subsection demonstrate that gas stations en-
gaging in asymmetric cycles charge on average lower prices than non-cycling
14Figure F.5 in Appendix F displays the Cycling Ratio distributions for periods of cycling
and non-cycling.
15Other robustness checks of Table 2.4 using a four-month rolling window (Table F.7)
and controlling for neighbors cycling behavior (Table F.8) are presented in Appendix F.
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gas stations. This finding can naturally be interpreted as evidence against
the hypothesis posed by some previous work that cycles in retail gasoline
markets are the result of traditional forms of collusion. In this sense, the
coordination of firms in the restoring stage of the cycles seems to be the
realization of some specific form of firm interaction rather than involving
collusive behavior in the conventional sense. The remainder of the paper is
devoted to understanding the nature of those interactions. We first assess to
which extent Edgeworth cycles can explain the cycling pattern found in our
data. Finally, we suggest insights on why cycle heterogeneity arises within
markets.
2.6.2 Edgeworth Cycles Revisited
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the overwhelming majority of empirical studies
of price cycles in retail gasoline markets align with the theory of Edgeworth
cycles (Maskin and Tirole, 1988). In this subsection, we document ways in
which the standard version of that theory and its available extensions are
inconsistent with our new findings. The first and foremost limitation is the
assumption underlying virtually every previous work on Edgeworth cycles
that all firms in a cycling market engage in cycling patterns and vice versa.
As we documented in Section 2.5, there is a high degree of heterogeneity
in cycling behavior within markets, sometimes even within yards distance,
which entirely rules out the accuracy of that assumption. The only contribu-
tion that steps into the right direction in that sense is Doyle et al. (2010)’s.
In their model, they aim to explain why some markets display cycles while
others do not by treating cycling behavior as a firm-level decision, driven by
some station characteristics. However, they test their model with aggregated
data and are silent about the possibility of cycling heterogeneity within lo-
cal markets. We also discussed earlier in Subsection 2.5.2 how the station
features that should predict cycling according to their model—i.e., brand
loyalty, geographic differentiation, and complementary goods—do not nec-
essarily find support in our firm-level results. For the theory of Edgeworth
cycles or its extensions to be able to explain the observed patterns in the re-
tail gasoline industry an adaptation rendering cycling strategy heterogeneity
at the station level would be needed. We address a way in which that can
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be accomplished in Subsection 2.6.3.
Apart from these limitations, another drawback of Edgeworth cycles as an
explanation of the asymmetric cycles in retail gasoline prices comes from the
fact that one testable prediction of the model is decidedly contradicted by
our data. The main empirical prediction of the theory is the asymmetry of
the cycles in price dynamics; the resemblance of the asymmetric cycles in
retail gasoline markets to the pattern of Edgeworth cycle dynamic pricing
equilibrium was what linked the observed phenomenon to Maskin and Tirole
(1988)’s explanation in the first place. Even though it has been claimed that
the theory does not offer any other testable predictions, there is an additional
feature of Edgeworth cycles that can be tested in the data. In Maskin and
Tirole (1988)’s Edgeworth cycle equilibrium, the decreasing phase of the
cycle has firms undercutting each other until they reach marginal cost. At
the trough of the cycle, the firms enter a war of attrition in which they
randomize between restoring price or not; once one of them does relent,
the other follows and a new cycle is initiated. One consequence of that
mechanism is that the cycle length should be random; in particular, it should
not be possible to predict when firms leave the trough of the cycle. However,
we find strong weekly patterns in the asymmetric cycle dynamics,16 revealing
that the timing of price relenting could be predicted by day of the week.
To illustrate this claim, Figure 2.14 overlaps the price dynamics of cycling
stations in our cycling market examples of Chicago and Dallas with weekly
markers; the shaded areas indicate Monday-Tuesday-Wednesday intervals.
One regularity to notice is that when a new cycle starts it does so at the
beginning of the week, and then a cycle peak occurs certainly within a couple
of days. On the other hand, the time span between cycle troughs is always
weekly, biweekly, triweekly, and so on. These two observations imply that the
duration of the cycles can be approximately measured in multiples of weeks,
and that which multiple depends on whether a price jump is triggered in that
market early in the week or not. In what follows we look into each of those
regularities.
We first explore which days of the week are more likely to be cycle peaks
or troughs. For each cycling gas station, we calculated the empirical proba-
16Weekly patterns in asymmetric retail gasoline price cycles have been documented
before (see, e.g., Lewis and Noel (2011)); however, they have not been analyzed as a
contradiction of the fundamentals of Edgeworth cycles.
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bility distribution of peaks and troughs across days of the week, in terms of
the relative frequency; then, we averaged the day-of-the-week probabilities
of peaks and troughs at the market level. Figure 2.15 shows the results for
our two example markets. Both Chicago’s and Dallas’ gas stations are more
likely to have cycle peaks on Thursdays (Figure 2.15a). As for the troughs,
gas stations in Chicago are more likely to reach cycle troughs quite similarly
either Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday; in Dallas, gas stations’ probabili-
ties of trough are concentrated on Monday, followed by Tuesday and Sunday
(Figure 2.15b). Comparing Figures 2.15a and 2.15b, even though peak prob-
abilities are better lined up on Thursday for both markets, the distributions
are flatter (i.e., there is a mode on Thursday but the average probability
does not differ greatly among days of the week). Contrarily, Chicago and
Dallas market average probabilities of trough are shifted apart, but these
distributions are much more concentrated than peak distributions.
The findings just described for our example markets hold for our entire
sample as well. We calculated these average empirical probability distribu-
tions of peaks and troughs for each market in our sample. Based on that,
we defined the market peak (trough) as the day of the week with highest
probability of being a peak (trough); for example, Figures 2.15a and 2.15b
imply that Chicago’s peak and trough are Thursday and Tuesday, respec-
tively, while Dallas’ are Thursday and Monday. Table 2.16a summarizes the
results; it shows how many markets have their peak and trough at each day
of the week.17 The majority of the cities in our sample (59%) are more likely
to have cycle peaks on Thursdays. Even though the market troughs are not
that centered around one day of the week, Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday
contain over 85% of market troughs.
We explore the flatness of peak (trough) distributions using as a measure
the maximum probability of a peak (trough), that is, the average empirical
probability of the market peak (trough) as define above. For example, from
Figures 2.15a and 2.15b the maximum peak probability in Dallas is 0.2172
and in Chicago is 0.1930; the maximum trough probability is 0.3258 for
Dallas (the average probability of the market trough, which is Monday for
Dallas) and 0.2275 for Chicago. Figure 2.16b depicts the densities of market
17The total number of markets is 293—instead of 313—because we excluded markets
with less than 10 cycling gas stations, as their average empirical probabilities were very
noisy.
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maximum probabilities of peaks and troughs. Just as in the Chicago and
Dallas example, peak distributions are more similar but flatter (maximum
probability density has a higher mode, but is centered at a low probability
value), whereas the trough distributions can be more or less concentrated in
different markets (e.g., it is more concentrated in Dallas than in Chicago)
but are in general more concentrated than peak distributions (the density of
the maximum probability of troughs is shifted to the right with respect to
peaks).
These results indicate that, for a given market, the day of the week for
the occurrence of cycle troughs is easier to predict than for peaks. The
importance of these results for the overall predictability of cycle peaks and
troughs is nonetheless played down by the fact that cycles reach their peaks
certainly within a couple of days after a trough, whereas troughs do not
necessarily occur a certain number of days after a peak. The distance between
troughs, however, can be always measured in multiples of weeks. This stresses
the importance of understanding the nature of cycle troughs, rather than the
emphasis on cycle peaks commonly found in the literature.
The issue of why price restoring is triggered at the beginning of some weeks
and not others should be investigated thoroughly. We aim to contribute
to that discussion by showing the relationship between price relenting and
changes in costs. As it is well documented in the literature, the cycle asym-
metry in retail gasoline prices is not inherited from asymmetry in upstream
price dynamics. In our data period, for example, the Cycling Ratios of two
common proxies for costs, crude oil prices and New York gasoline futures, are
0.85 and 0.82, respectively (see Figure F.6). Instead, in Table 2.5 we explore
whether changes in wholesale prices are likely to trigger retail price restora-
tions of cycling gas stations. The observation level is a cycling station-day
combination; the dependent variable takes a value of one if the gas station had
a trough that day, and zero otherwise. Our results indicate that an increase
in costs either that day, the day before, or two days ago is associated with a
higher chance that the gas station relents (we proxy for cost with the price
of crude oil18). We control for city-day of the week fixed effects, therefore
the interpretation holds on average for any given market-level probability of
trough each day of the week. Most importantly, an increase in cost is twice
18Table F.9 in Appendix F explores the same analysis using New York gasoline futures
instead, with similar results.
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more likely to trigger a price restoration on the day of the week that corre-
sponds to the market trough. The results are more pronounced when run
only for cycling markets, where there are many well-synchronized cycling gas
stations. This suggests that whether or not firms face changes in wholesale
costs close to the market-level trough might be a key factor in determining
which weeks will mark the beginning of a cycle in a given market.
In this subsection we provided evidence that the standard Edgeworth cycle
theory cannot account for one key feature of asymmetric cycles in retail
gasoline markets, which is the n-week duration of the cycles with troughs
systematically aligned by day of the week. We documented which days of
the week are more likely to be peaks and troughs, and discussed some reasons
why new cycles begin some weeks and no others. Left to be addressed is why
Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday are the days of the week when troughs
occur in almost every market. Possible explanations can be associated with
different price elasticity of consumers within a week.19 Cycling firms may
decrease prices to attract price-searching consumers; when the week starts
and demand becomes more inelastic (e.g., because consumers less-flexibly
need gasoline for work commuting) is when they can afford to temporarily
charge higher prices. In line with this reasoning, below we provide evidence
on the relationship between cycling behavior an consumer price search.
2.6.3 Consumer Search and Price Sensitivity
We have shown so far that asymmetric cycling strategies seem to be the
realization of some form of imperfect competition rather than the result of
collusion. We also showed that Maskin and Tirole (1988)’s theory of Edge-
worth cycles and its few available extensions are inadequate to fully account
for the patterns found in our results: n-week duration of the cycles and high
degree of cycling heterogeneity within markets. In this last subsection, we
contribute to the discussion of what explains these cycles and their hetero-
geneity with new evidence indicating that gas stations might be dividing
markets up by choosing pricing strategies that target different types of con-
sumers.
Some of the results from previous sections hint in the direction of cycling
19This phenomenon has been proven to exist in other industries; see Puller and Taylor
(2012) for an example of day-of-the-week price discrimination by U.S. airlines.
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and non-cycling stations following different strategies to attract consumers.
The negative cycling price gap and the fact that cycling stations concen-
trate lower prices in certain days of the week could be the result of these
stations targeting price-sensitive consumers more inclined to price search or
willing to restrict their gas purchases to particular days. If this were the case,
one would expect non-cycling stations aiming at more inelastic consumers.
In Subsection 2.5.2 we showed how non-cycling stations are strongly more
likely to offer cash or loyalty discounts, which indicates that they may actu-
ally be dividing up the pricing space in a different way. These discounts work
as a laid-back search strategy for consumers not willing to actively search for
low prices, but willing to incur the hassles of carrying station cards or cash.
For consumers not willing to do so, they charge much higher prices. Because
of their low propensity to search, these consumers will also be attracted to
non-cycling stations’ fewer and milder changes in prices. In contrast, cycling
stations aim to attract attentive, price-sensitive consumers, also drawn by
cyclers’ frequent and sizable changes in price. In what follows, we provide
evidence in favor of this source of heterogeneity in cycling behavior. First,
some scattered indications of the relationship between price search and cy-
cling behavior are presented; we then delve into a more systematic measure
of that relationship.
Table 2.6 contains findings that align with the hypothesis of cycling sta-
tions targeting more elastic consumers. In Table 2.6a, cycling stations are
shown to be less likely to be found on state borders, but if in the border they
tend to locate on the lower-state tax side. Gas stations have been proven
to bunch on the lower side of the border (Hurtado, 2018); consumers using
those gas stations will be comparatively more prone to be looking for cheaper
prices. Table 2.6b analyzes the surcharge for premium (or midgrade) gasoline
applied by gas stations when facing different demand preferences. The results
indicate that cycling stations charge a lower price differential for premium
or midgrade gasoline in higher income neighborhoods. Wealthier consumers
are more prone to search for cheaper premium (or midgrade) gas prices,20
since they are more likely to actually demand that product; then, the finding
in Table 2.6b can be the consequence of cycling gas stations intending to
capture those high-income, search-oriented consumers.
20We confirm that relationship using the measure of price search frequency that we
introduce later.
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To assess the relationship between firm cycling strategies and consumer
price sensitivity in U.S. retail gasoline markets in a more definite and sys-
tematic fashion, we construct a measure of search activity using the nature
of our data. As described in Section 2.3, we use consumer-reported data
retrieved at the same time every day and we observe how long ago each price
was reported. Gas stations with prices reported more frequently will tend to
have lower ‘how long ago’ values; therefore, a measure of reporting frequency
would be inversely related to that variable. We define such a measure simply
as 24-‘how long ago’21 and use this ‘popularity’ index as a proxy for the level
of search activity, since price reports are the result of consumers searching
for cheap prices through the app.22
The average popularity of U.S. cycling and non-cycling stations over our
sample period is presented in Figure 2.17. For both types of gas stations, the
reporting frequency seems to drop in general right before the shaded areas,
that is, during the weekends. Most interestingly, in this raw comparison
cycling gas stations have arguably more reports than non-cycling ones. Some
identification concerns need to be addressed, however, before claiming that
this purely reflects more price-searching of cycling station’s consumers. First,
users of the app might be more prone to report the price of the gas station
they actually end up buying gas from, which will most likely be the one
with the lowest price. Since we found that cycling gas stations generally
charge lower prices than non-cycling ones, part of the difference in reporting
from Figure 2.17 may merely reflect that difference in price and not the
cycling strategy itself. Second, users can report a price they spot both if
it is different than in the app (i.e., correct or update a price), as well as if
it is unchanged (i.e., check or confirm a price). If they are more likely to
report in the former case, this would bias the effect of cycling on consumer
search behavior upwards, because cycling gas stations change their prices
more often.
Table 2.7 shows how much search activity differs for consumers of cycling
and non-cycling stations, accounting for the identification issues previously
21We chose that measure because ‘how long ago’ is expressed in hours, and we pre-
ferred a linear transformation. The value of the variable itself does not have a meaningful
interpretation, but its usefulness comes from its direct relationship with reporting and
search.
22See Byrne et al. (2015) for another example of the use of report frequency as a proxy
for search intensity.
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pointed out. The day-of-the-week fixed effects included in the estimation
are displayed in Figure F.7, where the drop in reporting activity during
the weekends is confirmed. The results in Table 2.7 indicate that, indeed,
consumer search is higher for cycling than for non-cycling stations, even after
controlling for the price level and the frequency with which stations change
their prices. We additionally considered if consumers change their report
intensity in different stages of the cycle (peaks and troughs). We find that
search activity is higher right before and during peaks, and lower at troughs.
Since we control for day of the week and price level, this finding can solely be
attributed to the awareness of consumers of when peaks and troughs are more
likely to happen in each market, which in turn translates into the recognition
of gains from search being higher (lower) at peaks (troughs). Notice also that
this effect is intensified for cycling stations’ consumers, because they are more
attentive and knowledgeable of the structure of the cycles.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper identifies the presence of asymmetric cycles in individual gas sta-
tion price dynamics, and classifies firms in retail gasoline markets according
to their cycling and non-cycling strategies. The cycling indicator we propose
represents a methodological contribution since, unlike the one previously
used in the literature, it is suited to the identification of cycles at the station
level and it is robust to the presence of price trends and short periods of
data. The coexistence of both types of gas stations found within markets
contrasts with previous work on asymmetric cycles in retail gasoline mar-
kets, where asymmetric cycles were regarded as a market-level phenomenon.
In this sense, the focus on market-level price dynamics has so far prevented
this literature from contributing to the explanation of the equally puzzling
intra-market, cross-sectional price variability. Indeed, we find that cycling
behavior is a significant determinant of gas stations’ price level: stations that
engage in asymmetric-cycle strategies charge on average 3.43 cents less than
non-cycling stations. On the other hand, our results invite to revisit the
discussion on asymmetric cycles and market-level price dispersion. It has
been recently argued that these cycles are associated with high price disper-
sion (Noel, 2018). An exploratory analysis in Figure 2.18, however, suggests
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that markets with higher share of cycling stations—which tend to be cycling
markets—present a relatively low and systematic daily overall price disper-
sion. Market-level price cycle asymmetry does not seem to induce price
dispersion in the cross-section; if anything, a high share of well-synchronized
cycling stations seem to guarantee relatively low levels of dispersion com-
pared to an average non-cycling market. This issue deserves further and
more careful research left for future work.
In terms of the reasons behind these cycles and the heterogeneity in cycling
behavior, a setting where gas stations choose a pricing strategy depending on
the type of consumers they intend to target is consistent with our data. The
Edgeworth cycle model that, with little exception, has served as the theoret-
ical foundation of the empirical literature in retail gasoline price cycles, finds
no support in our results, as we find that one of the testable predictions of
its standard version does not hold in light of our new evidence. Our nega-
tive cycle-induced price gap also rules out recent concerns that these cycles
could be collusive in nature, which have led to investigations by competition
authorities. Since the lack of a valid identification strategy for the estima-
tion of the effect of cycles on price levels restricted the ability of previous
work to test this fundamental empirical prediction of conventional forms of
collusion, the intra-market variability in cycling behavior that we exploit for
such estimation is also a valuable contribution in that sense. Our results
indicate that the presence of asymmetric cycles in retail gasoline markets do
not pose a threat to competition and therefore are not a public policy issue
to be addressed. On the contrary, these cycles make price changes easier
to predict and are associated with lower prices and lower market-level price
dispersion, all of which benefit consumer welfare.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: New vs Old Indicator Comparison at the Market Level
Old indicator
New indicator Non-cycler Cycler Total
Non-cycler 159 0 159
Cycler 73 81 154
Total 232 81 313
Note: The new indicator classifies cities according to their Cycling Ratio and percent price jump; the old
indicator refers to the median price change, using -0.5 cents as cutoff.
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Table 2.2: Contribution of Cycling Heterogeneity to Cross-Sectional Price
Level Variability
(1) (2)
Pricing strategy
Cycler -3.429∗∗∗ -6.157∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010)
Location characteristics
Income (log) 0.206∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
Population density -0.022∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
On highway 0.184∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
No. of neighboring stations -0.241∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
No. of neighbors (sq) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Station characteristics
Offers loyalty discount 0.586∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
Offers cash discount 3.535∗∗∗ 3.488∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014)
Has convenience store -0.115∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
Has restaurant 0.341∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
Has car wash -0.304∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Has service station 1.730∗∗∗ 1.726∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015)
Has truck stop -0.587∗∗∗ -0.547∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.023)
R2 0.9599 0.9620
Observations 10,113,008 7,184,024
Date-Zip FE Yes Yes
City-Brand FE Yes Yes
Sample Full Rest.
Note: Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day
combination. Standard errors in parenthesis. The symbol *** denote significance at the 99% level.
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Table 2.3: Cycling Behavior, Cycling Price Gap, and Discounts
Loyalty card: No Loyalty card: Yes
% cyclers cycling-gap % cyclers cycling-gap
Cash discount: No 61% -3.14 55% -3.46
Cash discount: Yes 39% -3.33 36% -4.42
Note: The table tabulates the proportion of cycling stations that offer loyalty cards and cash discounts.
The table also shows the cycling-induced price gap for the corresponding subgroup.
Table 2.4: The Effect of Asymmetric Price Cycles on Gasoline Price Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycling indicator -11.446∗∗∗ -4.910∗∗∗ -3.429∗∗∗ -2.710∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Cycling intensity -0.315∗∗∗
(0.003)
Varying cycling ind. -0.576∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Varying cycling int. -0.047∗∗∗
(0.001)
R2 0.2594 0.9359 0.9599 0.9600 0.9862 0.9862
Obs 10,113,008 10,113,008 10,113,008 10,113,008 7,141,398 7,141,398
Y¯ 256.080 256.080 256.080 256.080 254.119 254.119
Date FE Yes
Date-Zip FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Brand FE No No Yes Yes
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day
combination. Cycling indicator is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior; cycle intensity is the
full-sample Cycling Ratio. Varying cycle indicator and intensity are the date-level versions of those two
variables. Standard errors in parenthesis. The symbol *** denote significance at the 99% level.
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Table 2.5: Price Restoration and Changes in Cost for Cycling Stations
Full sample Cycling markets
∆costt > 0 0.023
∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆costt−1 > 0 0.020
∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆costt−2 > 0 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt > 0=1 0.023
∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt−1 > 0=1 0.026
∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt−2 > 0=1 0.002
∗∗ -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.1006 0.1027
Observations 5,820,508 3,313,895
Week-Zip FE Yes Yes
Brand FE Yes Yes
City-dow FE Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: 1(station-level trough); the observation level is a cycling station-day combina-
tion. Standard errors in parenthesis. The symbols **,*** denote significance at the 95% and 99% levels,
respectively.
Table 2.6: Some Evidence on Station Cycling Behavior and Propensity of
Consumer Search
Cycling indicator
In border -0.064∗∗∗
(0.011)
Lower-tax side 0.003
(0.008)
In border=1 × Lower-tax side=1 0.031∗∗
(0.015)
R2 0.3826
Obs 58,497
Location char. Yes
Station char. Yes
City-Brand FE Yes
(a) Cycling behavior at the state border.
Premium Midgrade
Cycler=1 0.602∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.075)
Income (log) -0.017∗∗ -0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
Cycler=1 × Income (log) -0.040∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007)
R2 0.8469 0.7110
Obs 7,130,388 6,943,466
Y¯ 20.561 10.744
Date-Zip FE Yes Yes
City-Brand FE Yes Yes
(b) Premium/midgrade surcharge.
Note: (a) Dependent variable: cycling indicator; the observation level is a gas station. In border =
1(station located within 5 miles of the state border). For measures of state taxes see Hurtado (2018). (b)
Dependent variable: premium and midgrade price differentials with respect to regular gasoline price, in
percentage points; the observation level is a station-date combination. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Price Search and Cycling Strategies
Report frequency
Price -0.012∗∗∗
(0.000)
% of ∆p = 0 -4.389∗∗∗
(0.024)
Cycler=1 0.092∗∗∗
(0.010)
Peaks and troughs
Peak today=1 0.019∗∗∗
(0.007)
Peak tomorrow=1 0.024∗∗∗
(0.007)
Trough today=1 0.000
(0.007)
Trough tomorrow=1 -0.022∗∗∗
(0.007)
Cycler=1 × Peak today=1 -0.008
(0.010)
Cycler=1 × Peak tomorrow=1 0.010
(0.010)
Cycler=1 × Trough today=1 -0.034∗∗∗
(0.009)
Cycler=1 × Trough tomorrow=1 -0.023∗∗
(0.009)
R2 0.2027
Obs 9,968,687
Day-of-the-week FE Yes
Week-zip FE Yes
City-Brand FE Yes
Note: p-values in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 2.1: Retail Gasoline Price Dynamics: Markets with and Without
Asymmetric Cycles
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Note: The figure shows the average price of retail gasoline for Los Angeles, California, and Chicago,
Illinois. Chicago shows an asymetric pricing behavior. Los Angeles shows a smooth average price of retail
gasoline.
Figure 2.2: Maskin and Tirole (1988)’s Edgeworth Cycles
Note: The figure shows the Edgeworth cycles form Maskin and Tirole (1988) paper.
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Figure 2.3: Station-Level Price Dynamics for Two Selected Gas Stations in
Chicago, IL
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(a) Non-cycling gas station.
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(b) Cycling gas station.
Note: Panel (a) of the figure shows the pricing strategy of a gasoline retailer that does not changes prices
as frequently. Panel (b) of the figure shows the reported price of a gasoline retailer that changes prices
frequently.
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Figure 2.4: A New Cycling Indicator: Cycling Ratio and Average Percent
Price Increase
(a) Cycling Ratio and average price
jump.
(b) Cycling indicator definition.
Note: A point in these panels represent a gas station according to its combination of Cycling Ratio and
average percent increase in price (price jump). For the purposes of illustration, only gas stations in Chicago
are displayed.
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Figure 2.5: Indicators’ Performance in the Presence of Price Trends or
Short Data Span
(a) No trend. (b) Increasing trend.
(c) Short data span. (d) Decreasing trend.
Note: The Cycling Ratio is robust to the presence of price trends and short data periods: it equals 2
for panels (a), (b), and (c) regardless of those circumstances because the patterns come from the same
asymmetric-cycling data process. If the decreasing phase of the cycles is under of overrepresented, the
median price change can falsely reject (panels (b) and (c)) or falsely confirm (panel (d)) the presence of
asymmetric cycles.
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Figure 2.7: Heterogeneous Price Strategies Within Markets
(a) Chicago, IL. (b) Dallas, TX.
(c) Boston, MA. (d) Los Angeles, CA.
Note: Blue points represent non-cycling gas stations. Red and orange indicate different levels of cycling
asymmetry.
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Figure 2.8: Close-By Gas Stations with Different Price Strategies
(a) Two cycling stations and one non-cycling station yards away in the Chicago
area.
(b) Price differential between gas stations with different price strategies.
Note: Images were screenshotted from Google Maps and Street view (captured in November 2017). Panel
(a) shows heterogeneous price dynamics types of three gas stations in Park Ridge IL, located yards away
from each other. Panel (b) shows very different posted prices for two of these stations at the same time.
78
Figure 2.9: Price Dynamics of Cycling and Non-Cycling Stations Within
Markets
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(a) Chicago, IL.
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(b) Dallas, TX.
Note: Both panel (a) and (b) of the figure show the average retail gasoline price for non-cyclers and cyclers.
The average price of noncyclers is above the average price of non-cyclers for both Chicago, Illinois, and
Dallas, Texas.
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Figure 2.10: Varying Pricing Strategies
0
.25
.5
.75
1
Nov-17 Dec-17 Jan-18 Feb-18 Mar-18
Share of non-cyclers Share of cyclers
(a) Share of cycling stations across time, U.S.
# stations
Always no-cycler 4,988
Mostly no-cycler 24,918
Mostly cycler 22,906
Always cycler 11,990
Total 64,802
(b) Station strategy switching.
Note: For each gas station, cycling indicators were calculated at every day in the sample using a two-
month window. Panel (a) shows the resulting share of cycling and non-cycling stations in the U.S. over
time. Panel (b) breaks down the firms according to whether they changed strategies during the sample
period or not.
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Figure 2.11: Identification Strategies for the Estimation of the
Cycle-Induced Price Gap
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(a) Average market price of cycling and non-cycling markets, U.S.
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(b) Cycling vs. non-cycling stations in the same market, Chicago IL.
Note: Panel (a) shows the average retail gasoline price for non-cyclers and cyclers in the United States.
Panel (b) shows the reported price for 3 gasoline stations in Chicago. In panel (b), the doted line shows
a non-cycling station and the solid lines show two different cycling stations.
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Figure 2.12: The Effect of Cycles on Price Level over Time
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Note: The coefficients plotted are the date-cycler fixed effect on price, controlling for zipcode and brand.
Figure 2.13: Cycling Price Gap Across Markets
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(a) Ditribution of market price gaps.
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(b) Market price gap and share of
cyclers.
Note: The market price gap is the coefficient of the market-cycler fixed effect, controlling for date, zipcode,
and brand.
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Figure 2.14: Weekly Patterns in Asymmetric Price Cycles, Chicago and
Dallas
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Note: These price dynamics correspond to the average price of cycling stations in each market.
Figure 2.15: Distribution of Troughs and Peaks Across Day of the Week,
Chicago and Dallas
(a) Peaks. (b) Troughs.
Note: For each cycling gas station, the relative frequency of peaks and troughs by day of the week was
calculated. Depicted is the average of those empirical probabilities at the market level.
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Figure 2.16: Market-Level Peaks and Troughs
Day-of-week Peaks % Troughs %
Monday 27 9.22 78 26.62
Tuesday 34 11.60 103 35.15
Wednesday 21 7.17 72 24.56
Thursday 173 59.04 27 9.22
Friday 17 5.80 2 .68
Saturday 4 1.37 1 .34
Sunday 17 5.80 10 3.41
Total 293 100.00 293 100.00
(a) Peaks and troughs by day of the week.
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(b) Max. prob. of peaks and
troughs.
Note: (a) 293 markets broken down according to the day of the week they more likely have peaks and
troughs. (b) The maximum probability of peak (trough) is the probability of peak (trough) of the market
day-of-the-week peak (trough).
Figure 2.17: Price Reporting Activity for Cycling and Non-Cycling
Stations, U.S.
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Note: Report frequency proxied for with a popularity measure constructed based on how long ago prices
were reported.
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Figure 2.18: Market-Level Cross-Sectional Price Dispersion and
Asymmetric Cycles
Note: Each point represent a market in our sample; price dispersion is measured as the average of daily
standard deviations of prices.
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CHAPTER 3
SUPPLY AND DEMAND RESPONSES TO
A TAX ON SIZE OF RENTAL HOUSING:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM IRAN
We use a unique administrative dataset on housing transactions in Tehran
to provide evidence on the incidence and distortionary effects of taxes on
the size of rental properties. We exploit a feature of the tax code in the
Tehran rental market where the tax-exemption threshold is based on the
property’s size in square meters. Substantial bunching occurs below the tax
cutoff, suggesting strong behavioral responses to the tax kink. We also find
higher after-tax rents above the kink. Based on these variations, we develop
a structural framework with property taxes and filing costs to estimate the
responses of supply and demand for rental housing size. We also examine
the question of the economic incidence of the property tax. We estimate a
mid-run (10-year) price response of rental housing size supply of 1.36, and
a price response of rental housing size demand of -0.17. We find high, but
incomplete pass-through of the rental tax, implying that most filing costs are
borne by renters.
3.1 Introduction
A large body of literature in public finance estimates structural parameters
to measure behavioral responses to taxation. Most of these studies consider
supply or demand in isolation, assuming the other side of the market is
perfectly elastic. This is more often the case for the analysis of the housing
market where the relationship between property taxes and housing supply is
generally neglected (Lutz, 2015). Such an assumption may result in biased
estimation of structural parameters because supply and demand responses to
taxes are associated with their share of the tax burden, not the full burden.
This paper develops a structural model to estimate the responses of rental
housing size supply and demand simultaneously. Based on these estimates,
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we answer the classic question: “Who bears the property tax?” A central
challenge in estimating separate structural parameters of supply and demand
is the requirement of observed tax-induced variations in both quantity and
price. In the case of the latter, it involves the identification of how changes
in taxes are passed through to producers and consumers.
This study examines size responses to taxation on rental properties using a
distinctive feature of the tax code in Tehran, where taxes on owners depend
on the size of their property. Specifically, the owner’s tax liability becomes
positive when the total cumulative size of her rental properties exceeds 150m2
(≈ 1600 ft2). This policy started in 2001. Moreover, in Tehran, paying rental
property taxes requires a specific filing process, different from filing income
taxes.1 Owners with zero rental income tax liability are exempted from
filing. Therefore, when the total size of owners’ rental properties surpasses
150 m2, the costs of filing taxes become positive for them.2 In this analysis,
we use a unique administrative dataset that includes over 600,000 rental and
purchasing transactions in Tehran from 2012 to 2014. Tehran’s rental market
provides an advantageous setting because the quasi-experimental variation
in total rental prices around the cutoff allows for quantifying the extent to
which the tax burden passes to renters.
To model demand and supply responses to a discrete change in the marginal
tax rates (a kink) on rental properties of a specific size, which we refer to
as the “size kink,” we develop a theoretical framework in which taxes are on
owners and depend on the size. This framework allows for passing forward
some of the tax burden to renters via higher rents. Moreover, it allows for
tax-induced changes in the measured area of properties around the size kink.
As for the supply responses, we address the hassle costs of complying with
taxes by assuming that this size kink adds extra costs for filing taxes in ad-
dition to owners’ tax liability. Therefore, the total tax liability is made up
of two elements: the fixed costs of filing taxes, and the marginal taxes on
rental income. On the demand side, renters’ responses to taxation are iden-
tified by assuming that renters only observe policy-induced changes in the
rental prices above the cutoff. This model predicts that the size kink creates
an incentive for both owners and renters to move from above the size kink,
1Wage earners are exempt from filing income taxes.
2This contrasts with tax systems in majority of developed countries where taxpayers
file taxes even if they do not owe any taxes.
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and locate at the tax-favored side or, in other words, to exhibit “bunching
behavior.” we show that the amount of bunching, the filing costs, and the
policy-induced changes in the total rent can characterize responses of rental
housing size supply and demand.
Rental housing is a bundle of services produced with land and compos-
ites of materials. Renters value rental units according to their floor area
and other characteristics. The total rent paid by renters is the sum of the
price of each attribute times its quantity. In our administrative database,
we observe total rent and property size in square meters. Unfortunately, the
only other attribute that we have is the time of construction of the property.
Because of this data limitation, we cannot decompose total rental prices into
the price of size and the prices of other characteristics completely. Even if
the quantity of other housing components remains unchanged around the size
kink, it may be possible that prices of other attributes change around the
size-threshold. Because of this data limitation, our structural estimates mea-
sure the responses of rental housing size only; bur our structural estimates
reflect both supply and demand. Our estimates are not comparable to price
elasticities of housing supply and demand from previous literature. However,
our estimates capture the behavioral responses on the size dimension around
the size kink.
For the empirical analysis, we apply the structural model to Tehran rental
market to identify size responses and pass-through rates. First, we estimate
the discrete increase in the rent-value right above the size kink and the change
in rents further away from the kink to identify filing costs and rent responses.
The quasi-experimental design allows for the use of average rent of properties
below 150 m2 as a valid counterfactual for apartments above 150 m2. The
results present significantly higher rent (approximately 3.9 percent) right
above the size kink in response to the filing costs. The results also show that
1 square meter increase in rent above the cutoff is associated with 3,700 to
4,300 Rials (roughly $1 in 2015 dollars) increase in rent. Second, we estimate
the excess bunching, defined as the difference between the empirical and
counterfactual densities in the small interval below the size kink as in Saez
(2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013). The results indicate large bunching
below the cutoff, suggesting strong behavioral responses to the size kink.
We find evidence on heterogeneity by age and neighborhoods, with stronger
responses for “old apartments” and low rent neighborhoods.
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Applying the measures of excess bunching, filing costs, and rent responses
to the model for the entire sample, we find significant responses of rental
housing size supply, ranging from 0.243 to 0.616, and significant but small
in magnitudes responses of rental housing size demand, ranging from -0.015
to -0.025. To alleviate the effects of market frictions, we use the measure
of bunching for the subsample of newly built properties for which owners
can consider tax policy before choosing the size of their properties. While
the estimated responses of rental housing size supply from the representative
of the “frictionless” market are roughly 2 to 6 times bigger, responses of
rental housing size demand are at least 10 times larger, ranging from 0.172
to 0.365. Estimation of the pass-through rate for the frictionless market
shows that most of the economic incidence of taxation is passed on to renters
in the form of higher rents.3 Overall, the results provide clear evidence of
bunching, large frictions, and higher after-tax rent, implying that size-based
taxation on rental properties is highly regressive and distortionary.
This paper builds on and contributes to a growing body of literature on
the distortionary effects of discrete changes in the marginal and proportional
taxes. The main contribution of this paper is to develop a framework that in-
corporates pass-through of taxes as a cost of filing them to estimate responses
of rental housing size supply and demand.
Recent literature documents behavioral response to taxes and transfers
using bunching techniques (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven and
Waseem, 2013). A small body of work has also studied sources of frictions
and has pursued different approaches to account for them (Chetty, 2009;
Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty and Saez, 2013; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Gel-
ber et al., 2013). This literature typically concentrates on one side of the
market, assuming the other side is perfectly elastic, which implies complete
pass-through of taxes.4 This study adds to the existing literature by consid-
ering both supply and demand responses simultaneously.5 This paper also
provides quasi-experimental evidence, plausibly hinging on fewer modeling
assumptions than elsewhere in the literature, regarding the effects of frictions
3In this study tax-incidence is defined as the ratio between the changes in consumer
surplus and the changes in producer surplus due to a tax.
4Saez et al. (2012) mentions that studies on payroll taxes and income-tax reform typi-
cally assume the full tax burden is borne by employees.
5Several studies have recently examined supply of housing and urban dynamics. See
Green et al. (2005), Glaeser et al. (2005), Astyk et al. (2010), and Saiz (2010).
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on the housing market’s responses to property taxes.
Another strand of literature to which this paper relates uses transaction
taxes to analyze behavioral responses to tax policies in the housing market
(Kopczuk and Munroe, 2015; Slemrod et al., 2017; Best and Kleven, 2017).
This paper departs from this literature by focusing on property taxes, which
compared to transaction taxes, represent a long-term tax commitment, and
thus, arguably reveal long-run behavioral responses. Property taxes are also
one of the primary sources of governments’ tax revenue.6 In addition, this
study analyzes the effects of taxes in the rental market, a subject targeted
by a variety of urban policies, but one that remains understudied by the
literature. The findings of substantial evidence of pass-through of taxes to
renters imply regressive distributional burden. This is different from the inci-
dence of transaction taxes (Besley et al., 2014) where both buyers and sellers
are arguably from the same quantile of the income distribution.7 Lastly, in
contrast to the existing literature that focuses on developed countries (e.g.,
the United States and the United Kingdom), this paper provides evidence of
behavioral responses to taxes in the housing market for an emerging country
where raising tax revenue is more of an issue for policymakers.
A few other studies have documented estimates of the costs of filing taxes.8
Benzarti (2015) suggests that the total burden of filing income taxes in the
United States amounts to 1.25 percent of GDP. Kleven and Kopczuk (2011)
model administrative hassle as a policymakers’ instrument to screen out in-
dividuals with higher opportunity costs. Ramnath and Tong (2017) shows
that monetary incentives to file tax returns significantly increase individual’s
participation in the tax system and increase their welfare in the long run.
However, to our knowledge, no literature considers the pass-through bur-
den of filing taxes - in particular, for property taxes. Our results suggest
that most of the burden of complying with rental property taxes is borne by
renters.
This paper is also related to a critical literature on the incidence of prop-
6In 2012, in the United States, transfer taxes compromise less than 2 percent of the
total state tax revenues, while property taxes generated over $480 billion dollars (Census
Bureau, Quarterly Sum of State and Local Tax Revenue).
7In 2014, in the United States, renters’ median income was $33,219, compared
to $68,142 for owners (American Community Survey Five-Year Estimates). Accessed
7/4/2016.
8Slemrod (1989) and Benzarti (2015)
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erty taxes (Simon, 1943; Mieszkowski, 1972; Hamilton, 1976; Fullerton and
Metcalf, 2002). Although, a large body of theoretical work attempts to find
ways to choose between “old,” “benefit,” and “new” views, only a small body
of empirical work addresses property taxes’ effects on rental housing (Carroll
and Yinger, 1994; Muthitacharoen and Zodrow, 2012). To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to combine micro administrative data on
rental properties with policy-induced quasi-experimental variation to analyze
the incidence of property taxes. We find renters bear most of the policy’s
costs. This result is of relevance because renters usually are at the left side
of the income distribution.9
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data sources
and overviews the policy. Section 3.3 develops the theoretical framework.
Section 3.4 describes the empirical methodology. Section 3.5 presents the
results, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data and Background
Taxes on rental properties are common around the world; however, tax policy
on rental properties in Tehran is unusual because the tax depends on both
the size of properties and their rental income.10 This policy was implemented
in 2001. Figure 3.1 presents the average annual tax paid with respect to size.
Taxes are applied to properties located at the right side of the vertical dashed
line; the taxes depend on the extra rental income, defined as the annual rental
income gained from extra square meters above 150 m2. Based on regulations
enforced by the Iranian National Tax Administration (INTA), the policy is
progressive, ranging from a low of 15 percent for an extra rental income less
than or equal to 30 million Rials (approximately $857 in 2015 USD) to a
high of 35 percent for part of an extra income that is over 1,000 million Rials
(approximately $28,571 in 2015 USD). Paying rental property taxes requires
a specific filling process, different from filing income taxes and owners with
zero rental income tax liability are exempted from filing. Table 3.1 shows
the percentage of tax that owners pay on their annual rental income for each
tax bracket in which they qualify.
9Median household income in 2014 (in the United States) was $53,482.
10Law of direct taxes 53-11.
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The primary data used in this paper are obtained from the Rahbar Infor-
matics Services Company (RISC). Since 2009, the law requires all purchasing
and rental transactions to be registered online.11 Nearly all rental properties
in Tehran are owned individually. Also, an owner typically leases her rental
property through real estate agencies. If the owner and renter reach an
agreement, the real estate agent will fill out specific forms online, including
information such as rent or price, full address of the unit, property size, age,
ZIP code, and date of the contract.12 For robustness checks, we also used
records on historical real estate listings in Tehran that come from the web-
site of Iranfile, that is the largest real estate portal in Iran.13 These records
contain rich details of each listing, including the number of stories in the
building, number of units in each floor, facing direction of the unit, kitchen
materials (e.g., steel, wood, MDF, etc.), flooring (e.g. parquet, stone, ce-
ramic, carpet, etc.), building facade materials, years since construction, floor
number, number of bedrooms.14
Since owners of two or more rental properties respond to the size kink at
150 m2 based on the total combined size of all their properties, one potential
concern is that the observed distribution of properties does not capture all
behavioral responses. The reason is that the multiple-rental-property owners
remain unresponsive to the size kink at 150 m2. However, the aggregate data
on homeownership in Tehran shows that only 4 percent of rental properties
belong to owners who possess more than one property.15 Therefore, their
impacts on our estimations are negligible.
The raw data include 278,473 rental and 371,904 purchasing observations
during the years 2012 – 2014. In the final data, we exclude transactions
for which complete information is not available along with all nonresidential
and non-apartment transactions.16 Observations that the district number
11http://www.iranamlaak.ir/Files/TasvibNameh.aspx
12Although personal information of the owner (seller) and tenant (buyer) are recorded,
for reasons of confidentiality the provided data do not include this information.
13www.iranfile.ir
14It also has information on number of phone lines, number of parking, storage, and
balcony, type of heating/cooling system, and whether the building has elevator, yard,
backyard, pool, sauna, and Jacuzzi.
15Rahbar Informatics Services Company (RISC) has provided this number by summa-
rizing number of different rental transactions in each year for each owner, using owner’s
unique identification number.
16An apartment in this study is defined as a unit that is owned individually, which is
very similar to the definition of a condo in the U.S. housing market.
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does not match with the Zip Code, possibly due to data-entering mistakes,
are excluded as well. Moreover, to rule out the effects of outliers, we trim
observations where the rent and price per square meter are in the least 1
percent and beyond the 99 percent levels. The final sample includes 243,144
rental and 344,774 purchasing observations from 2012 to 2014. Figure 3.2
shows the distribution of observations across Tehran to examine whether the
RISC dataset is representative of the universe of properties in Tehran. As can
be seen in Figure 3.2, each panel contains at least 2,800 housing observations
for each of the 22 districts, indicating that the data are representative of
nearly all neighborhoods.
Another concern is misreporting of size by owners to evade taxation. Be-
cause owner-occupied units are exempted from taxation, there is no clear
incentive for owners to misreport the size when they sell their properties.17
Therefore, one way to test for misreporting is to check whether the reported
sizes match in both rental and purchasing data. In doing so, we perform a
fuzzy match of the two datasets based on address, 10-digit ZIP Code, dis-
trict, and floor number. The matched data, composed of the high-quality
matches that result via this method, include 64,677 unique observations. we
focus on properties in the proximity of the size kink (140m2, 150m2], where
the probability of misreporting is expected to be high. The matched data
reveal that for over 87 percent of observations the reported size for the rental
transaction is exactly the same as for the purchased one. More importantly,
for only 4 percent of rental observations in (140m2, 150m2] is the reported
size for the purchasing transactions over 150 m2, which suggests that owners
do not strategically under-report the size of their rental properties.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for rental transactions. Although mean
size is below the cutoff of 150 m2, several thousand rental transactions are
within 10 m2 of the size-threshold. The jump in the average rent-value
right above the size-threshold is evident here, as is the dwindling number
of observations. Note that, the median age of properties is 11 years, which
implies many constructions are fairly new in Tehran.
17Misreporting the size of his rental property at the time of sale is a possible but difficult
undertaking for an owner. The seller, buyer and real estate agent must agree. Moreover,
the average price of more than $1,000 per-square-meter serves as a disincentive for the
seller to report a size that is smaller than the correct one.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
This section describes a model of behavioral responses to taxation in the
rental-housing market; this motivates and underlies the empirical investi-
gation. We analyze the distortion that a tax kink creates at a particular
housing size. We define a size kink as an increase in the marginal tax rates
on rental properties at a specific size. First, we develop a static model with
a cost of filing to measure the owners’ responses to a size kink. Second, to
calculate responses of rental housing size demand, we construct a model for
renters, who optimize their utility based on housing consumption and to-
tal rent price. Finally, we describe the connection between size responses,
tax-incidence, and pass-through rates.
3.3.1 Setup
Consider owners (providers) and renters (tenants) in the rental-housing mar-
ket. Each owner owns a rental property and maximizes profits by choosing
how much housing size services to provide (e.g., square meter). Let us de-
note by s the size of an apartment per-unit of land, which represents units
of housing services. Moreover, let us denote by p the gross equilibrium rent
price per-unit of size.18 Under this setup, an owner of a rental property
with size s receives a total rent of sp. This analysis allows for heterogeneity
on the costs of providing housing services at rent price p. Owners provide
housing services using composite materials, M , and land-factor, L, accord-
ing to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function defined
by S (M,L) = AM
η
1+ηL
1
1+η , where A is a productivity parameter with a
smooth density distribution g (A).19 Intuitively, the productivity parame-
ter controls for qualitative differences such as age, land characteristics, and
location across rental properties.
The housing services on a per-unit of land basis are:
s (m) = Am
η
1+η , (3.1)
18In this study, each unit size is one square meter.
19It can be shown that given a smooth tax system, the smooth productivity distribution
implies a smooth distribution of properties with respect to size.
94
where m = M
L
. Let us normalize the price per-unit of materials factors to
one and let us denote by r the land factor price. Solving for m in equation
(3.1), the owner’s profit per-unit of land is given by:20
π (s) = sp−
( s
A
)1+ 1
η
− r. (3.2)
Suppose the introduction of a discrete increase in the marginal tax rate
(a kink) for properties bigger than s. Suppose further that the owners of
rental properties larger than s pay taxes, τ , on the marginal rental income
gained from the extra square meters above this threshold. In response to
the size kink, each owner maximizes profits and relocates to the new optimal
size in the presence of taxes, assuming zero adjustment cost.21 Moreover,
assume that paying taxes adds extra filing costs on owners, denoted by f .
Intuitively, the cost of filing taxes captures the aversion to filing taxes, time
costs, record keeping, and tax-preparers’ fees. We assume that owners with
zero tax liability do not need to file any taxes, implying f = 0 for properties
sized below or equal s.
3.3.2 Responses of Rental Housing Size Supply
A size kink imposes tax liabilities and filing costs to owners, which can be
shifted forward to renters (i.e., pass-through). Let us denote by γ the pass-
through of filing costs and tax liability to renters via a discrete increase in
the total rent for properties sized above s. Hence, profits are given by:
π(s) = sp−
( s
A
)1+ 1
η
− r − ✶(s > s) · [τ (s− s) p+ (1− γ) f ] , (3.3)
where ✶(s > s) is the indicator function that takes the value of one if s > s,
and zero otherwise, and τ denotes the tax on the marginal rental income
20For simplicity, we only consider one period by assuming that the discount rate for
rental income β = 0. Considering a richer model with β 6= 0 only complicates the analysis,
and it does not change the quantitative conclusion.
21Think of it as an owner selling his current rental property and buying another property
of an optimal size where search costs of selling and buying are negligible. In practice, the
adjustment costs are lower for newly built and very old properties. In the case of the
former, an owner has the opportunity to take into account the effects of tax policy before
choosing the optimal size of her rental property. In the case of the latter, the opportunity
costs of demolishing properties and replacing them with properties smaller than the size
kink are arguably lower for owners of old properties.
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gained from the extra square meters above s. This is the owner’s profit per-
unit of land, equation (3.2), but with the possible additional cost of taxes
and filing cost.
The first order condition yields the following supply function:
s =
(
η
1 + η
)η
A1+η(1− ✶(s > s) · τ)ηpη. (3.4)
Notice that η = p
s
∂s
∂p
is the response of rental housing size supply with respect
to the total rent price. Figure 3.3 illustrates the implication of this size
kink in a production function diagram. Introduction of a size kink creates a
discontinuity in the Iso-profit curve at s and make it steeper for s > s. The
gap in the Iso-profit curves at s implies that owners who would have chosen
their rental properties in the range (s, s+∆s), in the absence of the size kink
can optimize their profits by providing less housing services and bunch at s.
Let us subindex with l the owners with the lowest productivity, Al, among
those who choose s = s. They would provide s both in the presence and
absence of the size kink. We indicate with h the owners with the highest
productivity, Ah, among those who bunch at the s. They would provide
s¯ = s + ∆s when there is no size kink. In the presence of the size kink,
they are indifferent between supplying s and s¯. With no other frictions in
the model, all owners with productivity parameters in the range (Al, Ah) will
bunch at the cutoff.22
Let us denote by p0 the distorted gross equilibrium rent price of an apart-
ment of size s, and denote by p1 the rent price of an apartment of size s¯ in
the presence of the size kink. Using equation (3.4), the marginal bunching
individual provides s¯ =
(
η
1+η
)η
A1+ηh (1 − τ)
ηpη1. From equation (3.3), there
are two possible profits for the marginal bunching individual:
π0 = p0s−
(
s
Ah
)1+ 1
η
− r, (3.5)
22Note that the above analysis is concentrated on intensive margin responses and cannot
identify extensive margin responses. Kleven and Waseem (2013) and Best and Kleven
(2017) show that extensive margin responses converges to zero in the vicinity of the cutoff.
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and
π1 = s¯p1 −
(
s¯
Ah
)1+ 1
η
− r − τ (s¯− s) p1 − (1− γ) f
= s¯p1(1− τ)−
(
s¯
Ah
)1+ 1
η
− r + τsp1 − (1− γ) f
=
ηη
(1 + η)1+η
A1+ηh (1− τ)
1+η p1+η1 − r + τsp1 − (1− γ) f. (3.6)
If we denote by p∗ the rent price in the absence of the size kink, from
equation (3.4), the marginal buncher has A1+ηh =
s¯
p∗η
(
1+η
η
)η
. Plugging this
expression in equation (3.6), and noting that π0 = π1, the relationship be-
tween the responses of rental housing size supply, rent responses, filing costs,
and bunching is:23
s
s¯
[
p0 − τp1
p∗
+
(1− γ)f
s¯p∗
]
=
1
1 + η
[
(1− τ) p1
p∗
]1+η
+
η
1 + η
( s
s¯
) 1+η
η
.
(3.7)
To solve equation (3.7) for η, we need to estimate the size responses s¯, the
pass-through rate γ, the filing costs f , the and the counterfactual rent price
p∗. The remaining parameters s, p0, p1 and τ are directly observable.
We estimate the size responses, s¯, using the total amount of bunching
(Saez, 2010). The number of owners who decide to locate at s after the
introduction of the size kink is:
B =
∫ s¯
s
h(s)ds ≈ h(s)∆s, (3.8)
where h(s) is the counterfactual density of s without taxation. This approx-
imation uses the standard assumption that h(s) is roughly constant around
the bunching interval. Hence, by estimating the amount of bunching B, and
the counterfactual density h(s) at the size-threshold, we numerically solve
for ∆s. Section 3.4.1 describes the empirical methodology for estimating B
and h(s).
For the remaining parameters, in section 3.3.4 we explain the relationship
between the responses of rental housing size supply and demand and the
pass-through rates. Finally, in section 3.4.2 we develop the identification
23Check appendix G.1 for the details.
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strategy to estimate rent responses and cots of filing.
3.3.3 Responses of Rental Housing Size Demand
From the demand perspective, we model individual preferences using a utility
function that only depend on consumption. We divide consumption into
two groups: consumption of housing and composition of all other goods.
Consumption of other goods equals the total income net of rent. We use
size as a proxy for housing consumption. Given all other variables, a larger
property provides higher utility for a renter. We use the following quasi-linear
utility function to represent individual preferences:
U (c, s) = c−
ǫ
1− ǫ
α
1
ǫ s1−
1
ǫ , (3.9)
where c is the consumption of market goods, ǫ is a positive constant different
than one24, s is the size of the apartment, and α is a measure of the relative
housing preferences. The quasi-linearity assumption on the preferences rules
out the income effects. Hence, the responses of rental housing size demand
reflects only the substitution effects in response to rent changes induced by
the size kink.25 Given the assumption on preferences, renters spend their
entire income, y, on rent and the composite good.
Although the statutory incidence of taxes is on owners, renters bear part
of the incidence that is passed into the rent. Let us consider a pass-through
of the tax burden in the form of a discrete increase in the total rent (equals to
γf) for properties bigger than s. Therefore, the budget constraint for renters
is: y = sp+ c+✶(s > s) · (γf), where ✶(s > s) is the indicator function that
takes the value of one if s > s, and zero otherwise. Replacing the budget
constraint into equation (3.9), we get:
U (c, s) = y − sp− ✶(s > s) · (γf)−
ǫ
1− ǫ
α
1
ǫ s1−
1
ǫ . (3.10)
The discontinuity and nonlinearity in the budget constraint at the right side
of the size kink creates an incentive for renters to locate at s to increase
24We show in equation (3.11) that this constant is related to the responses of rental
housing size demand because ǫ = −p
s
∂s
∂p
.
25Saez (2010) explains that income effects are negligible when changes in the marginal
tax rates are small because income effects depend on the average tax rates.
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their utility level. Figure 3.4 illustrates the mechanism, assuming heteroge-
neous housing preferences among individuals. A renter’s first order condition
(FOC) with respect to size leads to the following equation:
s = αp−ǫ, (3.11)
which shows an inverse relationship between gross rent and property size, if
the size response is negative (e.g., ǫ > 0).
Let us subindex with l the renters with the lowest preferences, αl, among
those who bunch at the tax-cutoff. They would choose s both in the absence
and presence of the size kink. We indicate with h the marginal renters with
the highest preferences, αh, among those who bunch at the s. They are
indifferent between s and s¯ in the presence of the size kink. Their optimal
choice in the absence of the size kink would be s¯ = s + ∆s. All renters
with preferences between (αl, αh), who would rent properties with size in the
range (s, s¯), bunch at the size kink. The utility level at s is:
u = y − sp0 −
ǫ
1− ǫ
α
1
ǫ
h s
1− 1
ǫ . (3.12)
Using equation (3.11), we have s¯ = αh(p1)
−ǫ. Hence, the corresponding
utility is
u¯ = y − s¯p1 − γf −
ǫ
1− ǫ
α
1
ǫ
h s¯
1− 1
ǫ
= y − αhp
1−ǫ
1 − γf −
ǫ
1− ǫ
αhp
1−ǫ
1 (3.13)
Let us denote by p∗ the rent price in the absence of the size kink. In this
case, individual h would choose a property with size s¯, which implies αh =
s¯p∗ǫ. Replacing αh in equations (3.12) and (3.13), and using the condition
u = u¯, the response of rental housing size demand is an implicit function of
size responses, the change in rent, and the filing cost:26
s
s¯
[
p0
p∗
−
γf
sp∗
]
=
1
1− ǫ
(
p1
p∗
)1−ǫ
−
ǫ
1− ǫ
( s
s¯
)− 1−ǫ
ǫ
(3.14)
Upon market clearing assumption, the rent response, total volume of bunch-
ing, and size response are the same from both supply and demand perspec-
26See appendix G.2 for the details on the derivation.
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tives. Therefore, using the same measure of rent and size responses from the
previous section, we can numerically solve for ǫ.
3.3.4 Pass-Through and Incidence
Under perfect competition, the pass-through – marginal changes in prices
due to a change in taxes – is a function of the relative elasticities of supply
and demand (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013):
γ =
dP
dτ
=
1
1− ǫ
η
=
η
η − ǫ
, (3.15)
where P is the after-tax price. This equation intuitively means that the
greater the price elasticity of one side of the market is, the more the tax
burden is borne by the other side.27 Pass-through itself is a key parameter
to determine incidence ratio, I, defined as the ratio between the changes in
consumer surplus (renters) and the changes in producer surplus (owners).
Applying the envelope theorem to the consumers, a decrease in the con-
sumer surplus (renters) due to an increase in a tax is equal to the product of
equilibrium quantity Q∗, and γ. Similarly, applying the envelop theorem to
producers, the reduction in producer surplus (owners) is equal to Q∗ times
the change in producers’ price 1− γ. Therefore, we have:
I =
∂CS/∂τ
∂PS/∂τ
=
γ
1− γ
= −
η
ǫ
, (3.16)
where CS is the consumer surplus and PS is the producer surplus.28 In-
tuitively incidence larger than one means the majority of the tax burden is
borne by the demand side of the market. Therefore, under perfect competi-
tion, the relative elasticity of supply and demand can fully characterize the
pass-through rates and tax incidence.
To numerically solve for η and ǫ, we use an iterative method with an
initial guess for the pass-through rate γ. This method generates successive
approximations to solve equation (3.7) and (3.14), by updating γ using the
previous approximations of γ and ǫ.
27Note that under imperfect competition, calculation of pass-through requires more
information about the market structure and demand curvature (Ganapati et al., 2016).
28These analyses assume infinitesimal changes in tax rates beginning from zero.
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3.4 Empirical Methodology
This section presents the empirical methodology for the identification of ex-
cess bunching B, rent counterfactual rent p∗, and filing costs f around the
size kink; the parameters required to estimate the structural parameters.
3.4.1 Estimation of Excess Bunching
The difference between the observed and counterfactual densities around the
size kink provides a measure of excess bunching. To recover the counterfac-
tual density, defined as the density of rental properties with respect to size
in the absence of the size kink, we fit a smooth polynomial to the empirical
density and exclude the observations around the kink that are affected by the
tax policy (Kleven and Waseem, 2013). The reason is that in the presence
of the size kink, individuals in the range (s, s+∆s] cluster at the left side of
the size kink in the range (so, s].
29 Therefore, apartments are grouped into
small size bins (i.e., one square meter) and estimate the following classical
regression:
Ni =
k∑
j=0
bjs
j
i +
∑
r∈R
ρr · ✶
(si
5
∈ N
)
+
s+∆s∑
s=so
es · ✶ (si = s) + νi, (3.17)
where Ni is the number of apartments in bin i, the size-level is si, the order
of the polynomial is k, and ✶
(
si
5
∈ N
)
are indicator variables that controls
for rounding effects.30 The excess distribution is capture by the indicator
✶ (si = s), for s ∈ (so, s+∆s].
The counterfactual density is the fitted value of the dependent variable
from equation (3.17), excluded from the estimated values of dummies in the
29In practice, excess bunching doesn’t occur at one point, instead, it is spread over a
tiny band (so, s]. The optimal bunching segment is the one that the difference between
the counterfactual and empirical distribution is minimum.
30One possible concern is that owners may tend to register the properties’ size in round
numbers, which can cause spikes at multiples of 5 in the empirical distribution. To address
this issue we use the finite set of rounded sizes that are natural numbers N, that is,
φ =
{
s| s5 ∈ N
}
. We denote by R a set of indexes for φ.
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affected range. We estimate it using the classical regression:
N˜i =
k∑
j=0
b˜js
j
i +
∑
r∈R
ρ˜r✶
(si
5
∈ N
)
+ εi. (3.18)
As mentioned above, excess bunching is the difference between empirical and
counterfactual densities for a range (so, s], that is: B̂ =
∑
i∈(so,s]
(Ni−N˜i).
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We compute the standard errors of the excess bunching using a bootstrap
procedure.
3.4.2 Estimating Rent Responses and Cost of Filing Taxes
As mentioned in the theoretical section, if owners can pass forward some of
the burdens of filing costs to renters, the expectation is to observe a dis-
crete increase in total rent right above the size kink. Similarly, an increase
in marginal tax rates above the cutoff can be shifted forward to renters in
the form of higher rent for extra size above the cutoff. Figure 3.5 graphi-
cally shows how the treatment effect is identified using evidence from data.
Comparison between the mean annual rent at the left and right side of the
size kink, presented in the figure, provides clear evidence of a spike in rent
payments for properties that are located right above the size kink. Figure 3.5
provides evidence that a policy-induced spike exists in rent payments at the
cut-off; however, to test this hypothesis, we estimate the following regression:
Renti = β0 + β1SizeKinki + β2SizeKinki ×
(
Sizei − 150m
2
)
+
β3
(
Size− 150m2
)
+ β4Agei + β5Age
2
i+
Zipcodei + t+Q+ εi (3.19)
where Renti is the annual real rent for apartment i. Age, and Age
2 control for
the characteristics of the rental properties. SizeKink is a dummy variable
31One concern is that this method does not consider the shifting of the observed distri-
butions above s + ∆s to the right of the cutoff. However, Kleven (2016) describes that
these effects are negligible in many applications, in particular, if the observed distribution
is not steep.
32Note that if the number of owners with more than one rental property is significantly
high, the estimated bunching underrepresents the true level; in this case our estimation of
the response will be a lower bound. However, in this sample, only 4 percent of properties
belong to owners with more than one property.
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equal to one for properties larger than 150 m2, and zero otherwise. Interac-
tion of SizeKink with (Size − 150m2) captures the change in the slope of
rent per square meter above 150 m2. ZIP Code-level fixed effects are added
to control for the neighborhood characteristics. In Iran, the 10-digits ZIP
Code locates an address precisely. The first 5 digits of a ZIP Code can prop-
erly determine the neighborhood boundaries, which typically contain several
blocks.33 The data cover 2,601 neighborhoods in Tehran. Year fixed-effects t,
control for business cycles and macroeconomic variables that may affect the
overall rental housing market. Seasonal fixed effects Q, control for seasonal
patterns in the rental market.34
The central coefficient of interest in equation (3.19) is β1 that captures the
differences of rent value between properties above and below the cutoff due
to the pass-through of the filing costs. The other coefficient of interest is β2,
that capture the effects of marginal taxes on rent per square meter above
the cutoff point. The coefficient of SizeKink, β1, will do a better job in
capturing the effects of filing costs around the cutoff because tax liability is
very small. On the other hand, as the size gets further away from the cutoff,
the tax liability becomes larger and β2 can capture the effects of marginal
taxes more precisely. Therefore, we estimate equation (3.19) for different
samples: the entire sample, a sample that only include observations around
the cutoff, and a sample that exclude the bunching area.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Graphical Evidence
Figure 3.6 illustrates the distribution of rental properties with respect to size
for the entire sample (panel a) and newly built properties (panel a) between
March 2012 and September 2014 by bins of 5 m2.35 The size kink is denoted
by the vertical dashed line, which itself belongs to the tax-zero side of the
33A block is defined as the smallest area surrounded by four streets.
34The Box-Cox lambda transformation for our specification shows that qualitatively
linear transformation is a better choice compared to log-log and log-linear transformations.
The transformation parameter is 0.62.
35Newly built properties are defined as those for which the “year since construction” is
zero at the time of transaction.
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kink. Two elements are worth noting in these panels. First, there is clear
evidence of bunching right below the tax-exemption threshold, followed by
a substantial drop in the number of properties above it. Second, sharper
bunching at the kink point surfaces in the distribution of newly built prop-
erties for which owners have already taken into account the tax policy before
choosing the size of their apartments.36 This is consistent with the opti-
mization friction theory of Kleven and Waseem (2013) that predicts larger
responses in frictionless markets compared to the ones observed in the pres-
ence of frictions. Sample of newly built properties is a suitable representative
of a frictionless market because the adjustment costs of choosing the optimal
size are much smaller for owners, who purchase them for leasing. This also
implies that a more responsive supply leads to stronger bunching at the size
kink.
Exploiting the longitudinal feature of the dataset, Figure 3.7 breaks down
the full sample of properties into three consecutive years, 2012-2014, to il-
lustrate the dynamics of bunching behaviors.37 While all three panels show
substantial bunching at 150 m2, the contrast between panel a (year: 2012)
and panel c (year: 2014) is still striking, suggesting that behavioral responses
are magnified over time. One way of thinking about this transition is that
the stock of existing properties, i.e., properties that were built before the im-
plementation of tax-regulation (2001), decreases through time.38 The share
of existing properties for each year, presented in Table 3.3, demonstrates that
sharper bunching is associated with the reduced share of existing stock.
To explicitly verify that the tax policy induces bunching, Figure 3.8 presents
the comparison of the density of apartments that were constructed before the
tax-regulation and newly built apartments in the owner-occupant market.
The sample of newly built properties here is reduced to observations from
2014, which have the furthest time-distance from the tax implementation
date. The focus here is on the owner-occupant market that is not subject
36The reduction in the number of apartments that occurs by moving from the bin
(145m2, 150m2] to the bin (150m2, 155m2] is 58 percent for panel b, versus 52 percent for
panel a.
37Data are broken down into a three-year period based on Iranian calendar in which the
new year starts on March 21st.
38Here, we count an apartment as existing if it has been completely constructed before
2004, assuming that those between 2001 and 2003 had already been partly built at the
time of the change in the regulation. However, changing the cut-off criteria from 2004 to
2003 or 2002 does not noticeably affect the graphs or results.
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to the property taxes (as opposed to the rental market). As in the figure,
for properties built before the introduction of the regulation, the density
smoothly decreases over size, and there is no evidence of systematic cluster-
ing below the size kink. Moreover, the absence of evident bunching in the
density of old properties helps to rule out alternative explanations for bunch-
ing at the focal point. In fact, properties in both graphs are similar in all
respects except age. In contrast, the distribution of newly built properties in
2014 provides clear evidence of bunching at the size kink.
3.5.2 Estimation of Rent Responses and Filing Costs
We estimate equation (3.19) to measure the rent responses to the tax in
Tehran rental market. Under the null hypothesis of no tax policy effects on
rent, the coefficients on the dummy variable for size, β1, and the interaction
term, β2, in equation (3.19) are zero: owners of properties larger than 150 m
2
cannot shift forward the burden of filing costs and marginal taxes to renters
through higher rent. On the other hand, as long as supply is not perfectly
inelastic, the prediction is that the size kink creates a spike in the rent value
right above the tax-cutoff, followed by a linear increase in rent per square
meter afterward.
Table 3.4 presents the OLS estimates of β1 and β2 for various versions
of equation (3.19). All specifications include year, seasonal, and 5-digit ZIP
Code fixed effects. Results for the entire sample, presented in models 1 and 2,
suggest that introduction of the size kink at 150m2 lead to a discrete increase
in the rent value, and positive change in rent per square meter for each extra
square meter above the cutoff. The positive and significant coefficients for
β1 and β2 imply that some of the tax burden is passed forward to renters.
Models 3 and 4 of the same table present the results for the sample that
removes observations in the range (140m2, 160m2). The point estimate of
the interaction term in model 4 is larger in magnitude, suggesting that the
effects of marginal taxes on rent per square meter tend to enhance further
away from the cutoff.
Models 5 and 6 report estimates from specifications that restrict the sample
to include only observations within 10 square meters of the cutoff. This
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restriction plausibly isolates the effects of filing costs on rent.39 The results
in models 5 and 6, which are not significantly different from their counterparts
in models 3 and 4, show that the burden of filing taxes is associated with
a 140,000 (approximately $3.9 in 2015 dollars) Rials increase in rent per
square meter.40 Considering average rent per square meter of 3,600,000 Rials
(approximately $100 in 2015 dollars) per square meter below the cutoff, this
number can be translated to 3.9 percent increase in rent value right above the
cutoff. This is also consistent with findings of Benzarti (2015) and Ramnath
and Tong (2017) that show individuals compromise a significant amount of
money to avoid the burden of filing taxes.
3.5.3 Estimation of Excess Bunching
Figure 3.9 presents the results of excess bunching by comparing the empirical
and counterfactual distributions of properties with respect to size for different
samples. Counterfactual distributions in all panels are estimated based on
equation (3.17). Panel a shows the results for the entire sample. Panel b
focuses on newly built properties in the rental market where greater bunching
is happening. Panel c, on the other hand, presents the same graphs in the
owner-occupant market by combining purchasing transactions of newly built
properties for the years 2012 to 2014. Each panel shows the estimation of
excess bunching which is defined as the proportion of excess bunching to the
counterfactual frequency in the small interval above the kink.41
The main findings from these panels are the following. First, excess bunch-
ing for all panels is highly significant varying from 1 to 5 times the height of
the counterfactual distributions. Second, the estimated parameter is larger
for the newly built apartments in both rental and owner-occupant markets,
thus supporting the idea that attenuation of frictions leads to stronger re-
sponses. Third, the difference in magnitude of excess bunching in panel a
and b also suggests that stronger bunching responses are associated with the
more elastic supply.
39This restriction also rules out the alternative explanation that observations with both
large size and high rents are driving the results.
40Wald test results cannot reject the null hypotheses of restricting the point estimates
in models 4 and 6 to be the same.
41As a robustness check, we use different orders of polynomials to estimate the counter-
factual distributions. The results appear to be insensitive to the order of polynomials.
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Examining the heterogeneous bunching responses across different type of
properties, Figures 3.10 and 3.11 present excess bunching based on the prop-
erty’s age and rent-value. Panel a in Figure 3.10 includes rental properties
that were built at least 5 years before the tax regulation. Panel b of the
same figure presents the same histogram for older rental properties by trim-
ming the dataset further to include only rental properties that were built at
least 15 years before the regulation. Figure 3.11 presents excess bunching
for high- and low- rent regions. In doing so, the full sample is split into two
subsamples, one that includes only properties located in postal regions with
average rent above the median, and the other one that includes the rest of
observations.
There is evidence of heterogeneity by the property’s age that suggests an
increasing relationship between age and volume of bunching. This is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that housing deteriorates with age (Brueckner and
Rosenthal, 2009). Therefore, older dwellings (with probably lower quality)
larger than 150 m2 can be torn down and replaced with new dwellings with
size below 150 m2 at arguably lower costs. Moreover, Figure 3.11 illustrates
that the bunching for apartments in low-rent neighborhoods is strongly larger
compared to high rent neighborhoods. This contrast can be interpreted as ev-
idence that owners and renters in low-rent neighborhoods might have higher
responses. These figures may suggest that some of the responses are along
with other margins such as quality. In Section 3.5.5, we compare the hous-
ing characteristics of properties at the two side of the cutoff to explore this
possibility further.42
To rule out alternative explanations for bunching at the focal point, we
formally check for the presence of a density discontinuity at the size kink in
the owner-occupant market, by performing the McCrary test separately for
the distributions of the full sample of newly built properties, and proper-
ties built before the regulation (McCrary, 2008). The results are consistent
with the graphical evidence, suggesting that the log-difference between the
frequencies of newly built properties just below and above the size kink are
statistically significant, while the null hypothesis that the discontinuity at
the size kink is zero cannot be rejected for already built properties.43 The
42Saez et al. (2012) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) argue that tax-induced responses
along other margins still indicate the efficiency costs of taxation.
43Point estimates of the McCrary tests for distributions in Figure 3.8 are as follows:
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contrast between these two distributions confirms that the supply of new
housing strongly responds to the tax policy. This finding also provides evi-
dence of tax spillovers – i.e., the impact of tax policy in one market on others
– in the housing market.
3.5.4 Estimation of Elasticities and Pass-Through
The measures of rent responses, bunching, and costs of filing around the kink
point (150m2) allow us to calculate the separate estimation of responses of
rental housing size demand and supply using the structural framework intro-
duced in Section 3.3. Table 3.5 presents the estimated responses for different
choices of bunching segments. The table presents five models. Models 1
and 2 report the responses of rental housing size demand and supply using
equation (3.7) and (3.14), respectively. Models 3 and 4 present estimated
responses, using the measure of bunching from the subsample of newly built
properties, the representative of the frictionless market. Model 5 takes the
estimated responses from column (3) and (4) and embeds them into equation
(3.15) to measure the pass-through rate.
The results for the entire sample show that both responses of rental housing
size supply and demand are almost always statistically significant with the
expected signs for all specifications, consistent with the graphical evidence
presented earlier.44 The estimated responses of rental housing size supply for
the subsample of newly built properties, the representative of the frictionless
market, are 2 to 6 times as large as their counterparts in model 1. This
contrast highlights the substantial role of frictions in attenuating the rental
housing size supply responses. The estimates of rental housing size demand
responses, reported in models 2 and 4, are smaller, but still significant. Re-
sults here suggest that the estimation of the response of rental housing size
demand highly depends on the magnitude of bunching responses. Model 5
presents the estimation of the pass-through rates that range between 0.88
and 0.91 across the different choice of bunching segments, meaning that the
Newly built properties: 0.451 (0.039); Built before the regulation: 0.074 (0.045). Optimal
bin size and bandwidth as in McCrary (2008).
44Although estimated responses based on the measure of bunching from the entire sam-
ple are small, they are consistent with the literature on behavioral responses to transaction
taxes, which finds relatively small elasticities in spite of large housing price responses, e.g.
Best and Kleven (2017).
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incidence ratio is over one.45
3.5.5 Robustness Checks
This section contains additional estimations to ensure that potential biases
in the sample or alternative explanations do not drive the results. One alter-
native explanation is that some of the local response to the size-kink may be
due to the supply side and demand side adjustment along the quality margin.
Although our concentration is on a narrow band around the tax cutoff, it is
possible that properties below and above the cutoff are significantly different
along housing characteristics other than size. To investigate this possibility,
we use records on real estate listings in Tehran for years 2014 to 2016.
Table 3.6 presents the summary statistics for the 875 listings. Column (1)
and (2) present the housing characteristics for observations in the size range
(140m2, 150m2] and (150m2, 160m2], respectively. Each row presents the
mean value of housing characteristics for both groups. Column (3) presents
the results for the mean difference between the two groups. The t-statistics
are in parentheses. Column (4) reports the p-value. For mostly all key hous-
ing characteristics there is no significant difference between the two groups of
observations. In fact, the computed Benjamini-Hochberg p-values only reject
the null hypothesis for one characteristic with a significance of one percent.46
Although there is no direct way to fully capture the quality of housing, at-
tributes such as facing direction, kitchen materials, flooring, building facade,
and age plausibly reflect the quality of housing. Hence, the results here are
reassuring that the base results for the rent responses and costs of filing are
not significantly biased by the quality adjustment.
We also run placebo tests to investigate the causality concerns regarding
the effect of the tax policy on rent. If the results reflect a treatment effect of
the tax kink, then the results should disappear if we falsely assume that the
treatment occurs at 10 square meters before or after the actual kink-point.
45While the results do not seem to be very sensitive to the choice of the bunching
segment, increasing the length of the bunching segment lead to inclusion of lower and
upper band densities around the size kink that are probably affected by the tax policy
(Saez, 2010). Therefore, one would expect to see higher responses when the length of
bunching segments is increased. As a result, the baseline estimations that rely on small
bunching segment around the kink are lower-bound estimates.
46Although the difference for the number of bedrooms between the two groups is signif-
icant, the magnitude is small.
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For these tests, we run two additional regressions, one for observations within
the interval (130 m2, 150 m2) assuming 140 m2 is the size kink, and another
one for observations within the interval (150 m2, 170 m2) assuming 160 m2
is the size kink. Results of these regressions indicate that the coefficients
estimates on the falsified kink dummies are insignificant. We do two addi-
tional placebo tests for intervals (120 m2, 140 m2) and (160 m2, 180 m2).
As in the previous test, results again indicate that falsified dummies are not
significant. Therefore, the placebo tests show that the baseline results are
robust to subsample choices and the size kink has a causal effect on rent
values.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has taken advantage of rich micro administrative data on rental
properties in Tehran and quasi-experimental variation in marginal taxes to
estimate the responses of rental housing size demand and supply simulta-
neously. This paper then examined the pass-through rate of the size kink
using the estimated responses. The analysis reveals substantial evidence of
behavioral responses through bunching below the size kink, and a rent spike
above it. Using the measure of bunching from newly built properties that
have fewer frictions, the responses of rental housing size supply and demand
are at least 10 times larger compared to estimates using the entire sample.
The high but incomplete estimation of pass-through rates suggests that own-
ers are able to pass forward the majority of the tax burden in the form of
higher rents.
This paper shows the importance of considering the supply responses to un-
cover structural parameters of demand. Additional conclusions are reached
because the setting accounts for the effects of incomplete pass-through in
attenuating demand responses. The results from the representation of the
“frictionless” market highlight the effects of frictions on attenuating behav-
ioral responses. Moreover, this may be of broader interest in other fields
that generally assume completely elastic supply and full pass-through. The
estimation of incidence ratio above one implies that renters who typically are
at the bottom tail of the income distribution are the ones who bear most of
the cost of the policy. That is, size-based taxes on rental properties might
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be highly regressive. Finally, the findings show that rental taxation policy
not only distorts the owners’ and renters’ decisions in the rental market but
also induces large distortionary responses in the owner-occupant market.
In this paper, we provided a framework to estimate separate responses
of rental housing size supply and demand using evidence of bunching and
incidence. Here, we focus on the effects of taxation on locations around
the kink-point where agents chiefly react through the intensive margin. It
would be interesting to use this evidence to examine the extensive responses
to the size kink. We also provided evidence that size-based tax policy will
increase the supply of smaller apartments of a size below the cutoff, which can
ultimately lead to higher urban density. Another exciting research question
would be to consider the tax-induced variation in urban density to analyze
its impacts on labor markets and urban characteristics such as innovation
rate, local climate, and energy consumptions.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Rental Income Tax Schedule
Bracket (000 Rials) Marginal Tax Rate
0 - 30,000 15%
30,000 - 100,000 20%
100,000 - 250,000 25%
250,000 - 1,000,000 30%
Over 1,000,000 35%
Note: Taxable rental earnings are shown in thousands of Rials, with the IRR to USD
exchange rate varying from 15,000 to 39,000 during these years. For owners of rental
properties with a combined total size over 150 m2, each bracket cutoff is associated with
a jump in the marginal tax rate.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Rental Transactions
Number of
Observations
Mean
Annual Rent
(000 Rials)
Mean
Age
(Years)
Mean Size
(Sqr.
Meters)
Entire Sample 243,144 3,046 11 79.4
(2.74) (0.02) (0.07)
In the range (140 , 150 ] 3,951 3,635 14.4 146.0
(25.9) (0.20) (0.05)
In the range (150 , 160 ) 1,813 3,853 13.7 154.9
(38.09) (0.27) (0.06)
Note: This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of residential units that
were rented between March 2012 to September 2014. Rent values are deflated to reflect
2015 prices using the Statistical Centre of Iran Housing Price Index. Data is obtained
from Rahbar Informatics Service Corporate (RISC). The IRR to USD exchange rate was
between 15,000 and 39,000 during these years.
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Table 3.3: Existing Stock of Housing
Year Properties
built before
2004
Properties
built after
2004
Share of existing
stock (before /
(before + after))
Difference (%) in
Properties between
bin 150 and 155
Q2 2012 - Q2 2013 52,322 25,940 66.9% 49.3%
Q2 2013 - Q2 2014 49,958 49,444 50.3% 51.9%
Q2 2014 - Q3 2014 30,585 34,895 46.7% 56.1%
Total 132,865 110,279 54.6% 52.2%
Note: The table presents the breakdowns of the number of properties by year and time of
construction. Sharper shrink in the number of properties above the kink-point is associated
with a reduced share of existing stock of housing.
Table 3.4: The Effects of Taxation on Rent
Dependent variable is total rent
Entire Sample Excluding (140-160) Only(140-160)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
SizeKink : β1 238.62*** 143.66*** 293.37*** 153.43*** 140.09* 125.38
(26.04) (29.84) (29.25) (35.58) (81.62) (86.23)
SizeKink × (Size− 150) : β2 3.78*** 4.30*** 5.71
(0.57) (0.63) (17.07)
(Size− 150) : β3 -3.90*** -4.36*** -4.19*** -4.69*** -17.74** -19.20**
(0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (7.21) (8.74)
Observations 243,144 243,144 237,380 237,380 5,764 5,764
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.54
Note: The dependent variable is the total annual real rent. Regressions are based on
equation (3.19) using the entire sample (March 2012 to September 2014). SizeKink is
a dummy variable equal to one for properties larger than 150 m2. Models 2, 4 and 6
include the interaction of SizeKink and size-threshold. All specifications include 5-digit
ZIP Code, year, and seasonal fixed effects. Standard errors in all columns are clustered
by 5-digit ZIP Code, and stars indicate statistical significance level. * = 10 percent level,
** = 5 percent level, *** = 1 percent level.
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Table 3.5: Estimates of Responses of Rental Housing Size
Measure from the entire
sample
Measure the Newly-built apartments
Response
of Housing
Demand
Response
of Housing
Supply
Response
of Housing
Demand
Response
of Housing
Supply
Pass-
Through
Rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Segment (145-155) -0.015 0.243 -0.172 1.368 0.884
(0.002) (0.041) (0.052) (0.555) (0.001)
Segment (145-160) -0.017 0.291 -0.211 1.794 0.889
(0.002) (0.051) (0.068) (0.769) (0.017)
Segment (140-155) -0.024 0.544 -0.302 2.913 0.902
(0.003) (0.122) (0.098) (1.301) (0.001)
Segment (140-160) -0.025 0.616 -0.365 3.765 0.0907
(0.003) (0.174) (0.113) (1.579) (0.001)
Note: The table presents estimates of responses of the rental housing size demand and
supply using the measure of bunching from the entire sample in models 1 and 2. Models 3
and 4 present the same estimates using the measure of bunching from the market of newly
built properties. Model 5 presents the pass-through rates based on the estimates from
models 3 and 4. Each row shows the results for a different choice of bunching segment.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Summary of Housing Characteristics
Segment
(140,150]
Segment
(150,160]
Mean
difference
P-Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stories in the building 4.79 5.14 0.35 0.145
(1.46)
Properties in each floor 2.11 1.96 -0.15 0.260
(-1.13)
View 0.228 0.253 0.025 0.391
(0.86)
Floor number 2.71 2.79 0.086 0.639
(0.47)
Bedrooms 2.81 2.90 0.092 0.001
(3.47)
Age 12.17 12.25 0.054 0.932
(0.09)
Parking 0.88 0.88 0.006 0.787
(0.27)
Storage 0.87 0.90 0.032 0.156
(1.42)
Balcony 0.54 0.51 -0.033 0.355
(-.092)
Pool, Sauna, or Jacuzzi 0.1 0.14 0.032 0.141
(1.47)
Yard 0.235 0.277 0.043 0.156
(1.42)
Elevator 0.547 0.61 0.068 0.047
(1.99)
Kitchen Materials
Metal, Half-Wooden, High Gloss 0.11 0.08 -0.037 0.082
(-1.74)
MDF 0.80 0.85 0.047 0.078
(1.76)
High-end 0.081 -0.071 -0.01 0.583
(-0.55)
Flooring
Carpet 0.40 0.36 -0.035 0.305
(-1.03)
Ceramic 0.025 0.036 0.011 0.322
(0.99)
Parquet 0.099 0.105 0.005 0.791
(0.27)
High-end stone 0.422 0.451 0.029 0.389
(0.86)
Building Facade Materials
Stone 0.77 0.76 -0.014 0.627
(-0.49)
Roman design 0.038 0.046 0.008 0.547
(0.60)
Bricks 0.076 0.092 0.017 0.384
(0.87)
Cement 0.036 0.029 -0.005 0.68
(-0.41)
Granite 0.031 0.034 0.003 0.792
(0.26)
Kenitex 0.025 0.019 -0.006 0.517
(-0.65)
Travertine - Composite 0.014 0.012 -0.002 0.796
(-0.26)
Observations 552 323
Note: Parking, storage, balcony, pool, sauna or jacuzzi, yard, and elevator are indicator
variables that take the value of one if the unit has the corresponding characteristic and
zero otherwise. The variables under the panels of kitchen materials, flooring and building
facade materials are also indicators variables that take the value of one if the unit has
the corresponding characteristic. DMF under kitchen materials is an abbreviation for
Medium-Density Fiberboard used in kitchens. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Figure 3.1: Average Annual Tax
Note: This figure shows the average annual tax liabilities by property size for the entire
sample. The vertical dashed line shows the point where taxation begins. Owners of rental
properties with a total combined size over 150 m2 are exposed to the rental income tax.
The vertical dashed line itself is in the tax-zero side of the kink. Rent values are deflated
to reflect 2015 prices using the Statistical Centre of Iran Housing Price Index. The IRR
to USD exchange rate was between 15,000 to 39,000 during the years 2012 - 2014.
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Figure 3.2: Spatial Distribution of Observations
(a) Rental Market
(b) Owner-occupant Market
Note: Panel 3.2a shows the number of rental observations by districts for time period
March 2012 – September 2014. Panel 3.2b shows the number of purchasing observations
in each district for the same time period. Labels in 3.2a and 3.2b are in thousands.
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Figure 3.3: Bunching at the Size Kink
Note: This figure illustrates the impact of a size kink on owners’ profits and their decisions
on their properties’ size. Red curved lines show the production functions. Black solid lines
show the Iso-profit curves in the absence of the tax. Blue dashed lines show the Iso-profit
curves in the presence of the size-kink. Owner HA is the marginal bunching individual
who would choose a property with size s∗ + ∆s in the absence of size-threshold. In the
presence of the size kink, she is indifferent between sI and s∗. Individual LA, who is not
affected by the size kink, chooses a property with size s∗ both in the absence and presence
of the size kink.
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Figure 3.4: Renters’ Budget Set Diagram
Note: This figure illustrates the impact of a size kink on renters’ budget sets and their
properties choices. Dashed curved line shows renter’s L indifference curve. Solid curved
lines show renter’s H indifference curves.
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Figure 3.5: Mean Annual Rent Around the Kink
Note: This figure shows the mean annual real rent and 90% confidence intervals for rental
transactions from March 2012 to September 2014. The vertical dashed line shows the
point where taxation begins. The line is in the zero-tax side. The dashed line on the left
is the linear fit for properties with a size smaller than 140 square meters. The dash-dotted
line on the right of the same figure is the linear fit for properties with a size larger than
160. The solid line in the figure is the linear fit using the full range. The IRR to USD
exchange rate was between 15,000 and 39,000 during the years 2012 to 2014.
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Figure 3.6: Properties Distribution and the Taxation Point
(a) Entire Sample from 2012 - 2014
(b) Newly Built Apartments
Note: The figure displays the histogram of properties’ size (by 5 m2 bins). Panel 3.6a
includes all observations from March 2012 to September 2014 for segment (120m2, 180m2).
Panel 3.6b is reduced to include only newly built apartments. The dashed vertical line
shows the starting point of taxation. The line belongs to the tax-zero side of the kink. The
numbers next to the dashed line are the percentage reduction in the number of apartments
that occurs by moving from the bin (145m2, 150m2] to the bin (150m2, 155m2].
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Figure 3.7: Dynamics of Bunching Behaviors
(a) Q2 2012 – Q2 2013 (b) Q2 2013 – Q2 2014
(c) Q2 2014 – Q3 2014
Note: Histogram of properties’ size for three consecutive years, separately. The dashed
vertical line shows the starting point of taxation. The line belongs to the tax-zero side
of the kink. The numbers next to the dashed line are the percentage reduction in the
number of apartments that occurs by moving from the bin (145m2, 150m2] to the bin
(150m2, 155m2].
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Figure 3.8: Apartments Distribution in the Owning Market
Note: This figure shows the density of newly built and old properties for the owner-
occupant market by 5 m2 bins. The sample of newly built apartments is reduced to
include only observations from 2014. The dashed line displays the polynomial fit of degree
five for newly built apartments. The solid vertical line shows the starting point of taxation.
The line is on the tax-zero side of the kink.
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Figure 3.9: Empirical and Counterfactual Distributions Around the Size
kink
(a) Rental Units – Entire Sample (b) Rental Units – Newly Built
(c) Owner-Occupied Units – Newly Built Properties
Note: The figure illustrates the empirical and counterfactual distributions of apartments in
Tehran for years 2012 to 2014. The counterfactual distribution is estimated for each panel
separately based on equation (3.17), by fitting a fifth-order polynomial to the empirical
distribution and excluding the bunching segment. The vertical line shows the starting
point of taxation. The line is on the tax-zero side of the kink. The excess bunching B
is the difference between the observed and counterfactual densities in the small interval
below the size kink in proportion to the average counterfactual distribution right above
the cutoff.
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Figure 3.10: Apartment Distributions by Property Age
(a) Apartments built at least 5 years before the regulation
(b) Apartments built at least 15 years before the regulation
Note: This figure illustrates the empirical and counterfactual distributions of apartments
in Tehran for years 2012 – 2014. Panel 3.10a includes rental apartments that were built
at least 5 years before the tax regulation. Panel 3.10b presents the same graphs for older
rental apartments by trimming the dataset further to include only apartments that were
built at least 15 years before the regulation. The counterfactual distribution is estimated
for each panel separately based on equation (1.16) by fitting a fifth-order polynomial to
the empirical distribution and excluding the bunching segment. The solid line shows the
starting point of taxation. The line itself is on the tax-zero side of the kink. The excess
bunching B is the difference between the observed and counterfactual densities in the small
interval below the size kink in proportion to the average counterfactual distribution right
above the cutoff.
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Figure 3.11: Apartment Distributions across Different Neighborhoods
(a) High-rent Neighborhoods
(b) Low-rent Neighborhoods
Note: This figure illustrates the empirical and counterfactual distributions of apartments
in Tehran for years 2012 to 2014. Panel 3.11a includes only properties that are located in
postal regions with average rent above the median, and Panel 3.11b includes the rest of
the observations. The counterfactual distribution is estimated for each panel separately
based on equation (1.16) by fitting a fifth-order polynomial to the empirical distribution
and excluding the bunching segment. The solid line shows the starting point of taxation.
The line itself is on the tax-zero side of the kink. The excess bunching B is the difference
between the observed and counterfactual densities in the small interval below the size kink
in proportion to the average counterfactual distribution right above the cutoff.
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APPENDIX A
OTHER SOURCES OF VARIATION IN
GASOLINE PRICES
As previously indicated, part of the variability in gasoline prices across states
arises as a result of spatial tax notches across jurisdictional boundaries. How-
ever, other sources of variation in gasoline prices include differences in local
minimum wages, price gouging laws, the point on the supply change where
states collect gasoline taxes, local wholesale prices, and additional gasoline
regulations. To account for the variation in wages, the values of state and
local minimum wages were collected for every month of the sample period. I
obtained information on state and local regulations from the Minimum Wage
Tracker of the Economic Policy Institute. Then, I determined monthly val-
ues by reviewing these regulations using Lexis Nexis Uni. Figure A.1 shows
a map of the United States with the state and local minimum wages as of
April 2018. Also from Lexis Nexis Uni, I found the list of state with price
gouging laws.1 Finally, I reviewed the regulation to determine the point of
taxation of gasoline in the supply change.2
Another source of variation in the gasoline prices is the differences in local
wholesale prices. The local wholesale gasoline prices depend on several fac-
tors related to the gasoline supply chain. The supply chain has four central
nodes: extraction or importation of crude oil, production of gasoline at the
refinery, blend of gasoline with ethanol at the bulk facilities or terminals,
and distribution to retailers. The price of crude oil and other costs for the
refineries depend on the infrastructure to transport the product. The U.S.
1The states with price gouging laws are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jer-
sey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
2The states that collect the gasoline taxes at the distributor level are Alabama, Col-
orado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine,
Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode,
Island, Utah, Vermont, Oregon.
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Energy Information Administration uses the Petroleum Administration for
Defense Districts (PADD) to assess regional petroleum product supplies.3
Figure A.2 shows a map of the PADDs using the 48 contiguous states and
the District of Columbia.
The U.S. gasoline requirements are the final source of variability in the
gasoline prices. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) operates five
gasoline standards programs to control ground-level ozone commonly known
as smog. The gasoline standards regulated are: Gasoline Sulfur, Mobile
Source Air Toxics (MSAT), which are both regulated at the federal level;
and Reformulated Gasoline (RFG), Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP), and Winter
Oxygenates (WO), which are regulated at state and local levels with fed-
eral oversight by the EPA. The objective of these regulations is to reduce
smog, particulate matter, and the emissions of carbon monoxide and other
hazardous air pollutants.
The EPA sets standards for the sulfur content in gasoline. Sulfur reduces
the effectiveness of emission control technologies in cars. Sulfur also con-
tributes to smog. The EPA gasoline standards on sulfur (Tier 2) decreased
sulfur content by 90 percent from levels that existed before the regulation.
On January 1, 2006, the sulfur content on gasoline produced at most re-
fineries in the United States was as low as 80 parts per million (ppm) on
a per-gallon basis, according to statistics of the American Fuel and Petro-
chemical Manufacturers. The current criteria (Tier 3) reduced the content
of sulfur on gasoline to a maximum of 10ppm and mandated new vehicle
emissions standards. Implementation of the current rule began in 2017.
The MSAT program aims to reduce dangerous air pollutants emitted by
motor vehicles. The regulation started in 2001 (Phase 1) with rules from the
EPA. Beginning on January 1, 2011, (Phase 2) refiners were required to meet
annual average gasoline content limits on benzene, set at 0.62 percent (of
3The regions are as follows: PADD I (the East Coast) includes: Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. PADD II (the Midwest) includes: Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The PADD III (the Gulf Coast)
includes: Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Texas. PADD IV
(the Rocky Mountain region) includes: Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming.
Finally, PADD V (the West) includes: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Ore-
gon, and Washington.
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volume) for all of gasoline produced at the refinery. Additionally, since July
1, 2012, refiners were also required a maximum benzene level of 1.3 percent
(of volume). Phase 2 of the regulation has applied to all refineries since 2016.
The program achieves less geographic variability in gasoline benzene levels
around the country.
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act introduced the RFG program.
Under this program, some counties and cities require a gasoline blend to burn
more cleanly than the conventional fuel. The RFG program is mandatory
in towns with high smog levels, and it is optional elsewhere. On January 1,
2018, the RFG program operated in 17 states and the District of Columbia.
According to the EPA statistics, 30 percent of the gasoline sold in the United
States is reformulated. The RFG regulation operates on a year-round basis
and requires cleaner standards than the conventional gas (see Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 40, Chapter I, Subchapter C, Part 80, numeral 80.41).
Phoenix, Arizona has a waiver from the RFG program because the state
implemented the Cleaner Burning Gasoline (CBG) regulation, which is more
stringent than the federal program’s requirements. Similarly, California has
more rigorous regulations than those set by the federal government.
Figure A.3 shows a map of the gasoline requirements for the RFG, the
RVP, and the WO where the implementation occurs at the state and local
levels. The gasoline blends of RFG vary for each location, but the colors in
the figure indicate the location of the variability in regulation. For example,
the RFG in California is different than the RFG in New Jersey.
Finally, Figure A.4 shows the average retail gasoline prices on a daily fre-
quency for selected states. The missing dates are due to technical difficulties
collecting the price data.4 Regardless of the missing information, a noticeable
variation of gasoline prices across space and time emerges. It is worth noting
the saw-tooth pattern in the gasoline prices in the Midwest. The analysis
of the pricing strategies at the station level is developed in Gonza´lez and
Hurtado (2018). Also notice the variation in the price range, with California
showing the highest prices, and Texas showing the lowest prices.
4An example of a technical difficulty is the change of the design of the web page, or
changes in the policy of allowed requests per second.
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APPENDIX B
OTHER SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table B.1 presents the number of stations per state as well as the number
of retailers per 10,000 residents. Columns (a) to (f) display the percentage
of retailers offering additional services, such as convenience store, pay at the
pump, or cash discounts. The last row of the table shows the corresponding
value for the United States.
Table B.1 shows considerable variability in the number of gasoline retailers
per state. Notably, Texas has the most retailers of any state. Its retailers
represent almost 10 percent of the total number of stations nationwide. Cal-
ifornia, Florida, and Georgia follow Texas in terms of the ranking of states
with the most retailers. The locations with the fewest retailers are: the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, and Alaska. However, the case looks
strikingly different for the number of retailers per 10,000 residents. Vermont,
South Dakota, Mississippi, and Alabama are the states with the most stations
per capita. The fewest retailers per capita are in the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, California, and New York.
Column (a) of Table B.1 presents the percentage of fueling stations offer-
ing also a convenience store or service station. The numbers show that the
gasoline retailers in the United States sell a variety of other everyday prod-
ucts in their convenience stores. Column (b) of the same table presents the
proportion of gas stations offering the service of pay-at-the-pump. Wyoming,
Georgia, California, and New Jersey are the states with the highest percent-
age of retailers providing the service. On the opposite side of the ranking,
in the states of Mississippi, Oregon, Alaska, and Vermont, fewer than 50
percent of the listed retailers offer the pay-at-the-pump service.
Column (c) of Table B.1 shows that more than 70 percent of the reported
gasoline retailers also sell diesel in the states of Wyoming, Utah, and Idaho.
By contrast, fewer than 50 percent of the retailers sell diesel in the District of
Columbia, Vermont, and Rhode Island. Table B.1 column (d) exhibits that
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Arkansas, Oregon, and Louisiana are the states with the smallest proportion
of retailers holding an ATM, whereas, in Georgia, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware more than 50 percent of stations offer the service.
Column (e) of Table B.1 shows great variability in the number of retail-
ers that offer a car wash. More than 15 percent of the fueling stations in
Minnesota, Utah and Nevada offer this service. On the contrary, fewer than
6 percent of the gasoline retailers offer the service in Connecticut, New Jer-
sey and Vermont. Finally, Table B.1 in column (f) shows that some states
have a considerable proportion of gasoline retailers offering cash discounts.
In particular, more than 50 percent of New Jersey’s stations provide this
benefit. Connecticut, California, New York, and Nevada follow the ranking.
By contrast, fewer than 2 percent of gasoline retailers offer such a discount
in West Virginia, Montana, Minnesota, and Iowa.
Panel (a) of Figure B.1 shows the ranking of states by the number of gaso-
line retailers. The horizontal axis exhibits, from left to right, the states with
the highest number of stations. Similarly, panel (b) of the same Figure B.1
presents the ranking of states using the number of retailers per 10,000 resi-
dents. Finally, Figure B.2 shows the same ranking but using the proportion
of retailers offering the additional services listed in columns (a) to (f) of Table
B.1.
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES ON LOCATION
DECISION
The most economic-relevant estimates of the coefficients in the choice model
were presented in Table 1.4 of the main document. However, the magnitudes
and significance of the other estimates shed light on the effects of regulation
and other controls on the probability that a gasoline retailer is located in a
given area. The regulation controls include indicators for the Winter Oxy-
genates Fuels and Reformulated Gasoline programs described in Appendix A.
Other regulation controls include indicators for price-gouging laws and the
point of taxation as described below. The price-gouging laws regulate prices
to prevent retailers from charging exorbitant prices for necessities. These
laws enter into effect in some states during a declared state of emergency.
To define the indicator variables on the regressions, I used the list of states
that have price-gouging laws from findlaw.com. The point of taxation refers
to the tax collection location in the supply chain of gasoline. Kopczuk et al
(2016) has a detailed explanation of the importance of the point of taxation
to reduce tax avoidance. To define the indicator variables, I used the point
of taxation of gasoline from the Motor Fuel Tax Information report from
the Federation of Tax Administrators. Finally, the minimum wage variable
corresponds to the value of the local regulation in April of 2018.
Table C.1 presents all the coefficients of the spatial differencing approach
in equation (1.4) and the conditional logit from equation (1.1). The table
also presents additional specifications exploring nonlinearities on distance to
the border. Table C.1 presents the estimates for the logit model, and also
includes the probit and linear probability models to show the robustness
of the results. The results in Table C.1 show the marginal effects at the
mean of the logit and probit models. All the estimations include border
pair fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 under the logit column in the table show
the marginal effects at the mean without and with regulatory controls that
change across borders. Notably, the signs and magnitudes of the probit
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and linear estimates, models 3 to 6, are similar to those of the logit model
estimates. Also, higher taxes reduce the probability that a gasoline retailer
is located in a given area near a state border. Moreover, the distance to the
border and the interaction between being on the low-tax side, the distance
to the border and the tax differential are statistically indistinguishable from
zero.
Table C.1 also presents models exploring nonlinearities of distance to the
border on the probability that a gasoline retailer is located in a given area,
models 9 to 12. It is worth noting that the introduction of nonlinearities on
distance to the border reduces the estimates of the effect of crossing to the
low-tax side of the border, although the effect remains statistically signifi-
cant. Moreover, the maximum probability of finding a gasoline retailer on
the high-tax side can be computed as d∗ = α/2η, where α is the coefficient
for distance to the border and η is the coefficient of square distance to the
border. Replacing the coefficients in models 9 to 11, the maximum prob-
ability on the high-tax side happens 15 to 20 miles away from the border.
However, the quadratic specifications seem to misrepresent the probabilities
for locations that are far away from the border. Further research is needed
to better understand the location decisions of the retailers away from the
border.
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APPENDIX D
OTHER ESTIMATES OF PASS-THROUGH
D.1 Pass-Through of Regulation to Prices
The pass-through of regulation to prices has gain a renewed interest in the
environmental literature due to the recent work of Fullerton and Muehlegger
(2018). The literature on public economics has developed the analysis of the
tax incidence, but other non-tax regulations are also of importance. Table
D.1 presents the estimates of the coefficients in equation (1.6) using OLS.
The coefficients of tax, distance to the border, population, retailers and roads
are those presented in the main text. The first pattern to notice is the
variability of the gasoline prices by PADD. The Gulf Coast tends to have
the smallest average price per gallon whereas the West Coast has the highest
gasoline prices. It is also very interesting to note that one dollar increase
in the minimum wage passes-through gasoline prices in about 3 cents, but
this relationship is only 2.3 cents in inland stations whereas it goes to almost
4 cents on the border. Finally, the point of taxation and the Reformulated
Gasoline program increase the gasoline prices.
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the pass-through of
many regulations to prices from the high- and low-tax sides of the border.
The differentiated pass-through of regulation and other characteristics de-
pending on the side of the border can inform of the distortionary effects of
administrative jurisdictions. Table D.2 presents the average pass-through of
regulation and other controls near state borders. The dependent variable is
the retailers’ idiosyncratic prices in cents per gallon. The regressions include
explanatory variables for gasoline regulation, PADD, and other characteris-
tics. Model 3i in Table D.2 presents selected interaction coefficients using
the full sample. The coefficients show that the Reformulated Gasoline pro-
gram increases the price of gasoline in about 4 cents regardless of the size
142
of the gasoline taxes. Also, from Model 3i in Table D.2, the point of taxa-
tion does not have a significant average effect on the price of gasoline. The
pass-through of the minimum wage seems to be balanced, but more popula-
tion seems to have a substantial impact on the price of gasoline only for the
part of the state with low gasoline tax compared to the neighboring jurisdic-
tion. Importantly, from Model 3i in Table D.2, more competitors reduce the
average price of gasoline.
The results show some substantial differences when looking at the same
regression but using the subsample of retailers within 15 miles of the bor-
der. Model 6i in Table D.2 shows selected interaction coefficients using the
restricted subsample. The coefficients show that the Reformulated Gasoline
program increases in almost 7 cents the price of gasoline only on the low-tax
side of the border whereas the high-tax side increases the price by an average
of 4 cents. Also, from Model 6i in Table D.2, the point of taxation generates
a significant increase in the price of gasoline only on the low-tax side of the
border. Again, the pass-through of the minimum wage seems to be balanced,
but more population increases the price of gasoline only on the low-tax side
of the border. Perhaps the most interesting result in the appendix, more
competition reduces the average price of gasoline only on the low-tax side.
This result seems to be relevant for future research.
D.2 Pass-Through near Borders
Table D.3 presents the estimates of equation (1.6) for the interaction of tax,
distance to the border, and high- or low-tax side. The first column of the
table, Model 1, presents the OLS estimates of the selected distances. The
second column of the table presents the estimates of pass-through of taxes to
prices using equation (1.8). The negative intervals represent distance to the
border form a location on the low-tax side whereas positive intervals cover
locations on the high-tax side of the border. I use the absolute value of the
midpoint of the interval to compute the estimates of in column 2 of Table
D.3. For example, the pass-through for the interval (-20,-15] corresponds to
1.39 = 0.92 + 0.027 ∗ 17.25. The standard errors come from the appropriate
linear combination of the variance-covariance matrix. The point estimates of
the pass-through on the low-tax side are statistically indistinguishable from
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one except in the (-20,-15] interval. On the high-tax side, the pass-through
of taxes to prices is smaller than one within 15 miles of border.
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Tables and Figures of Appendices A to D
Table B.1: Additional Descriptive Statistics
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
State
Gasoline
Stations
Stations per
Capita
Conv.
Store
Pay at
Pump
Has
Diesel
ATM
Car
Wash
Cash
Disc.
AL 3,667 7.5 78.7 57.2 51.7 34.4 10.5 2.7
AR 1,897 6.3 77.2 60.8 62.4 22.4 12.4 4.3
AZ 2,029 2.9 86.8 75.5 64.6 40.4 13.7 10.9
CA 9,493 2.4 91.8 84.3 58.4 43.9 18.5 36.7
CO 2,037 3.7 79.8 67.6 72.8 34.1 21.9 2.3
CT 1,438 4.0 77.5 65.4 49.5 30.5 6.1 42.6
DC 114 1.7 81.6 72.8 37.7 37.7 7.9 26.3
DE 307 3.2 91.2 81.4 63.8 50.5 11.7 5.5
FL 7,501 3.6 88.5 73.5 60.9 42.6 15.0 14.4
GA 6,378 6.2 92.8 84.9 60.4 77.3 8.0 13.8
IA 2,083 6.6 79.3 68.7 54.7 34.6 8.6 1.3
ID 834 5.0 77.9 69.7 77.3 32.6 11.4 5.4
IL 4,429 3.5 87.9 82.0 58.5 49.6 17.2 6.2
IN 3,194 4.8 83.2 71.3 60.9 40.7 10.5 4.4
KS 1,663 5.7 73.7 64.3 63.1 29.4 11.3 3.6
KY 2,459 5.5 73.5 57.3 63.3 28.0 7.4 2.4
LA 2,853 6.1 71.2 53.5 58.3 22.7 7.6 3.8
MA 2,443 3.6 82.6 67.9 45.9 32.3 7.1 18.7
MD 1,913 3.2 82.5 76.4 62.5 44.1 14.7 18.9
ME 953 7.2 91.6 54.9 56.5 35.7 6.2 5.4
MI 4,446 4.5 83.7 68.9 64.1 37.4 9.0 27.7
MN 2,614 4.7 85.5 68.8 67.2 45.1 26.7 1.2
MO 3,229 5.3 82.3 72.7 63.1 28.3 12.9 3.6
MS 2,247 7.5 76.9 46.6 53.6 27.1 11.3 2.1
MT 642 6.2 72.0 61.5 72.4 36.3 7.8 0.9
NC 5,672 5.6 91.1 60.8 61.8 46.6 12.8 3.6
ND 560 7.4 76.2 59.8 72.9 27.1 17.9 1.4
NE 1,212 6.4 73.8 53.3 58.2 33.1 15.0 2.2
NH 741 5.6 86.6 64.4 56.1 36.2 10.0 5.5
NJ 2,997 3.4 72.7 84.0 55.0 27.9 4.9 55.0
NM 1,025 4.9 79.9 70.9 68.0 24.6 10.3 2.8
NV 941 3.2 90.0 80.3 65.6 58.7 22.6 31.0
NY 5,496 2.8 84.6 73.8 50.3 38.1 6.6 33.4
OH 4,735 4.1 84.2 76.7 59.3 47.0 10.0 5.3
OK 2,522 6.4 74.0 52.4 60.1 29.6 7.7 2.1
OR 1,185 2.9 71.1 49.2 68.1 23.2 9.3 25.9
PA 4,627 3.6 86.4 77.1 52.6 56.1 8.0 6.7
RI 396 3.7 88.9 67.2 44.2 33.3 8.1 15.9
SC 3,089 6.2 86.8 68.9 57.3 42.1 8.7 21.7
SD 702 8.1 81.8 59.5 63.8 26.1 12.3 9.3
TN 4,026 6.1 76.7 62.1 54.3 27.7 9.2 2.6
TX 13,727 4.9 77.9 67.4 69.3 36.9 11.0 9.4
UT 1,095 3.6 86.2 78.4 79.5 29.8 23.7 3.6
VA 3,938 4.7 90.2 79.0 65.7 45.5 11.2 6.6
VT 557 8.9 87.8 51.2 42.5 39.0 3.2 1.8
WA 2,584 3.5 82.1 64.4 68.3 49.2 12.5 28.7
WI 3,029 5.2 86.2 72.2 62.3 47.0 20.5 3.6
WV 1,070 5.8 79.7 61.0 61.8 40.6 7.2 0.6
WY 425 7.3 86.4 86.1 85.2 45.4 8.0 9.6
USA 137,214 4.3 83.3 70.2 60.7 40.5 11.8 13.1
Note: The table reports the number of gasoline stations per state. The column of stations per capita
exhibits the number of gasoline retailers per 10,000 residents. Columns (a) to (f) show the percentage of
petrol retailers offering the particular service on the header of the table. Column (a) refers to convenience
store or service stations. Column (f) refers to cash discounts. The last row of the table presents the
number of gasoline retailers and the percentage offering corresponding services for the US
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Table C.1: Location Decision of Gasoline Retailers Including All Coefficients
Dependent Variable: Indicator of a Retailer on a Square of the Grid
Logit Probit Linear Conditional Logit Nonlinearities on Distance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Low-Tax .0059∗∗ .0069∗∗∗ .0073∗∗∗ .0091∗∗∗ .0093∗∗∗ .0110∗∗∗ .2178∗∗∗ .2889∗∗∗ .0037∗ .0028 .0041∗ .2125∗∗∗
(.0019) (.0019) (.0021) (.0022) (.0023) (.0024) (.0124) (.0128) (.0018) (.0016) (.0018) (.0107)
∆Tax/10¢ −.2173∗ −.2189∗ −.2636∗ −.2644∗ −.4496∗∗ −.4512∗∗ .5718 3.6794∗∗∗ −.2540∗ −.2100∗ −.4391∗∗ 3.9622∗∗∗
(.0968) (.0968) (.1172) (.1172) (.1566) (.1566) (.7382) (.7514) (.1168) (.0964) (.1565) (.7517)
Dist. to Border/50mi −.0014 −.0017 −.0007 −.0011 −.0018 −.0022∗ .0653∗∗∗ .0531∗∗∗ 3.0553∗∗∗ 1.8595∗ 2.5122∗∗ 66.5055∗∗∗
(.0009) (.0009) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0056) (.0057) (.8875) (.8599) (.8078) (4.9419)
Low-Tax × ∆Tax/10¢ −.0010 −.0008 −.0020 −.0022 −.0032 −.0036 .0450∗∗∗ −.0367∗∗ .0001 −.0009 −.0009 −.0307∗∗
(.0019) (.0019) (.0023) (.0023) (.0028) (.0028) (.0123) (.0126) (.0020) (.0018) (.0023) (.0104)
Low-Tax × Dist. to Border/50mi −.0048∗∗∗ −.0045∗∗∗ −.0061∗∗∗ −.0057∗∗∗ −.0067∗∗∗ −.0062∗∗∗ −.1027∗∗∗ −.0990∗∗∗ −4.6335∗∗∗ −3.4566∗∗∗ −5.9135∗∗∗ −58.9928∗∗∗
(.0012) (.0012) (.0013) (.0013) (.0014) (.0014) (.0073) (.0073) (1.1062) (1.0424) (1.0789) (6.1699)
∆Tax/10¢ × Dist. to Border/50mi .0094∗∗∗ .0096∗∗∗ .0106∗∗∗ .0110∗∗∗ .0129∗∗∗ .0133∗∗∗ .2168∗∗∗ .1973∗∗∗ .8818 2.1306 −.1114 100.5802∗∗∗
(.0011) (.0011) (.0013) (.0013) (.0014) (.0014) (.0068) (.0069) (1.3705) (1.3056) (1.3048) (7.2095)
Low-Tax × Dist. to Border/50mi × ∆Tax/10¢ −.0039∗ −.0040∗∗ −.0039∗ −.0039∗ −.0042∗ −.0044∗ −.1912∗∗∗ −.1479∗∗∗ 16.2882∗∗∗ 10.1294∗∗∗ 17.5260∗∗∗ 357.2722∗∗∗
(.0015) (.0015) (.0017) (.0017) (.0020) (.0020) (.0093) (.0094) (2.8249) (2.5452) (3.1514) (13.4846)
Square of Dist. to Border/(50mi)2 −4.7340∗∗∗ −5.6786∗∗∗ −3.2805∗∗∗ −30.7190∗∗∗
(.8646) (.8190) (.8041) (4.9111)
Low-Tax × Square of Dist. to Border/(50mi)2 −1.7481 −.0775 −3.8927∗∗∗ −29.7247∗∗∗
(1.0251) (.9606) (.9870) (5.8082)
∆Tax/10¢ × Square of Dist. to Border/(50mi)2 −3.7468∗∗ −.8417 −8.4838∗∗∗ −29.2118∗∗∗
(1.3440) (1.2370) (1.3376) (7.2457)
Low-Tax × Square of Dist. to Border/(50mi)2 × ∆Tax/10¢ 20.8573∗∗∗ 13.3939∗∗∗ 25.7229∗∗∗ 451.7644∗∗∗
(2.4908) (2.2016) (2.8032) (12.7468)
Oxygenated Fuels −.0005 −.0010 −.0025 −.0971∗∗∗ −.0015 −.0012 −.0029 −.0847∗∗∗
(.0026) (.0029) (.0030) (.0212) (.0028) (.0026) (.0030) (.0212)
Price-Gouging Laws .0082∗∗∗ .0111∗∗∗ .0085∗∗∗ .0824∗∗∗ .0111∗∗∗ .0080∗∗∗ .0090∗∗∗ .1003∗∗∗
(.0017) (.0019) (.0019) (.0129) (.0019) (.0017) (.0019) (.0130)
Reformulated Gasoline .0713∗∗∗ .0725∗∗∗
(.0100) (.0101)
Minimum Wage / USD .0732∗∗∗ .0732∗∗∗
(.0040) (.0040)
Point of Taxation −.2313∗∗∗ −.2223∗∗∗
(.0093) (.0093)
Area of Square on Grid / mi2 .1506∗∗∗ .1510∗∗∗ .1456∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0023) (.0024)
Population / 100,000 residents .8615∗∗∗ .8462∗∗∗ .8684∗∗∗
(.0068) (.0069) (.0070)
Number of Highways .1279∗∗∗ .1286∗∗∗ .1289∗∗∗
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Nonlinearities model estimation? Logit Probit Linear Cond. Logit
Adj. R2 .0977 .0978 .0991
Pseudo R2 .1710 .1712 .1712 .1714 .6474 .6492 .1737 .1735 .6518
Num. obs. 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076 331,076
Note:The table presents all the coefficients of the spatial differencing approach in equation (1.4) and the conditional logit from equation (1.1). The table reports the marginal
effects at the mean for the logit and probit estimations, models 1 to 4. The coefficients of the linear model come from an OLS estimation. The coefficients of the logit, probit,
and linear models are for the spatial differencing approach of equation (1.4). The estimates of the conditional logit models are for equation (1.1) without retailer specific
characteristics. All the regressions include border pair fixed effects. The squares of the grid are the unit of analysis. The table also presents models exploring nonlinearities
of distance to the border on the probability of finding a gasoline retailer, models 9 to 12. The standard errors are presented in parentheses. The distance to the border is
measured in 50-mile units. The tax difference, ∆τ , is in 10 cent units. The symbols *,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
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Table D.1: Average Pass-Through of Regulation to Consumer Prices
Dependent Variable: Retailers’ Idiosyncratic Prices in cents
States All Stations Inner Land Border
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Tax in cents: β0 1.00
∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ .99∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ .91∗∗∗ .89∗∗∗
(.09) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Distance to Border in mi. .00 .00 .01 −.07 −.07
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.08) (.08)
Population per 10,000 res. .54∗∗ .88∗∗ .30
(.18) (.34) (.17)
Retailers per mi.2 −1.93∗∗∗ −2.82∗∗∗ −.77
(.53) (.50) (.64)
Roads per mi.2 .72∗ 1.11∗∗ .10
(.31) (.39) (.20)
Oxygenated Fuels −1.68 −1.73 −1.55 .05 −5.04∗∗ −4.88∗∗
(3.11) (1.68) (1.65) (2.10) (1.76) (1.69)
California 27.06∗∗∗ 25.37∗∗∗ 24.91∗∗∗ 26.30∗∗∗ 59.65∗∗∗ 60.49∗∗∗
(5.38) (2.25) (2.24) (2.61) (3.33) (3.13)
Arizona −30.06∗∗∗ −27.42∗∗∗ −27.63∗∗∗ −25.44∗∗∗ −25.94∗∗∗ −25.79∗∗∗
(6.32) (2.23) (2.20) (2.80) (3.73) (3.48)
Reformulated Gasoline 4.22∗ 3.56∗∗∗ 3.29∗∗ 2.17 6.07∗∗∗ 5.76∗∗∗
(1.59) (1.00) (1.00) (1.19) (.96) (.96)
Point of Taxation 3.36∗ 3.94∗∗ 3.70∗∗ 3.07 4.84∗∗∗ 4.99∗∗∗
(1.52) (1.29) (1.31) (1.57) (1.15) (1.12)
Price-Gouging Laws −.56 1.32 1.23 1.18 1.66 1.44
(1.85) (1.72) (1.71) (1.99) (1.97) (1.83)
Minimum Wage in USD 2.70∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗ 3.96∗∗∗ 3.75∗∗∗
(.58) (.55) (.50) (.57) (.59) (.55)
East Coast −39.69∗∗∗ 164.24∗∗∗ 166.46∗∗∗ 168.33∗∗∗ 158.53∗∗∗ 161.13∗∗∗
(5.84) (5.40) (5.09) (5.65) (5.79) (5.71)
Midwest −39.09∗∗∗ 164.71∗∗∗ 167.09∗∗∗ 169.40∗∗∗ 159.54∗∗∗ 162.16∗∗∗
(5.41) (4.84) (4.52) (5.19) (5.39) (5.35)
Gulf Coast −42.84∗∗∗ 161.24∗∗∗ 163.90∗∗∗ 167.14∗∗∗ 154.92∗∗∗ 157.54∗∗∗
(5.38) (4.93) (4.59) (5.00) (5.55) (5.53)
Rocky Mountain −30.91∗∗∗ 172.92∗∗∗ 175.38∗∗∗ 177.39∗∗∗ 178.69∗∗∗ 181.22∗∗∗
(5.81) (6.11) (5.74) (6.08) (4.92) (4.91)
West Coast −9.03 193.81∗∗∗ 196.57∗∗∗ 197.25∗∗∗ 192.66∗∗∗ 195.51∗∗∗
(7.29) (5.82) (5.49) (6.41) (7.38) (7.23)
Adj. R2 .89 .74 .75 .78 .54 .55
Num. obs. 49 126,981 126,934 96,727 30,218 30,207
RMSE 29.56 14.17 14.06 14.14 13.12 13.03
Note: The dependent variable is the idiosyncratic price in cents per gallon. The unit of analysis is the
gasoline retailer, except for Model 1, where the analysis is at the state level. All estimations use the OLS
method. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** denote
significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively. East Coast, Midwest, Gulf Coast, Rocky
Mountain and West Coast are indicator variables for the five PADDs. For the column States, the analysis
uses the price fixed effects of the 49 contiguous states. For the column All Stations, the analysis uses the
information from all gasoline retailers. The column Inner Land uses the information of retailers more than
15 miles away from the border. The column Border presents the results for the subsample of retailers
within 15 miles of the border. The RMSE row presents the Root Mean Square Error. In models 5 and 6,
with a significance smaller than 5%, the tax coefficient is different from 100 percent.
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Table D.2: Average Pass-Through of Regulation and Other Controls at the
Border
Dependent Variable: Retailers’
Idiosyncratic Prices in cents
All Stations Border
Model 3i Model 6i
Low × Tax 1.01∗∗∗ .82∗∗∗
(.11) (.12)
High × Tax .95∗∗∗ .98∗∗∗
(.07) (.07)
Low × Reformulated Gasoline 4.27∗∗ 6.79∗∗∗
(1.32) (1.40)
High × Reformulated Gasoline 3.75∗∗ 3.55∗
(1.30) (1.72)
Low × Point of Taxation 3.03 5.25∗∗
(1.73) (1.62)
High × Point of Taxation 2.55 2.77
(1.60) (1.44)
Low × Minimum Wage in USD 3.02∗∗∗ 3.65∗∗∗
(.81) (.79)
High × Minimum Wage in USD 2.42∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗
(.53) (.68)
Low × Population per 10,000 res. 1.38∗ 1.87∗∗
(.59) (.68)
High × Population per 10,000 res. .43∗∗∗ .18
(.08) (.11)
Low × Retailers per mi.2 −2.71∗∗∗ −3.56∗∗∗
(.73) (.95)
High × Retailers per mi.2 −2.32∗∗∗ −1.11
(.63) (.60)
Low × Roads per mi.2 .33 .48
(.22) (.41)
High × Roads per mi.2 .96∗ .22
(.39) (.17)
All Other Controls yes yes
Share of Low [%] 44 53
Share of High [%] 56 47
Sample All Border
Adj. R2 .76 .58
Num. obs. 126,934 30,207
RMSE 13.84 12.60
Note: The dependent variable is the idiosyncratic prices in cents per gallon. The unit of analysis is the
gasoline retailer. All estimations use the OLS method. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in
parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
All other controls indicates that the regression includes explanatory variables for gasoline regulation,
PADD, and other characteristics. If Sample reports All, the method uses the information from all gasoline
retailers. If Sample shows Border, the regression uses the subsample of retailers within fifteen miles of the
border. The RMSE row presents the Root Mean Square Error.
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Table D.3: Pass-Through Near State Borders
Dependent Variable: Retailers’
Idiosyncratic Prices in cents
Model 1 Tax Pass-Through
(-30,-25] 1.04∗∗∗
(.20)
(-30,-25] x Tax 1.04∗∗∗
(.23)
(-30,-25] x Tax x dist .01
(.01)
(-25,-20] 1.05∗∗∗
(.15)
(-25,-20] x Tax 1.05∗∗∗
(.21)
(-25,-20] x Tax x dist .01
(.01)
(-20,-15] 1.39∗∗∗
(.18)
(-20,-15] x Tax .92∗∗∗
(.16)
(-20,-15] x Tax x dist .03∗
(.01)
(-15,-10] 1.23∗∗∗
(.14)
(-15,-10] x Tax .83∗∗∗
(.16)
(-15,-10] x Tax x dist .03∗∗
(.01)
(-10,-5] .88∗∗∗
(.19)
(-10,-5] x Tax .61∗∗∗
(.14)
(-10,-5] x Tax x dist .04∗
(.02)
(-5,0] .99∗∗∗
(.17)
(-5,0] x Tax .79∗∗∗
(.16)
(-5,0] x Tax x dist .08∗∗∗
(.03)
Adj. R2 .78
Num. obs. 126,934
RMSE 13.33
The table continues on next page
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(cont.) Pass-Through Near State Borders
Dependent Variable: Retailers’
Idiosyncratic Prices in cents
Model 1 Tax Pass-Through
(0,5] .80∗∗∗
(.08)
(0,5] x Tax 1.02∗∗∗
(.09)
(0,5] x Tax x dist −.09∗∗
(.03)
(5,10] .74∗∗∗
(.10)
(5,10] x Tax 1.09∗∗∗
(.11)
(5,10] x Tax x dist −.05∗
(.02)
(10,15] .78∗∗∗
(.07)
(10,15] x Tax 1.11∗∗∗
(.06)
(10,15] x Tax x dist −.03∗∗∗
(.01)
(15,20] 1.03∗∗∗
(.08)
(15,20] x Tax 1.03∗∗∗
(.08)
(15,20] x Tax x dist −.01
(.01)
(20,25] .99∗∗∗
(.11)
(20,25] x Tax .99∗∗∗
(.12)
(20,25] x Tax x dist −.01
(.01)
(25,30] 1.07∗∗∗
(.08)
(25,30] x Tax 1.07∗∗∗
(.20)
(25,30] x Tax x dist −.00
(.01)
Adj. R2 .78
Num. obs. 126,934
RMSE 13.33
Note: The dependent variable is the idiosyncratic prices in cents per gallon. The unit of analysis is the
gasoline retailer. The estimation of Model 1 uses the OLS method. Standard errors clustered at the state
level are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels,
respectively. All other controls such as explanatory variables for gasoline regulation, PADD, and other
characteristics included but not reported. The RMSE row presents the Root Mean Square Error
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Figure A.1: Minimum Wage in April 2018
Note: The figure shows a map of the United States with the state and local minimum wages as of April
2018. The values of the state and local minimum wages were collected for every month of the sample
period. Data were collected on state and local regulations from the Minimum Wage Tracker of the
Economic Policy Institute. Then, a further determination was performed by reviewing these regulations
using Lexis Nexis Uni.
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Figure A.2: Petroleum Administration for Defense District (PADD)
Note: The figure shows a map of the PADDs using the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration uses the PADDs to assess regional petroleum product sup-
plies. These regions were defined during World War II to ration gasoline, although the regulation was
abolished in 1946. The PADD I, — East Coast— is composed by Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. The PADD
II —Midwest — is composed by Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The PADD III —
Gulf Coast — includes Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Texas. The PADD
IV — Rocky Mountain — has Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. Finally, the PADD V —
West Coast — includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
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Figure A.3: The Environmental Protection Agency Gasoline Standards
Note: The figure shows a map of the gasoline requirements for the RFG, the RVP, and the WO where the
implementation occurs at the state and local levels. The gasoline blends of RFG vary for each location,
but the colors in the figure indicate the location of the variability in regulation. For example, the RFG in
California is different than the RFG in New Jersey.
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Figure A.4: Gasoline Prices for Selected States
(a) Gas Prices for Selected States (b) Gas Prices Cycle in Some States of the Midwest
Note: The figure shows the average retail gasoline prices on a daily frequency for selected states. The missing dates are due to technical difficulties collecting the price data.
Examples of the technical difficulties include changes of the design of the web pages, or changes in the policy of allowed request per second. The analysis of the pricing
strategies at the station level is developed in Gonzalez and Hurtado (2018). Also notice the variation in the price range, with California showing the highest prices and Texas
showing the lowest prices.
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Figure B.1: Number of Gasoline Retailers
(a) Total Number of Gasoline Retailers
(b) Gasoline Retailers Per Capita
Note: The figure shows the ranking of states by the number of gasoline retailers. The horizontal axis
exhibits, from left to right, the states with the highest number of stations. Panel (a) shows the total
number of gasoline retailers. Panel (b) presents the ranking of states using the number of retailers per
ten thousand residents.
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Figure B.2: Proportion of Gasoline Retailers by Additional Services
(a) Retailers Offering Convenience Store (b) Retailer Offering the Service of Pay-at-the-Pump
(c) Retailers Also Selling Diesel (d) Retailers Holding an ATM
(e) Retailers Offering Cash Discounts (f) Retailers Offering Cash Discounts
Note: The figure shows the ranking of states by the proportion of gasoline retailers offering additional
services. The horizontal axis exhibits, from left to right, the states with the highest proportion of retailers
offering the additional services listed in columns (a) to (f) of Table B.1. This is just a graphical visualization
that shows the variability of additional services provided by the gasoline retailers.
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APPENDIX F
ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES OF
CHAPTER 2
Table F.1: Cycling, Location Characteristics, and Neighbors’ Behavior
All w/neighbors
Location characteristics
Income (log) 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Population density -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
No. of neighboring stations 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
No. of neighbors (sq) -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Neighbors’ behavior
Avg. neighbors’ ind. 0.248∗∗∗
(0.009)
Closest neighbor’s ind. 0.136∗∗∗
(0.007)
Dist. closest neigh. (100m) 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Closest neighbor’s ind.=1 × Dist. closest neigh. (100m) -0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
R2 0.3821 0.4301
Observations 58,497 50,764
Station char. Yes Yes
City-brand FE Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: cycling indicator (linear probability model); the observation level is a gas
station. Results in the first column include all the stations in our sample; second column includes gas
stations with at least one neighboring station. Neighbors are defined as gas stations within a 1-mile radius.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table F.2: Cycling, Location Characteristics, and Neighbors’ Behavior:
Restricted Sample
All w/neighbors
Location characteristics
Income (log) 0.010∗∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Population density -0.001∗∗ -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000)
No. of neighboring stations 0.013∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
No. of neighbors (sq) -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Neighbors’ behavior
Avg. neighbors’ ind. 0.234∗∗∗
(0.009)
Closest neighbor’s ind. 0.124∗∗∗
(0.008)
Dist. closest neigh. (100m) 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Closest neighbor’s ind.=1 × Dist. closest neigh. (100m) -0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
R2 0.3849 0.4334
Observations 41,033 35,787
Station char. Yes Yes
City-brand FE Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: cycling indicator (linear probability model); the observation level is a gas
station. Results in the first column include all the stations in our restricted sample; second column
includes (restricted sample) gas stations with at least one neighboring station. Neighbors are defined as
gas stations within a 1-mile radius. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table F.3: Cycling Behavior, Brand Size, and Station Characteristics
All brands Small Med-small Med-big Big
Brand size
Med-small 0.085∗∗∗
(0.010)
Med-big 0.151∗∗∗
(0.008)
Big 0.022∗∗∗
(0.007)
Station characteristics
Loyalty discount -0.044∗∗∗ 0.024 -0.017 -0.004 -0.048∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.032) (0.021) (0.009) (0.005)
Cash discount -0.075∗∗∗ 0.001 0.007 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.007)
Convenience store 0.049∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008)
Restaurant -0.029∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.009 -0.002 -0.048∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.026) (0.023) (0.012) (0.007)
Car wash -0.006 -0.030 0.019 0.002 -0.006
(0.005) (0.026) (0.022) (0.012) (0.006)
Service station -0.077∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.158∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.024) (0.029) (0.021) (0.008)
Truck stop 0.014 -0.027 -0.025 0.036∗ 0.005
(0.010) (0.038) (0.038) (0.019) (0.015)
R2 0.2370 0.2077 0.2564 0.2249 0.2533
Observations 58,497 4,354 4,172 12,489 37,482
Location char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: cycling indicator (linear probability model); the observation level is a gas
station. Brand sizes are defined as follows: small, up to 10 gas stations; med-small, more than 10 and
less than 100; med-large, more than 100 and less than 1000; big, more than 1000. Standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table F.4: Cycling Behavior, Brand Size, and Station Characteristics:
Restricted Sample
All brands Small Med-small Med-big Big
Brand size
Med-small 0.091∗∗∗
(0.010)
Med-big 0.139∗∗∗
(0.008)
Big 0.022∗∗∗
(0.008)
Station characteristics
Loyalty discount -0.046∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.018 -0.004 -0.051∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.036) (0.022) (0.007) (0.006)
Cash discount -0.081∗∗∗ 0.045 0.036 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.028) (0.026) (0.015) (0.008)
Convenience store 0.029∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.022) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009)
Restaurant -0.029∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.014 -0.001 -0.047∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.029) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008)
Car wash -0.006 -0.036 0.008 0.001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.030) (0.022) (0.010) (0.007)
Service station -0.104∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.028) (0.029) (0.019) (0.010)
Truck stop 0.013 -0.010 -0.032 0.025 0.002
(0.011) (0.044) (0.038) (0.017) (0.016)
R2 0.2109 0.2315 0.2562 0.1948 0.2293
Observations 41,033 2,912 2,928 9,557 25,636
Location char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: cycling indicator (linear probability model); the observation level is a gas
station. Brand sizes are defined as follows: small, up to 10 gas stations; med-small, more than 10 and
less than 100; med-large, more than 100 and less than 1000; big, more than 1000. Standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table F.5: The Effect of Asymmetric Price Cycles on Gas Price Levels:
Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycling indicator -11.986∗∗∗ -8.112∗∗∗ -6.157∗∗∗ -5.498∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Cycling intensity -0.282∗∗∗
(0.003)
Varying cycling ind. -0.728∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Varying cycling int. -0.045∗∗∗
(0.001)
R2 0.2572 0.9423 0.9620 0.9621 0.9873 0.9873
Obs 7,184,024 7,184,024 7,184,024 7,184,024 5,248,969 5,248,969
Y¯ 253.352 253.352 253.352 253.352 252.961 252.961
Date FE Yes
Date-Zip FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Brand FE No No Yes Yes
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day
combination. Cycling indicator is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior; cycle intensity is the
full-sample Cycling Ratio. Varying cycle indicator and intensity are the date-level versions of those two
variables. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table F.6: Cycling Price Strategy Effect on Price Level: Premium and
Midgrade Gasoline
Premium Midgrade
Cycler -3.592∗∗∗ -3.619∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012)
R2 0.9057 0.9271
Obs 7,130,388 6,943,466
Y¯ 309.212 285.096
Date-Zip FE Yes Yes
City-Brand FE Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variables: price of premium and midgrade gasoline, in cents; the observation level is
a station-day combination. Cycler is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior. Standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table F.7: The Effect of Asymmetric Price Cycles on Gas Price Levels:
Four-Month Rolling Window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycling indicator -11.446∗∗∗ -4.910∗∗∗ -3.429∗∗∗ -2.710∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Cycling intensity -0.315∗∗∗
(0.003)
Varying cycling ind. -0.170∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008)
Varying cycling int. -0.021∗∗∗
(0.002)
R2 0.2594 0.9359 0.9599 0.9600 0.9862 0.9862
Obs 10,113,008 10,113,008 10,113,008 10,113,008 7,129,088 7,129,088
Y¯ 256.080 256.080 256.080 256.080 254.100 254.100
Date FE Yes
Date-Zip FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Brand FE No No Yes Yes
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day
combination. Cycling indicator is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior; cycle intensity is the
full-sample Cycling Ratio. Varying cycle indicator and intensity are the date-level versions of those two
variables. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table F.8: The Effect of Asymmetric Price Cycles on Gas Price Levels:
Controlling for Neighbor Strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cycling indicator -8.209∗∗∗ -4.940∗∗∗ -3.418∗∗∗ -2.728∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Cycling intensity -0.302∗∗∗
(0.003)
Varying cycling ind. -0.594∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Varying cycling int. -0.048∗∗∗
(0.001)
R2 0.2777 0.9370 0.9612 0.9613 0.9866 0.9866
Obs 8,863,627 8,863,627 8,863,627 8,863,627 6,217,738 6,217,738
Y¯ 256.366 256.366 256.366 256.366 254.370 254.370
Date FE Yes
Date-Zip FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-Brand FE No No Yes Yes
Station FE No No No No Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: price of regular gasoline, in cents; the observation level is a station-day
combination. Cycling indicator is the full-sample indicator of cycling behavior; cycle intensity is the
full-sample Cycling Ratio. Varying cycle indicator and intensity are the date-level versions of those two
variables. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table F.9: Price Restoration and Changes in Cost for Cycling Stations:
New York Gasoline Futures
Full sample Cycling markets
∆costt > 0 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆costt−1 > 0 0.023
∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆costt−2 > 0 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt > 0=1 0.012
∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt−1 > 0=1 0.032
∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Market trough=1 × ∆costt−2 > 0=1 -0.004
∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.1007 0.1024
Observations 5,820,508 3,313,895
Week-Zip FE Yes Yes
Brand FE Yes Yes
City-dow FE Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: 1(station-level trough); the observation level is a cycling station-day combina-
tion. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
163
Figure F.1: Increasing and Decreasing Stages in Station-Level Price
Dynamics
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(a) Non-cycling station.
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(b) Cycling station.
Note: Dashed lines delimit the dates included in τ+ and τ− for the station-level price dynamic examples
of Figure 2.3.
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Figure F.2: Cycling Ratio and Average Percent Price Increase, Chicago IL:
Restricted Sample
Note: Each Chicago gas station in our sample is represented by a point in these panels, according to their
combination of Cycling Ratio and average percent increase in price (price jump).
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Figure F.4: The Effect of Cycles on Price Level over Time: Restricted
Sample
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Note: The coefficients plotted are the date-cycler fixed effect on price, controlling for zipcode and brand.
Figure F.5: Cycling Ratio Distribution and Switching Pricing Strategies
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(b) Restricted sample.
Note: The market price gap is the coefficient of the market-cycler fixed effect, controlling for date, zipcode,
and brand.
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Figure F.6: Cost Proxies Dynamic Patterns during the Sample Period
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Note: These price dynamics correspond to the average price of cycling stations in each market.
Figure F.7: Price Reporting Activity by Day of the Week
Note: Plotted are the day-of-the-week fixed effects on reporting frequency from the estimation of Table 2.7.
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APPENDIX G
DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS IN
CHAPTER 3
G.1 Derivation of Equation (3.7)
A1+ηh =
s¯
p∗η
(
1 + η
η
)η
=
s¯
p∗η
(
1
δ
)η
(G.1)
Plugging this expressions in equations (3.5) and (3.6), we get:
π0 = p0s−
(
s
Ah
)1+ 1
η
− r
= p0s−
s
1+η
η
A
1+η
η
h
− r
= p0s−
s
1+η
η
s¯
1
η
p∗δ − r
= p0s− δs¯p
∗
( s
s¯
) 1
δ
− r, (G.2)
and
π1 = (1− δ)δ
ηA1+ηh (1− τ)
1+η p1+η1 − r + τsp1 − (1− γ) f
= (1− δ)
s¯
p∗η
(1− τ)1+η p1+η1 − r + τsp1 − (1− γ) f
= (1− δ)s¯p∗
(
(1− τ) p1
p∗
) 1
1−δ
− r + τsp1 − (1− γ) f. (G.3)
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Equating expressions (G.2) and (G.3) we get:
s (p0 − τp1) + (1− γ) f = (1− δ)s¯p
∗
(
(1− τ) p1
p∗
) 1
1−δ
+ δs¯p∗
( s
s¯
) 1
δ
s (p0 − τp1)
s¯p∗
+
(1− γ) f
s¯p∗
= (1− δ)
(
(1− τ) p1
p∗
) 1
1−δ
+ δ
( s
s¯
) 1
δ
Finally, we can return to our original notation to get the relationship be-
tween price elasticity of housing size supply, rent responses, filing costs, and
bunching as:
s
s¯
[
p0 − τp1
p∗
+
(1− γ)f
sp∗
]
=
1
1 + η
(
(1− τ) p1
p∗
)1+η
+
η
1 + η
( s
s¯
) 1+η
η
If p∗ = p0, then
s
s¯
[
1− τ
p1
p0
+
(1− γ)f
sp0
]
=
1
1 + η
(
(1− τ) p1
p0
)1+η
+
η
1 + η
( s
s¯
) 1+η
η
G.2 Derivation of Equation (3.14)
In the absence of the size kink, individual h would choose a property with
size s¯, which implies αh = s¯p
∗ǫ. Replacing αh in equations (3.12) we get
u = y − sp0 −
ǫ
1− ǫ
α
1
ǫ
h s
1− 1
ǫ
= y − sp0 −
ǫ
1− ǫ
s¯
1
ǫ p∗s1−
1
ǫ
= y − sp0 −
ǫ
1− ǫ
p∗s¯
( s
s¯
)1− 1
ǫ
. (G.1)
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Similarly for equation (3.13) we get
u¯ = y − αhp
1−ǫ
1 − γf −
ǫ
1− ǫ
αhp
1−ǫ
1
= y − s¯p∗ǫp1−ǫ1 − γf −
ǫ
1− ǫ
s¯p∗ǫp1−ǫ1
= y − s¯p∗
(
p1
p∗
)1−ǫ
− γf −
ǫ
1− ǫ
s¯p∗
(
p1
p∗
)1−ǫ
= y −
1
1− ǫ
s¯p∗
(
p1
p∗
)1−ǫ
− γf (G.2)
Equating expressions (G.1) and (G.2) we get:
sp0 +
ǫ
1− ǫ
p∗s¯
( s
s¯
)1− 1
ǫ
=
1
1− ǫ
s¯p∗
(
p1
p∗
)1−ǫ
+ γf
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s¯p∗
=
1
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(
p1
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+
ǫ
ǫ− 1
( s
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) ǫ−1
ǫ
which simplifies to:
s
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[
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−
γf
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]
−
1
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(
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−
ǫ
ǫ− 1
( s
s¯
) ǫ−1
ǫ
= 0
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